The legitimising role of judicial dialogue between the United Kingdom courts and the European Court of Human Rights by Davies, Gregory
 
 
 
 
 
The Legitimising Role of Judicial Dialogue between the 
United Kingdom Courts and the European Court of 
Human Rights 
 
 
Gregory James Davies 
 
2017 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy (Law) 
 
 
 
School of Law and Politics, Cardiff University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DECLARATION 
This work has not been submitted in substance for any other degree or award at this or any other 
university or place of learning, nor is being submitted concurrently in candidature for any degree or 
other award. 
Signed …………………………………… (candidate)     Date ………………….…………….……… 
 
STATEMENT 1 
This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of PhD. 
Signed …………………………………… (candidate)     Date ………………….…………….……… 
 
STATEMENT 2 
This thesis is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where otherwise stated, and the 
thesis has not been edited by a third party beyond what is permitted by Cardiff University’s Policy on the 
Use of Third Party Editors by Research Degree Students. Other sources are acknowledged by explicit 
references.  The views expressed are my own. 
Signed …………………………………… (candidate)     Date ………………….…………….……… 
 
STATEMENT 3 
I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available online in the University’s Open Access 
repository and for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside 
organisations. 
Signed …………………………………… (candidate)     Date ………………….…………….……… 
 
STATEMENT 4: PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BAR ON ACCESS 
I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available online in the University’s Open Access 
repository and for inter-library loans after expiry of a bar on access previously approved by the Academic 
Standards & Quality Committee.  
Signed …………………………………… (candidate)     Date ………………….…………….……… 
 
 
 
i 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
The task of producing this thesis was aided by many individuals and 
organisations. I am very grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council 
and the School of Law and Politics at Cardiff University for having given me the 
opportunity to conduct the research. I owe particular thanks to the project 
supervisors, Professor Jiří Přibáň and Professor Philip Fennell, for their academic 
support and for the patience and enthusiasm which they have shown throughout 
the project. I am also indebted to the eight Justices of the UK Supreme Court and 
the four judges of the European Court of Human Rights who generously gave 
their time to be interviewed, and for the courtesy which they showed me during 
my visits to their courts. Thanks are also due to several people who kindly 
offered their time to read and comment on the work at various stages: Dr Rachel 
Cahill-O’Callaghan, Dr Nicolette Priaulx, Emma Borland, Dr Hélène Tyrrell, Dr 
Robert Jones and Dr Ben Yong. I would also like to thank PluriCourts at the 
Faculty of Law at the University of Oslo, Norway, for hosting me on an 
informative research visit, the LSE Law Department, for two enlightening public 
law workshops, and the postgraduate community at the School of Law and 
Politics.  
Finally, I wish to thank my family, friends and Emma Jane for their unwavering 
support during this period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
 
Abstract 
Since the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, discussions have developed concerning a 
judicial ‘dialogue’ taking place between the UK courts and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) over the interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and its 
application to UK law. This thesis contributes to these debates by offering a judicially-informed 
account of the dialogue between these courts based on in-depth interviews conducted with eight 
Justices of the UK Supreme Court and four judges of the European Court of Human Rights. It 
combines these insights with analysis of case law, extra-judicial commentary and contributions 
from political and legal theory to explore the role of judicial dialogue in legitimising the 
judgments of these courts. In this way, the thesis offers a unique methodological approach to a 
highly topical area of constitutional discourse in the UK.  
The thesis argues that dialogue has arisen in response to legitimacy challenges facing these 
courts based on concerns over the extent of the ECtHR’s influence in the UK. Both at the level of 
judgments and through informal meetings, dialogue responds to these challenges through the 
participation of the national courts in the jurisprudential development of ECHR rights, the 
accountability of the ECtHR to domestic judicial concerns, and the ongoing revision and 
refinement of the Convention rights at the supranational level to accommodate for legal and 
constitutional diversity. To this extent, dialogue is part of a wider effort to legitimise the 
Convention system and the courts charged with upholding it by strengthening the role and 
identity of the domestic courts in human rights adjudication, as reflected in the reemphasis on 
subsidiarity and the common law ‘resurgence’.  
However, the thesis also observes that a significant part of the dialogue resides in an increased 
willingness by the UK courts to refuse to apply parts of the ECtHR’s case law, and a tendency by 
the ECtHR to accommodate that refusal. On this basis, it argues that the process also carries the 
risk of delegitimising the ECHR system by promoting a disposition to disobey on the part of 
national authorities across the Council of Europe. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
What is the role of judicial ‘dialogue’ between the United Kingdom courts and the 
European Court of Human Rights in legitimising their respective judgments? 
The European Court of Human Rights takes part in the trans-judicial dialogue by 
providing inspiration for national courts and in turn being inspired by them. The 
longer-term vision must secure the viability of the European Court’s role in the 
system for protecting and promoting human rights across Europe.
1
 
- András Sajó, Judge of the European Court of Human Rights 
1. Overview 
Following the enactment of the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998, the UK courts and the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have sought to engage in a ‘creative’2 and ‘constructive 
dialogue’3 by exchanging views through their judgments and through informal meetings between 
their senior judges. These ‘valuable’4 and ‘laudable’5 interactions have been described by the 
former President of the ECtHR, Dean Spielmann, as ‘a jurisprudential dialogue of the highest 
standard’,6  and have been welcomed by UK and ECtHR judges of past and present.7 The 
                                                          
1
 András Sajó, ‘An all-European Conversation: Promoting a Common Understanding of European Human Rights’ in 
Spyridon Flogaitis, Tom Zwart and Julie Fraser (eds), The European Court of Human Rights and its Discontents: 
Turning Criticism into Strength (Edward Elgar 2013) 183, 191 
2
 Lord Steyn, ‘2000 - 2005: Laying the Foundations of Human Rights Law in the United Kingdom’ [2005] EHRLR 
349, 361 
3
 Pinnock v Manchester City Council [2011] 2 AC 104, [48] (Lord Neuberger)  
4
 R v Horncastle and others [2010] 2 AC 373 (SC) [11] (Lord Phillips) 
5
 Dean Spielmann, ‘Whither Judicial Dialogue?’ (Sir Thomas More Lecture, London, 12 October 2015) 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20151012_Spielmann_Sir_Thomas_More_Lecture.pdf.> accessed 17 
March 2016 
6
 Dean Spielmann, ‘Speech by Judge Dean Spielmann’ (UCL Graduation Ceremony, 6 July 2016) 
<https://www.laws.ucl.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/spielmann_dean_graduationceremony_speech_2016.pdf.> 
accessed 29 November 2016 
7
 Sir Stephen Sedley, ‘Personal Reflections on the Reception and Application of the Court’s Case-law’ in European 
Court of Human Rights, Dialogue between Judges (Council of Europe 2006); Lord Kerr, ‘The Conversation between 
National Courts and Strasbourg – Dialogue or Dictation?’ (2009) 44 IJ 1, 12; Tom Bingham, ‘The Human Rights 
Act’ (2010) 6 EHRLR 568, 574; Jean-Paul Costa, ‘On the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
Judgments’ (2011) 7(2) EuConst 173; Sir Nicolas Bratza, ‘The Relationship between the UK Courts and Strasbourg’ 
(2011) 5 EHRLR 505; Robert Walker, ‘The Indefinite Article 8’ (Thomas More Lecture, Lincoln’s Inn, 9 November 
2011) <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech_111109.pdf> accessed 10 December 2016; Lady Hale, 
‘Argentoratum Locutum: Is Strasbourg or the Supreme Court Supreme?’ (2012) 12(1) HRLR 65, 78; Lord 
Carnwath, ‘UK Courts and Strasbourg’ (Rome, 20 September 2013) <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-
130920.pdf> accessed 10 December 2016; Lord Justice Laws, ‘The Common Law and Europe’ (Hamlyn Lectures, 
27 November 2013), 12 <https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/.../laws-lj-speech-hamlyn-lecture-2013.pdf> 
accessed 10 December 2016; Lord Mance, ‘Destruction or Metamorphosis of the Legal Order?’ (World Policy 
Conference, 14 December 2013) <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131214.pdf> accessed 10 December 
2016; Paul Mahoney, ‘The Relationship between the Strasbourg Court and the National Courts’ (2014) 130 LQR 
568; Lord Neuberger, ‘The Role of Judges in Human Rights Jurisprudence: a Comparison of the Australian and UK 
Experience’ (Supreme Court of Victoria Conference, 8 August 2014) <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-
2 
 
Brighton and Brussels Declarations of 2012 and 2015 on the future of the Strasbourg-based 
system responsible for the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) signalled explicitly 
the view of the forty-seven member states of the Council of Europe that dialogue between the 
ECtHR and the national courts is to be ‘welcome[d] and ‘encourage[d]’8 and called upon the 
Strasbourg Court to ‘deepen this dialogue further’.9 
 The concept of ‘dialogue’ has attracted considerable academic discussion as a tool for 
describing, explaining and justifying different forms of interaction between sites of governance.
10
 
Since the enactment of the HRA, this has been particularly true in the UK in relation to the 
‘dialogic’11 model of judicial review thought to have been put in place by that legislation.12 There 
has also been much discussion of the dialogue between the UK courts and the ECtHR. With 
some notable exceptions,
13
 however, these debates have centred on normative arguments as to 
the correct interpretation of the duty of UK courts under s.2 HRA to ‘take into account’ the 
judgments of the Strasbourg Court when interpreting the rights contained under that Act.
14
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
140808.pdf> accessed 10 December 2016; Mary Arden, Human Rights and European Law: Building New Legal 
Orders (OUP 2015)  
8
 Brighton Declaration, High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights (Brighton 19-
20 April 2012) B[12](c) 
9
 Brussels Declaration, High-level Conference on the “Implementation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, Our Shared Responsibility” (Brussels 27 March 2015) A[1](b) 
10
 Barry Friedman, ‘Dialogue and Judicial Review’ (1993) 91(4) Mich LR 577; Peter W. Hogg and Allison A. 
Bushell, ‘The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A 
Bad Thing After All)’ (1997) 35(1) Osgoode Hall LJ 75; Luc Tremblay, ‘The Legitimacy of Judicial Review: The 
Limits of Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures’ (2005) 3(4) IJCL 617; Peter W. Hogg, Allison A. Bushell 
Thornton and Wade K. Wright, ‘Charter Dialogue Revisited: Or "Much Ado About Metaphors"’ (2007) 45(1) 
Osgoode Hall LJ 1; Ming-Sung Kuo, ‘In the Shadow of Judicial Supremacy: Putting the Idea of Judicial Dialogue in 
its Place’ (2016) 29(1) Ratio Juris 83 
11
 Po-Jen Yap, ‘Defending Dialogue’ [2012] PL 527 
12
 Richard Clayton, ‘Judicial Deference and ‘Democratic Dialogue’: the Legitimacy of Human Rights Intervention 
under the Human Rights Act 1998’ [2004] PL 33; Tom Hickman, “Constitutional Dialogue, Constitutional Theories 
and the Human Rights Act 1998” [2005] PL 306; Roger Masterman, ‘Interpretations, Declarations and Dialogue: 
Rights Protection under the Human Rights Act and Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities’ [2009] 
PL 112; Alison Young, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act (Hart 2009); Tom Hickman, Public 
Law After the Human Rights Act (Hart 2010); Sophie Briant, ‘Dialogue, Diplomacy and Defiance: Prisoners' Voting 
Rights at Home and in Strasbourg’ (2011) 3 EHRLR 243; Philip Sales and Richard Ekins, ‘Rights-consistent 
Interpretation and the Human Rights Act 1998’ (2011) 127 LQR 217; Alison L Young, ‘Is Dialogue Working under 
the Human Rights Act 1998?’ [2011] PL 773 
13
 Merris Amos, ‘The Dialogue between United Kingdom Courts and the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(2012) 61(3) ICLQ 557; Alan Paterson, Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court (Hart 
2013) 222-233 
14
 Roger Masterman, ‘Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998: Binding Domestic Courts to Strasbourg? [2004] 
PL 725; Roger Masterman, ‘Taking the Strasbourg Jurisprudence into Account: Developing a "Municipal Law of 
Human Rights" under the Human Rights Act’ (2005) 54(4) ICLQ 907; Jonathan Lewis, ‘The European Ceiling on 
Human Rights’ [2007] PL 720; Jane Wright, ‘Interpreting Section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998: Towards an 
Indigenous Jurisprudence of Human Rights’ [2009] PL 595; Eirik Bjorge, ‘Exceptionalism and Internationalism in 
the Supreme Court: Horncastle and Cadder’ [2011] PL 475; Lord Irvine of Lairg, ‘A British Interpretation of 
Convention Rights’ [2012] PL 237; Philip Sales, ‘Strasbourg jurisprudence and the Human Rights Act: a Response 
to Lord Irvine’ [2012] PL 253; Richard Clayton, ‘Smoke and Mirrors: the Human Rights Act and the Impact of 
Strasbourg Case Law’ [2012] PL 639; Roger Masterman, ‘Deconstructing the Mirror Principle’ in Roger  
Masterman and Ian Leigh (eds.), The United Kingdom’s Statutory Bill of Rights: Constitutional and Comparative 
3 
 
 This thesis has a different focus. It examines the role of the judicial dialogue between the 
UK courts and the ECtHR in legitimising their respective judgments. For this purpose, it draws 
upon original, in-depth interviews conducted with eight Justices of the UK Supreme Court and 
four judges of the ECtHR to develop an understanding of the nature of this dialogue based on the 
insights of those directly involved. While other interview-based studies conducted with senior 
UK judges have covered the subject in part,
15
 this is the first study to have conducted interviews 
with these judges exclusively on the subject of the dialogue between their courts. Further, the 
thesis explores the understanding of dialogue between these courts developed from the interview 
data and other materials using insights from constitutional and political theory in order to 
determine how the judges might be using this dialogue to confer legitimacy on their judgments. 
In this way, the thesis explores a classic jurisprudential question (what is the source of judicial 
legitimacy?) through a social scientific methodology. It thus offers a unique methodological 
approach to a highly topical area of constitutional discourse in the UK.  
 The thesis put forward is that judicial dialogue – in its various manifestations – embodies 
the mutual participation, mutual accountability and the ongoing revision and refinement of 
arguments at the domestic and European levels, each of which can perform legitimising functions 
for both the UK courts and the ECtHR. On this basis, it suggests that the judicial embrace of 
‘dialogue’ was unlikely to have been an act of spontaneity but a response to interwoven 
legitimacy challenges faced by the UK courts and the ECtHR in their decision-making on human 
rights.  This thesis, however, does not engage in debates over the conceptual accuracy of the term 
‘dialogue’ to describe the interactions between these courts. In the spirit of the advice given by 
the authors credited with popularising the concept, it aims instead to ‘deal with the significance 
of the phenomenon, rather than making "much ado about metaphors"’.16 Nonetheless, it does not 
shy away from normative critique. The closing chapter will argue that one manifestation of this 
‘dialogue’ – open disagreement by the national courts with judgments of the ECtHR – potentially 
contributes to the cultivation of a disposition to disobey on the part of the various actors subject 
to the rulings of the ECtHR across the Council of Europe, whether judicial or political. It 
therefore argues that dialogue between these courts also carries a delegitimising potential.  
 This introductory chapter has four aims. First, it provides context to the research by 
outlining the emergence of dialogue between the UK courts and the ECtHR (Part 2). It offers a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Perspectives (OUP 2013) 111; Carmen Draghici, ‘The Human Rights Act in the Shadow of the European 
Convention: are Copyist's Errors Allowed?’ (2014) 2 EHRLR 154 
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(forthcoming) 
16
 Hogg, Thornton and Wright (n 10) 54 
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summary of their relationship prior to the HRA, the transformation of that relationship following 
the enactment of that legislation, and traces the subsequent development by the UK courts from 
what was generally regarded as a deferential approach towards the ECtHR to an explicitly 
dialogic relationship. Second, the chapter offers a justification for the first three research 
questions addressed by this thesis, respectively concerning the form of dialogue through 
judgments, the functions of dialogue through judgments and the role of informal dialogue (Part 
3). Third, the chapter provides a justification for the fourth and central research question on the 
legitimising role of judicial dialogue. It outlines the concept of legitimacy and explains why the 
dialogic turn in the relationship between these particular courts poses significant questions (Part 
4). Finally, the chapter outlines the key arguments of this thesis and the structure of its content 
(Part 5).    
2. The Emergence of ‘Dialogue’ between the UK courts and ECtHR  
 2.1 Pre-HRA: a period of ‘little or no dialogue’ 
 A ‘dialogue’ is defined as a ‘discussion between two or more people or groups, especially 
one directed towards exploration of a particular subject or resolution of a problem’.17 Burgorgue-
Larsen explains that it is ‘a word with roots in the Latin term ‘dialogus’ which refers to a 
philosophical conversation in the manner of Plato’s dialogues’.18 A dialogue, it is said, is ‘always 
a sort of collaboration, a way of trying to attain the truth’.19 However, it is not always 
cooperative: dialogue can ‘provoke just as much opposition, contradiction, and even discord as 
agreement’.20  
 Prior to the enactment of the HRA, the UK courts and the ECtHR are thought to have 
engaged in little dialogue of any kind. While there was much in the way of contradiction between 
the respective conclusions of the UK courts and the ECtHR,
21
 it can be said that this consisted of 
one ‘diktat versus the other court’s diktat’22 or ‘competing monologues’23 and little in the way of 
discussion, collaboration or resolution by the judges. Despite the UK having ratified the ECHR 
                                                          
17
 ‘dialogue’, Oxford Dictionary of English (3rd edn, OUP 2010)  
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 Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, ‘A European Perspective’ in Louis Blom-Cooper, Brice Dickson and Gavin Drewry 
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in 1951
24
 and accepted the jurisdiction of the ECtHR
25
 and the right of individuals from the UK 
to petition the Court
26
 (via the former Commission)
27
 in 1966,
28
 it has been observed that during 
the decades preceding the HRA there was ‘little or no dialogue’29 between the courts. Dickson 
suggests that ‘before 2000 the Law Lords, applying laws constructed on different foundations 
from those underlying the Convention, were not speaking the same language as judges in 
Strasbourg’.30 Instead, the relationship was characterised by their strikingly dissonant roles in 
protecting rights and a notable lack of engagement by the UK courts with the views of the 
ECtHR. Three obstacles in particular appeared to hinder the development of a more productive 
relationship between these courts during this period.   
 First, there was no document of rights either equivalent or similar to the ECHR within the 
UK. Its dualist legal system meant that the ECHR rights could not be enforced by the UK courts. 
Under the UK’s ‘political constitution’,31 Hiebert explains that ‘rights were thought of as being 
protected by Parliament, and not from it’.32 Accordingly, they were not understood as ‘external 
or independent standards for evaluating legislation ... dependent on judicially-reviewable 
restraints on political power’.33 The role of the courts was in protecting the residue of negative 
liberties under the British constitution to do whatever insofar as it was not explicitly proscribed 
by law,
34
 in the application of private law remedies at common law to public officials,
35
 and 
through the judicial review of the legality of executive action.  
                                                          
24
 Ed Bates, ‘British Sovereignty and the European Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 128 LQR 382, 388  
25
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 Protocol 11 to the ECHR abolished the European Commission when it entered into force in 1998. The previously 
part-time European Court of Human Rights was established as a permanent court with mandatory jurisdiction. Bates, 
‘British Sovereignty and the ECtHR’ (n 24) 401  
28
 Lord Lester, ‘U.K. Acceptance of the Strasbourg Jurisdiction: What Really Went on in Whitehall in 1965’ [1998] 
PL 237 
29
 Department of Constitutional Affairs, ‘Review of the Implementation of the Human Rights Act’ (38/06, DCA 
2006) 11 cited in Merris Amos,  ‘The Impact of the Human Rights Act on the United Kingdom's Performance before 
the European Court of Human Rights’ [2007] PL 655 
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 ibid  
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 Second, while Acts of the UK Parliament could not be challenged in the UK courts due to 
the constitutional doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty,
36
 the same Acts could be subject to 
challenge before the ECtHR.
37
 Further, the standard of review applied to government acts 
differed significantly. The UK courts applied the standard of Wednesbury
38
 unreasonableness or 
irrationality,
39
 whereas the ECtHR applies to interferences with the ECHR rights the more 
exacting standard of proportionality.
40
 While the application of the latter varies depending on the 
Convention right in question, it generally demands, as Loveland notes, a ‘far more rigorous 
assessment of the moral merits of a government body’s decision than is allowed under the 
irrationality principle’.41 While the UK courts came to accept that executive interferences with 
human rights called for ‘anxious scrutiny’,42 Klug has observed how this fell decidedly short of 
the requirements of proportionality.
43
 The view of the UK courts was that they lacked the 
constitutional authority to examine the compatibility of executive action with the rights contained 
in the ECHR, in particular the proportionality of interferences with those rights, unless and until 
Parliament empowered them to do so.
44
 The UK’s constitutional arrangements instead demanded 
‘judicial silence’45as to the interpretation and application of Convention rights.  
 Third, and as a consequence of the previous points, the UK courts generally accorded 
‘scant weight’46 to the Convention and to the judgments of the ECtHR. While explicit references 
to the ECHR increased significantly during the 1990s,
47
 by which point the courts had deemed it 
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acceptable to refer to the Convention in a number of circumstances,
48
 Starmer and Klug have 
argued that these references played little role in the actual outcome
49
 of the decisions and thus 
reflected no more than ‘lip service’50 to the Convention. Despite the numerous rulings of the 
ECtHR in respect of UK cases which amassed before the HRA came into effect,
51
 Dickson notes 
that senior UK judges ‘appear to have spoken or written very little about those views, whether 
judicially or extra-judicially’.52 On this basis, he suggests that the right of individuals in the UK 
to petition the ECtHR ‘patently failed’53 to create ‘a more transparent dialogue between senior 
judges in the United Kingdom and Commissioners and judges in Strasbourg ... during this 
period’.54  
 2.2 The Human Rights Act  
 Each of these obstacles was removed with the entering into force of the HRA 1998 in 
England and Wales in 2000. A list of ‘Convention rights’,55 taken directly from the ECHR, 
became enforceable in the UK courts.  It became unlawful for any public authority, including a 
court, to act in a way which is incompatible with those rights.
56
 The UK courts were empowered 
to review not only government acts but parliamentary statutes for their compatibility with 
Convention rights.
57
 A new rule of construction was established that UK judges must interpret all 
domestic legislation in a way which is compatible with the Convention ‘[s]o far as it is possible 
to do so’.58 Where this is not possible, it empowered the courts to make a ‘declaration of 
incompatibility’59 which does not affect the legal validity of the Act but declares to Parliament 
that the legislation is incompatible with one or several of the Convention rights. Further, the 
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courts were quick to accept that interferences with Convention rights must be reviewed by 
reference to the standard of proportionality rather than reasonableness.
60
 Elliott here notes that 
the Act had ‘a significant emboldening effect’61 upon the judges, allowing proportionality to 
‘emerge from the shadows’62 of domestic judicial review.  
 Most importantly for this discussion, s.2(1) HRA established that 
A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection with a 
Convention right must take into account any ... judgment, decision, declaration or 
advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights, whenever made or 
given, so far as, in the opinion of the court or tribunal, it is relevant to the 
proceedings in which that question has arisen.  
At the core of this design was a desire to create a more interactive and productive relationship 
between the UK courts and the ECtHR. The White Paper which preceded the legislation 
lamented that ‘the fact that [the UK courts] do not deal in the same concepts as the European 
Court of Human Rights limits the extent to which their judgments can be drawn upon and 
followed’.63 By enacting the Convention rights and thereby allowing judges in the UK to 
interpret and rule on their application, the intention was that the ECtHR would be provided ‘with 
a useful source of information and reasoning for its own decisions’.64 During the parliamentary 
debates on the Human Rights Bill, the intention was made plain that the UK courts should not be 
‘hampered unnecessarily by a doctrine of stare decisis which is not required by the [ECHR]’.65 
Instead of a ‘straitjacket’66 they would have ‘flexibility’67 to ‘depart from existing Strasbourg 
decisions’68 and freedom ‘to try to give a lead to Europe as well as to be led’.69 With the 
necessary tools thus provided by the HRA, Besson observed that ‘British judges ... [were] 
positioned to engage in a more serious dialogue of give-and-take with the ECtHR’.70 
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2.3 Deference to the ECtHR  
Since the enactment of the HRA, it has been observed that the ECHR and Strasbourg case 
law have been cited by the UK courts ‘with a frequency and diligence hardly matched anywhere 
else in Europe’.71 However, the relationship which developed between the two for the first 
decade of the HRA is perceived as one based on deference toward the ECtHR by the UK courts 
rather than dialogue, despite the flexibility intended by its architects. According to an analysis by 
Klug and Wildbore, the ‘most common’72 approach to the interpretation of Convention rights for 
the first decade of the HRA was adherence to what is often termed (and with notable criticism)
73
 
the ‘mirror’74 principle. The two early authorities cited frequently in this connection are 
Alconbury
75
 and Ullah.
76
 In the former case, Lord Slynn reasoned that UK courts ‘...should 
follow any clear and constant jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’,77 short of 
‘some special circumstances’.78 This was to avert the ‘possibility that the case will go to that 
court which is likely in the ordinary case to follow its own constant jurisprudence’.79 In Ullah, 
Lord Bingham agreed. Lord Slynn’s reasoning ‘...reflects the fact that the Convention is an 
international instrument, the correct interpretation of which can be authoritatively expounded 
only by the Strasbourg court’.80 Thus, in a controversial passage, Lord Bingham stipulated that 
‘[t]he duty of national courts is to keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over 
time: no more, but certainly no less’.81  
The requirements to do ‘no more’ and ‘no less’ than the ECtHR, however, were 
subsequently applied at times with a striking stringency. In terms of doing no more, concern for 
the authorities, unable to challenge adverse HRA rulings by the domestic courts before the 
ECtHR, prompted Lord Brown in Al-Skeini
82
 to propose what Lewis terms the ‘heightened 
mirror principle’.83 On this view, the UK courts should do ‘“no less, but certainly no more”’84 
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than the ECtHR. In terms of doing no less, the case now infamously associated with undue 
deference to the ECtHR is AF (No 3).
85
 There, Lord Rodger’s single-paragraph contribution to 
the judgment declared: ‘Even though we are dealing with rights under a United Kingdom statute, 
in reality, we have no choice: Argentoratum locutum, iudicium finitum – Strasbourg has spoken, 
the case is closed’.86  
In the early years of the HRA, the approach of the UK courts was thus viewed as ‘rigid’,87 
with a ‘strong loyalty to Strasbourg’.88  It was said to be ‘based on the idea that the ECtHR is the 
authoritative exponent of Convention law; and the assumption that all Member States are under a 
duty to defer to it’.89 By adopting this course, however, Gearty argues that the UK courts allowed 
the ‘permissive language of section 2 to harden into an unavoidable obligation’90 and the ‘myth 
... of Strasbourg supremacism’91 to thrive. 
2.4 The Judicial Embrace of ‘Dialogue’ 
Despite the concerns that the UK courts were adopting an unduly restrictive approach to 
s.2 HRA duty, a report by the Department for Constitutional Affairs in 2006 observed that a 
dialogue between the courts was already underway:  
There is no doubt that the HRA has established a “dialogue” between English 
judges and the European Court of Human Rights. The close analytical attention 
paid by the English courts to the European Convention on Human Rights case 
law is respected by the European Court of Human Rights and is influential on the 
way that it approaches English cases.
92
 
The same sentiments were echoed by Lord Bingham, who observed in 2009 that a ‘constructive 
dialogue’93 had developed between the courts in the way that ‘the British courts have treated 
[Strasbourg] decisions with respect and analysed and applied them with care’,94 while ‘[t]he 
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Strasbourg judges, for their part, have taken notice of what the British courts have said, 
particularly when they have demurred’.95 
The concept of dialogue, however, had appeared only occasionally in the reasoning of 
domestic judicial decisions. In the early HRA case of R v Lyons,
96
 Lord Hoffmann observed 
‘room for dialogue’97 between the courts where a decision by the ECtHR had misunderstood a 
feature of domestic law. His Lordship reasoned that, in such circumstances, a UK court could 
issue a judgment which ‘invites the ECtHR to reconsider’98 the earlier judgment, a view which 
was later reiterated in Re P.
99
 There, Lord Hoffmann again observed that ‘section 2(1) of the 
1998 Act allows for the possibility of a dialogue between Strasbourg and the courts of the United 
Kingdom over the meaning of an article of the Convention’,100 particularly where the UK courts 
are of the view that ‘the Strasbourg court could be persuaded that it had been wrong’.101 
 Following the establishment of the UK Supreme Court in 2009, however, the concept of 
dialogue was fully embraced by the UK courts as the byword for their relationship with the 
ECtHR, invoked repeatedly in relation to the interpretation of s.2 HRA. In the explicit aim of 
promoting ‘valuable’102 and ‘constructive dialogue’103 with the ECtHR, the Supreme Court has 
undergone what Lord Wilson’s dissenting judgment in Moohan104 described as a ‘retreat’105 from 
the ‘no more’ and ‘no less’ stipulations of Ullah. While it has been well documented that the UK 
courts had diverged from those requirements previously,
106
 it can be argued that the deployments 
of the concept of dialogue by the Supreme Court have marked the most decisive shifts away from 
that approach.  
 In respect of the ‘no less’ stipulation, it was unanimously held by the newly-established 
Supreme Court in the landmark judgment of Horncastle
107
 that where the UK courts have 
concerns with a particular strand of the ECtHR jurisprudence, they could refuse to apply it in 
order to ‘give the Strasbourg court the opportunity to reconsider … so that there takes place what 
may prove to be a valuable dialogue’.108 Effectuating Lord Hoffmann’s earlier thinking in this 
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instance, the Court refused to apply the Strasbourg Chamber decision in Al-Khawaja v UK
109
 
concerning the admissibility of ‘sole or decisive’ hearsay evidence in criminal trials. The 
Chamber had held that the requirements of a fair trial under Art.6 ECHR would be breached if a 
defendant was convicted on the ‘sole or decisive’ basis of evidence obtained by witnesses 
unavailable for cross-examination at the trial.
110
 On this basis, it held that the admission of such 
evidence by the UK courts had violated Art.6.
111
 The UK government’s subsequent request for a 
referral of the decision to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR was adjourned in order for the 
ECtHR to consider the conclusions of the Supreme Court in Horncastle.
112
 The Supreme Court 
criticised the sole or decisive rule for its lack of clarity and argued that the ECtHR had applied 
the rule both inflexibly and without proper consideration of the existing protections in domestic 
law and the common law system.
113
 It thus held that the admission of hearsay evidence in 
criminal trials under domestic law would not violate Art.6, and called upon the ECtHR to 
reconsider its position.
114
 The resulting Grand Chamber judgment responded directly and even 
contested a number of the criticisms set out in Horncastle.
115
 However, in agreement with the 
UK courts, it held that the admission of decisive hearsay evidence would not necessarily violate 
Art.6.
116
 In a concurring opinion, the Court’s President, Sir Nicolas Bratza, observed that the 
Court’s judgment was ‘a good example of the judicial dialogue between national courts and the 
European Court on the application of the Convention’.117 When the Horncastle case subsequently 
reached the ECtHR, it was held unanimously that no violation of Art.6 had taken place.
118
 The 
Court’s press release declared that the decision ‘concludes the judicial dialogue ... which 
commenced with the delivery of this Court’s Chamber judgment in Al-Khawaja and Tahery’.119  
 This dialogic relationship was reiterated in a number of domestic judgments. In 
Pinnock,
120
 Lord Neuberger MR stated that uncritical adherence to the decisions of the ECtHR 
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could be ‘impractical’121 and ‘inappropriate’122 because it ‘would destroy the ability of the 
[Supreme] court to engage in the constructive dialogue with the European court which is of value 
to the development of Convention law’.123 The UK courts were therefore only required to follow 
clear and constant jurisprudence of the ECtHR to the extent that it is ‘not inconsistent with some 
fundamental substantive or procedural aspect of our law, and ... does not appear to overlook or 
misunderstand some argument or point of principle’.124 In the case of Chester125 an even more 
comprehensive expression of the dialogic relationship was delivered. There, Lord Mance stated: 
The process [of judicial dialogue] enables national courts to express their 
concerns and, in an appropriate case such as R v Horncastle, refuse to follow 
Strasbourg case-law in the confidence that the reasoned expression of a diverging 
national viewpoint will lead to a review of the position in Strasbourg.
126
  
In Lord Mance’s view, the UK courts might ‘contemplate an outright refusal to follow 
Strasbourg authority at the Grand Chamber level’127 where it concerned ‘some truly fundamental 
principle of our law or some most egregious oversight or misunderstanding’.128 In similar terms, 
Lord Sumption there reasoned that it was open to the UK courts to invite the ECtHR to consider 
‘a change of heart’129 in such circumstances.  
 The second dimension to this dialogue is based on a rejection of strict adherence to the 
‘no more’ stipulation of Ullah. This view is powerfully articulated in the case of Ambrose.130 
There, Lord Kerr used his dissenting judgment to criticise the ‘attitude of agnosticism’131 which 
he perceived within the majority’s decision not to accord protection to the applicable Convention 
rights in the absence of a definitive Strasbourg case to support the finding. Taking issue with 
what he perceived as ‘Ullah-type reticence’,132 he argued: 
It is to be expected, indeed it is to be hoped, that not all debates about the extent of 
Convention rights will be resolved by Strasbourg. ... If the much vaunted dialogue 
between national courts and Strasbourg is to mean anything, we should surely not 
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feel inhibited from saying what we believe Strasbourg ought to find in future. Better 
that than shelter behind the fact that Strasbourg has so far not spoken and use it as a 
pretext for refusing to give effect to a right that is otherwise undeniable.
133
 
Lord Kerr developed this argument further in his Clifford Chance lecture.
134
 There, he suggested 
that ‘a pre-emptive, properly reasoned opinion by our courts’135 on an issue which had not been 
subject to a Strasbourg ruling could be just as influential as an opinion expressing disagreement 
with Strasbourg. In his view, ‘[f]or a dialogue to be effective, both speakers should be prepared, 
when the occasion demands it, to utter the first word’.136 Lord Kerr’s dissident thinking in 
Ambrose, however, appeared to be embraced in the case of Rabone.
137
 There, Lord Brown 
remarked that the UK courts should not hesitate to reach a conclusion which ‘flow[s] naturally 
from existing Strasbourg case law’,138 even if it appears to be ‘carrying the case law a step 
further’.139 This would ‘promote each of two frequently expressed aims: engaging in a dialogue 
with Strasbourg and bringing rights home’.140  
 Once more, in Moohan,
141 
the Supreme Court reiterated this dialogic relationship:  
The courts of the United Kingdom are not bound by the judgments of the Strasbourg 
Court in interpreting the ECHR. ... There is room for disagreement and dialogue 
between the domestic courts and the Strasbourg Court on the application of 
provisions of the ECHR to circumstances in the UK. ... On occasion our domestic 
courts may choose to go further in the interpretation and application of the ECHR 
than Strasbourg has done where they reach a conclusion which flows naturally from 
Strasbourg’s existing case law...142 
Thus, a relationship based on dialogue can now be said to reflect the ‘orthodox approach of the 
UK courts to the jurisprudence of the European court’.143 
 This shift in domestic judicial thinking has been pointedly encouraged by a number of 
ECtHR judges, particularly the former ECtHR President and UK judge, Sir Nicolas Bratza. In 
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2011, he sought to assure UK judges that ‘“Strasbourg has spoken, the case is closed”144 is not 
the way in which I or my fellow judges view the respective roles of the two courts’.145 Observing 
that Lord Bingham’s reasoning in Ullah ‘suggests a position of deference from which it is 
difficult to have an effective dialogue’,146 the former President called for ‘increased dialogue’147 
between the courts. In his view, it is ‘right and healthy that national courts should continue to feel 
free to criticise Strasbourg judgments where those judgments have applied principles which are 
unclear or inconsistent or where they have misunderstood national law or practices’,148 even 
refusing to follow them in order to provide the ECtHR the ‘opportunity to reconsider’.149 Further, 
he remarked that it was ‘right and positive for the protection of human rights that the national 
courts, to use the words of Baroness Hale, should sometimes consciously leap ahead of 
Strasbourg’.150  
 2.5 The Rise of Informal Dialogue 
 There is a further dimension to the relationship between the UK courts and the ECtHR 
which has emerged since the enactment of the HRA. Alongside the dialogue through judgments 
is the rise of what the judges regularly describe as ‘informal’151 dialogue between their courts in 
the form of meetings between senior UK and ECtHR judges. The first Annual Report of the 
ECtHR in 2001 details bilateral meetings between ECtHR judges and judges from a wide range 
of national constitutional and supreme courts.
152
  Notably, however, the first meeting between 
UK and ECtHR judges did not take place until 2006.
153
 Since then, bilateral and multilateral 
meetings between ECtHR and UK judges have been taking place on a near-annual basis.
154
 The 
value of these meetings has been stressed by consecutive Presidents of the ECtHR
155
 and a 
                                                          
144
 Bratza (n 7) 512 citing AF (No 3) (n 85) [98] (Lord Rodger) 
145
 ibid 
146
 ibid 
147
 ibid 511 
148
 ibid 512 
149
 ibid 
150
 ibid citing R (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport [2008] 1 AC 
1312 (HL) [53] (Baroness Hale) 
151
 Costa (n 7) 182; Bratza, (n 7) 512; Arden (n 7) 286, 315 
152
 European Court of Human Rights, Annual Report 2001(Registry of the European Court of Human Rights 2002) 
33 
153
 Arden (n 7) 274 
154
 Detailed records of visits to and from the ECtHR from 2007 are available at the webpage of the court’s 
President. European Court of Human Rights, ‘Official Visits’ 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/pages/home.aspx?p=court/president&c=#n1364996188776_pointer> accessed 17 
March 2016 
155
 Costa (n 7) 182, Bratza (n 7) 512, Spielmann, ‘Whither Judicial Dialogue?’ (n 5)  
16 
 
number of senior UK judges,
156
 several of whom have called for them to take place on a more 
frequent basis.
157
  
3. The Research Questions 
In light of the discussion so far, it would not be unreasonable to argue that the relationship 
between the UK Supreme Court and the ECtHR is among the most dynamic and interactive of 
any which the Supreme Court shares with a court outside of its jurisdiction. Building on his 
seminal interview-based research on the decision-making of the Law Lords in the 1970s,
158
 
Paterson observes that the relationship between the UK courts and the ECtHR has indeed become 
‘dynamic and vibrant’159 in recent years as a result of the Supreme Court Justices being ‘eager to 
develop the dialogue with Strasbourg in a way that gave greater room for manoeuvre than the 
slightly unedifying and sulky response of the House in AF’.160 The President of the Supreme 
Court, Lord Neuberger, has spoken to similar effect: ‘...while UK judges may well initially have 
been too readily prepared to follow decisions of the Strasbourg court, we are now more ready to 
refuse to follow, or to modify or finesse, their decisions, as we become more confident in 
forming our own views about Convention rights’.161 Pointing to the response of the ECtHR in its 
Al-Khawaja judgment, Paterson also notes that ‘Strasbourg seems as keen to enter into dialogue 
with the Supreme Court as the Supreme Court is with Strasbourg’.162 Thus, along with the 
dialogues between the Justices and legal counsel, between the Justices and their judicial 
assistants, and among the Justices themselves in their deliberations, Paterson argues that the 
dialogues with the ECtHR now form a crucial dimension of the ‘social and collective process’163 
of decision-making in the UK’s most senior court, with ‘far more interaction – oral and written – 
between the two courts than there is with Luxembourg’164 and certain judgments ‘written 
consciously as a form of advocacy’.165 The same observations are made in Mak’s study of 
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judicial decision-making in the senior courts of various jurisdictions.
166
 It notes the recognition 
by several Supreme Court Justices interviewed of the influence of the UK courts upon the 
decision-making of the ECtHR, and their efforts to maximise that influence by ‘writ[ing] in a 
way which is attractive to the ECtHR’.167  
 Confronted with these developments, this thesis seeks to examine four questions. First, 
what is judicial dialogue in the context of the decision-making of the UK courts and the ECtHR? 
Second, what are its functions? Third, what is the role of the informal dialogue between these 
courts? Fourth, what is the role of the dialogue in legitimising the judgments of the UK courts 
and the ECtHR? The following sections will provide the justification for the first three questions, 
concerning dialogue, while the fourth question, which addresses the legitimising role of dialogue, 
is discussed in Part 4.  
 3.1 What is judicial ‘dialogue’ in the context of the decision-making of the UK 
 courts and the ECtHR?  
 The need for exploration of this subject arises from what some consider to be the 
‘puzzle’168 of judicial dialogue: its popularity in academic and judicial thinking, on the one hand, 
and the ‘ambiguities surrounding the very meaning ... and its practical implications’,169 on the 
other. Pérez, while embracing the concept as part of her theory of supranational adjudication for 
the European Court of Justice, acknowledges that its ‘prolific and ambiguous use has worked to 
mystify the meaning’.170 Similarly, Zoethout notes that it is ‘appealing and elusive, yet diffuse at 
the same time’.171 However, because ‘[e]veryone seems to have different associations with the 
term’,172 it is susceptible to the cynical charge that it simply ‘means anything its user wants it to 
mean’.173 The present context illustrates the problem. Dialogue between the UK courts and the 
ECtHR, as seen already in this chapter, has often been praised and further dialogue encouraged 
by the judges involved. However, it has been used to describe all manner of judgment-based 
interactions between the courts. Cross-citations,
174
 criticism,
175
 disagreement,
176
 agreement,
177
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influence,
178
 in either or both directions, to differing degrees, have all been considered to reflect 
dialogue between these courts.  
 Seeking to probe this wide-ranging use and thus decipher further what the UK and 
ECtHR judges understand by this dialogic relationship is not, to borrow a retort from Carolan, 
‘an indulgently academic exercise in linguistic trivialities’.179 As discussed above, ‘dialogue’ has 
become a central feature of the domestic case law on how the Strasbourg jurisprudence is 
approached by the UK courts, invoked across a significant body of case law, consisting of two 
judgments by the House of Lords
180
 and eight judgments of the Supreme Court.
181
 What is more, 
it appears to have taken a near permanent place in the narrative of national and ECtHR judges 
when discussing the relationship between their courts.
182
 Thus, it does not seem to be among the 
kind of judicially-invoked metaphors, observed by Bosmajian, which ‘appear once or twice and 
are never heard from again’.183 Instead, it is among those that have demonstrable ‘staying power, 
become institutionalized and integral to judicial reasoning and judicial decision making’.184 
Judicial dialogue might well mean ‘whatever its users want it to mean’,185 but that should not 
deter scrutiny of what exactly judges mean when it becomes such a recurrent feature of their 
judgments. 
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 The need to further probe the meaning behind this concept also arises from what is, on 
some accounts at least, a darker side to the judicial use of such concepts. The Justice of the 
Supreme Court, Lord Sumption, has cautioned: 
From time to time, English judges devise catch-phrases devoid of legal meaning 
in order to describe concepts which they are unwilling or unable to define. ... 
Now, I am not so austere that I would deny judges the right to use the odd slogan. 
But there are I think circumstances in which the use of catch-phrases ..., which 
have little or no legal content, is positively dangerous. This is because they tend 
to be a substitute for analysis. They mask what the court is really doing and why 
... [and] may divert attention from considerations which are legally a great deal 
more significant.
186
 
Applied to the present discussion, such remarks beg the question: is ‘dialogue’ to be considered 
one of those dangerous catch-phrases, devoid of legal meaning, masking what the courts are 
really doing and why, diverting attention from more significant legal considerations? Given his 
Lordship’s own willingness to employ the concept of dialogue,187 this seems unlikely to be his 
view. In this respect, however, it is notable that Lord Kerr, having previously written favourably 
of dialogue between the UK courts and the ECtHR,
188
 has since become critical of the notion: 
‘...as a matter of principle Strasbourg and the national courts cannot be engaged in much of a 
dialogue, because they are necessarily having different conversations’.189 The ECtHR, he 
observes, ‘...must decide each case despite what the national courts have said’.190 Combined with 
Lord Sumption’s warning of the dangers of judicial slogans, Lord Kerr’s concerns arguably 
justify a further enquiry into the judicial meaning behind this concept.  
 An additional reason to discern the form of dialogue between these courts relates to 
developments in the domestic case law. If it is the case that the UK courts and the ECtHR are 
engaged in dialogue through their judgments, it would appear that the dynamics of this dialogue 
are in a state of flux. Several commentators have noted what is frequently labelled the common 
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law ‘resurgence’191 in UK human rights adjudication. The entering into force of the HRA is 
thought to have marked the beginning of an ‘eclipse of common law by Convention rights’.192 
Developments in the Supreme Court in recent years, however, suggest that the eclipse has now 
passed. In Osborn v Parole Board,
193
 Lord Reed observed: ‘the error … is to suppose that 
because an issue falls within the ambit of a Convention guarantee, it follows that the legal 
analysis of the problem should begin and end with the Strasbourg case law’.194 On the correct 
approach, ‘the starting point [is] our own legal principles rather than the judgments of the 
international court’.195 The same thinking has been echoed forcefully in subsequent cases at the 
Supreme Court,
196
 where the Justices have lamented the ‘baleful and unnecessary tendency to 
overlook the common law’.197 Masterman and Wheatle thus observe that ‘...after a period of 
relative dormancy, the common law is being reasserted as an important source of rights 
protection’.198 According to Elliott, there are three dimensions to this resurgence consisting of the 
resilience, primacy and dynamism of the common law.
199
 The resilience refers to the ‘modest 
proposition that common law rights survive the HRA’.200 The primacy reflects the view that the 
common law ‘should form the focal point when human rights arguments are made’,201 and the 
dynamism refers to the view that ‘the common law has continued not only to exist, but also to 
evolve’202 since the enactment of the HRA. The question, therefore, is how this development 
might influence or shape the dialogue between the courts, as the primacy and dynamism of the 
common law resurgence in particular see the reasoning of the UK courts in human rights 
adjudication shift focus away from the Convention arguments and the Strasbourg case law.   
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 3.2 What are the functions of judicial dialogue in the context of the decision-
 making of the UK courts and the European Court of Human Rights? 
 The second research question can be justified by the sheer breadth of functions which 
have been attributed to the concept of judicial dialogue within the academic literature. It is linked 
to cross-influence between courts,
203
 the enhancement of the quality of judicial reasoning,
204
 
mutual accommodation,
205
 judicial empowerment,
206
 the strengthening of human rights 
protection,
207
 and, most radically, the development of a new legal order based on 
transgovernmentalist networks.
208
 The point need not be laboured. Rather than diminishing the 
need for research, it can be argued that these various functions underline the importance of 
understanding the judicial embrace of dialogue within the context of the relationship between the 
UK courts and the ECtHR. To what extent are the judges using this dialogue to influence one 
another, to enhance the quality of their reasoning, to accommodate or empower themselves or 
one another? The timing of the common law resurgence, alongside a number of the cases in 
which the UK courts have stressed a relationship with the ECtHR based on dialogue, raises a 
further question of whether, and to what extent, these developments are functionally related. 
 3.3 What is the role of informal dialogue between the UK courts and the 
 European Court of Human Rights? 
 The third research question arises from the lack of clarity as to the role of informal 
dialogue taking place through periodic meetings between senior UK and ECtHR judges. While 
much praised, the insights offered by the participating judges, with the notable exception of Lady 
Justice Arden,
209
 the UK judiciary’s Head of International Judicial Relations, have tended to be 
confined to the improvement of ‘mutual understanding’210 and the maintenance of the ‘high 
degree of respect’211 between their courts. Meanwhile, the academic debates on meetings 
between judges from different jurisdictions have often focused on the extent to which this form 
                                                          
203
 Melissa A. Waters, ‘Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial  Dialogue in Creating and 
Enforcing International Law’ (2005) 93 Geo LJ 487, 490 
204
 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’ (1994) 29 U Rich L Rev  99, 132 
205
 Kuo, ‘Discovering Sovereignty in Dialogue’ (n 168) 367; Krisch (n 71) 127-143 
206
 Amos, ‘The Dialogue between the United Kingdom Courts and the European Court of Human Rights’ (n 13) 579 
207
 Slaughter, ‘Typology of Transjudicial Communication (n  204) 134 
208
 From this perspective, ‘the state is not disappearing, it is disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct 
parts’ and judicial dialogue offers the communicative means through which courts across the world build their 
functionally distinct networks. Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘The Real New World Order’ (1997) 76 Foreign Affairs 183, 
185 
209
 Arden (n 7) 4, 274, 286, 315 
210
 J. Costa, ‘On the legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights’ judgements’ (2011) 7(2) European 
Constitutional Law Review 173, 182 
211
 Lord Carnwath, ‘UK courts and Strasbourg’ (Rome, 20 September 2013) 
<https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-130920.pdf> accessed 19 September 2015 
22 
 
of dialogue encourages the participants to cite one another’s judgments in their decisions.212 
Given, however, that both the UK courts and the ECtHR routinely cite and examine the other’s 
judgments, it seems unlikely that meetings between their judges serve the function of 
encouraging further cross-citation.  
 The need to explore the role of these meetings also arises from the indeterminacy of the 
relationship between these courts. Krisch argues that European human rights law consists of a 
pluralistic, ‘open architecture’213 in which inter-institutional relationships are increasingly 
‘...governed not by an overarching legal framework but primarily by politics, often judicial 
politics’.214 In his view, the s.2 HRA duty on the UK courts to ‘take into account’ the judgments 
of the ECtHR provides a good example of this open architecture. It reflects the kind of ‘interface 
norm’215 between legal regimes which ‘confers discretion on courts to situate themselves towards 
other orders as they please’.216 In this way, it is ‘buffered by a political element – an element that 
is not fully determined by law but leaves the relationship, to an important extent, open’.217 Krisch 
suggests that this provides the space for ‘judicial politics’218 in the form of ‘discretion and 
realism’.219 On this analysis, and given the importance that has been attached by UK and ECtHR 
judges to the role of informal dialogue, it would not be unreasonable to infer that these 
interactions can play an important role within the space for judicial politics provided by s.2 HRA.  
4. What is the role of judicial dialogue in legitimising the respective judgments of the UK 
courts and the ECtHR?     
 4.1 The Concept of Legitimacy 
 The fourth and central research question addressed by this thesis examines how the UK 
courts and the ECtHR have drawn upon the concept of judicial ‘dialogue’ and the practices 
underpinning that term in order to legitimise their judgments. Legitimacy is not easily defined. 
Shany notes that it is a ‘fully open-ended’220 term that ‘builds bridges across constituencies, 
and ... combines ideas about law, morality, and empirical reality’.221 The quality of legitimacy 
might be ascribed to a legal system, an institution, such as a court, parliament or executive body, 
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a decision, a legal text or a norm.
222
 Applied in this way, its meaning goes beyond the ‘general 
concept’ of legitimacy which treats ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ as terms of mere ‘approbation 
and disapproval’.223 Here, legitimacy concerns what is variably termed the ‘validation of 
power’224 or the ‘justification and acceptance of political authority’225 (authority being ‘a 
relational notion whereby one actor has a claim of obedience upon another’).226  
The concept of legitimacy is distinguished by its legal, normative and descriptive 
dimensions.
227
  First, the ‘legalist notion of legitimacy via legality’,228 also known as ‘formal’229 
legitimacy, focuses on whether ‘all requirements of the law are observed in the creation of the 
institution or system’.230 Further, it looks at whether actors have the ‘legal authority they claim 
and whether their decisions accord with the principles of legality’.231 Second, legitimacy as a 
‘full-blooded normative term’232 looks to the ‘conditions or reasons that justify the claim to 
authoritativeness’.233 These reasons provide what Habermas describes as an institution’s 
‘worthiness to be recognized’.234  
Descriptive legitimacy, also known as sociological or ‘subjective’235 legitimacy, looks at 
‘whether [an institution’s] authority is accepted by relevant audiences’.236 According to Weiler, 
legitimacy from this view connotes ‘a broad, empirically determined, societal acceptance of the 
system’.237 Traditionally, this was measured by compliance with the acts or decisions of a site of 
authority – what Bentham termed the ‘disposition to obey’238 on the part of the governed. Thus, 
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legitimacy is often treated synonymously with the ‘diffuse support’239 or the ‘reservoir of 
goodwill’240 enjoyed by an institution: that ‘which makes people willing to defer even to 
unpopular decisions and helps sustain the institution through difficult times’.241 For Weber, 
however, legitimacy derives from the belief in the rightful rule of governing institutions on the 
part of the governed.
242
 Here, ‘what makes a certain practice of power legitimate is the process 
through which authority justifies its exercise of power and gains social acceptance’.243 
Legitimacy from this perspective, however, retains a normative dimension. Bodanksy notes that 
it is ‘conceptually parasitic on normative legitimacy since beliefs about legitimacy are usually 
beliefs about whether an institution, as a normative matter, has a right to rule’.244 For this reason, 
several scholars have turned to Beetham’s understanding of legitimacy which seeks to bridge the 
two.
245
 This stresses the link between people’s beliefs in an institution’s legitimacy, on the one 
hand, and their normative reasons for holding those beliefs, on the other. Here, the focus is ‘the 
reasons social actors hold for supporting institutions’.246 These are described by Beetham as 
‘normative expectations’:247 socially-embedded standards of normative legitimacy.248 From this 
perspective, a ‘given power relationship is not legitimate because people believe in its 
legitimacy, but because it can be justified in terms of their beliefs’.249 
On this basis, it can be said that courts sustain their legitimacy because they can justify 
the exercise of their power in terms of the beliefs of those subject to their authority. In line with 
this approach, this thesis examines how the UK courts and the ECtHR use dialogue and the 
practices associated with that term in order to justify their authority in terms of the beliefs of 
those subject to their rulings. Weber argued that ‘Experience shows that ... every such system 
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attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy’.250 In a similar vein, Berger and 
Luckmann observed that ‘[i]nstitutions ... are legitimated by living individuals’251 who seek to 
‘justif[y] the institutional order by giving a normative dignity to its practical imperatives’.252 
Judges are no exception. They are not passive actors but central to the legitimacy of the courts in 
which they operate. Krisch notes that ‘legitimacy considerations’253 are among the key factors 
which influence judicial decision-making. On the one hand, judges will take opportunities to 
enhance the legitimacy of their courts as an institution.
254
 On the other hand, their actions can be 
tempered by opposing legitimacy considerations, particularly the ‘fear of a backlash’.255 In this 
regard, Baum’s research in the United States indicates that judges are acutely conscious of their 
audiences, who consist not only of their colleagues, the public, the other branches of government, 
but ‘the legal community, including judges on other courts’,256 from whom they seek acceptance. 
Likewise, Poole has argued that the ‘politicisation’257 of the UK judiciary following the conferral 
of their new powers under the HRA may have ushered in an increasingly audience-conscious 
form of decision-making. He suggests that ‘if it is true that individual judges themselves feel as 
though their judgments are under closer scrutiny, then we might expect them to respond by trying 
to persuade this newly interested audience that the new powers they are wielding are being used 
in a proper manner’.258 In Poole’s view, this would make more common ‘the self-conscious 
consideration of likely political ramifications in the process of formulating judgments’.259  
 4.2 Legitimacy Challenges to the UK Courts and the ECtHR 
 The emergence of dialogue between the UK courts and the ECtHR has an important 
contextual dimension. The powers of the UK courts under the HRA and the role of the ECtHR in 
the UK legal system have faced repeated challenges to their legitimacy. Both courts have faced 
the threat of court ‘curbing’260 in the form of proposals by the UK government to repeal the 
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HRA,
261
 reduce the legal status of final judgments of the ECtHR against states from binding in 
international law to ‘advisory’,262 and even withdraw the UK from the ECHR system 
completely.
263
 There have been severe attacks on the legitimacy of the ECtHR in particular, 
fuelled by its adverse rulings against the UK in respect of the disenfranchisement of prisoners,
264
 
the deportation of terrorist suspects
265
 and the issuing of whole life prison sentences.
266
 Bates 
notes here that ‘...at the core of the strained relationship [between the UK and the ECtHR] are 
concerns over ... the legitimacy of Strasbourg’s influence’.267 This position ‘questions why and 
how Strasbourg has the power that it has to (in effect) override what are generally seen to be 
reasonable British positions’,268 whether legislative or judicial. Further, critics of the ECtHR take 
particular issue with its evolutive interpretive approach, according to which the ECHR is ‘a 
living instrument ... which must be interpreted in the light of present day conditions’.269 The 
former Law Lord, Lord Hoffmann, for example, criticised it as ‘the banner under which the 
Strasbourg court has assumed power to legislate what they consider to be required by “European 
public order”’,270 an approach for which it lacked the ‘constitutional legitimacy’.271 Likewise, 
Lord Sumption has criticised the ECtHR as ‘the international flag-bearer for judge-made 
fundamental law extending well beyond the text which it is charged with applying’.272  
 The UK courts have also faced challenges. The significant new powers bestowed by the 
HRA brought with them the dilemmas and uncertainty as to the boundaries of their use. Lord 
Justice Sales here has noted that the UK courts are now ‘...inevitably political courts in the small 
“p” sense that in applying Convention rights they enter more fully into ruling on issues of policy 
                                                          
261
 UK Conservative Party, ‘Protecting Human Rights in the UK: The Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing 
Britain’s Human Rights Laws’ (3 October 2014) 
<https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/files/.../human_rights.pdf> accessed 10 December 2016 
262
 ibid 5 
263
 ibid 8; Christopher Hope, ‘Theresa May to fight 2020 election on plans to take Britain out of European 
Convention on Human Rights after Brexit is completed’ (The Telegraph 28 December 2016) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/28/theresa-may-fight-2020-election-plans-take-britain-european/> 
accessed 10 Jan 2017  
264
 Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2) (2006) 42 EHRR 41; Greens and MT v United Kingdom [2010] ECHR 1826 
265
 Othman (Abu Qatada) v United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 1 
266
 Vinter v United Kingdom (2016) 63 EHRR 1 
267
 Ed Bates, ‘The UK and Strasbourg: A Strained Relationship – The Long View’ in Ziegler, Wicks and Hodson 
(eds), (n 189) 39, 41 
268
 ibid 
269
 Tyrer v United Kingdom (1979-1980) 2 EHRR 1 [31] 
270
 Lord Hoffmann, ‘The Universality of Human Rights’ (Judicial Studies Board Annual Lecture, 19 March 
2009) 21 <https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/announcements/speech-by-lord-hoffmann-the-universality-of-human-
rights/> accessed 10 December 2016 citing Hatton v United Kingdom (2003) 37 EHRR 611 [O-I5] (Joint 
Dissenting Opinion of Judges Costa, Ress, Türmen, Zupancic and Steiner) 
271
 ibid 23 
272
 Lord Sumption, ‘The Limits of Law’ (27th Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture, Kuala Lumpur, 20 November 2013) 
<https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131120.pdf> accessed 16 December 2016 
27 
 
than was the case for the domestic courts before the HRA’.273 As such, ‘[t]he legitimacy and 
coherence of their activities will always be subject to democratic or populist pressures’.274 In the 
same vein, Masterman has observed that the ‘significant margin of discretion’275 bestowed by s.2 
HRA raised new questions for the ‘legitimacy of the judicial role under the HRA’,276 in particular 
to ‘the idea of maintaining legitimacy in judicial decision-making’.277 Further, the concerns over 
an undue influence being accorded to the ECtHR have fuelled some of the criticisms that the UK 
courts had taken a needlessly deferential approach to the ECtHR. The former Lord Chancellor, 
Lord Irvine, argued that it was imperative that the UK courts counter the perception that they are 
‘merely agents or delegates of the ECHR and CoE ... regard[ing] it as their primary duty to give 
effect to the policy preferences of the Strasbourg Court’.278 Such deference was ‘damaging for 
our courts' own legitimacy and credibility’279 and ‘would gravely undermine, not enhance, 
respect for domestic and international human rights principles in the United Kingdom’.280 
 The criticisms against the UK courts and the ECtHR do not mean that either necessarily 
lacks legitimacy. Føllesdal, Schaffer and Ulfstein point out that ‘...the fact that some of those 
addressed by authority protest and critique surely does not necessarily imply that an institution is 
illegitimate in normative terms’.281 The reality, however, is much harsher, particularly for the 
ECtHR, because ‘compliance often requires that subjects believe that an authority is normatively 
legitimate’.282 A lack of compliance, in turn, can further undermine legitimacy: ‘...whether a 
subject is morally obligated and motivated to comply may depend on whether the agent has 
reason to believe that others will also endorse the norm, for instance because they regard it as 
legitimate, for whatever reason’.283 
Indeed, the judges have shown themselves to be acutely conscious of the difficulties that 
they face. The former ECtHR President, Dean Spielmann, has remarked: 
We face a constant challenge as regards the acceptability of our decisions. This 
question is all the more sensitive as our legitimacy is conferred on us by the 
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States that we find against, and our position is therefore far from easy. We do not 
follow a particular judicial strategy, but it goes without saying that we do think 
about how our judgments will be received.
284
 
Likewise, the Court of Appeal judge, Sir John Laws, observing that ‘law’s authority rests upon 
public belief’,285 has expressed concern that where ‘the law is or seems to be driven by decisions 
of the Strasbourg court ... the resulting fears and resentments may undermine the confidence 
which thinking people ought to have’286 in the ability of the domestic courts to use foreign 
sources of law.   
 4.3 Harnessing the Legitimising Potential of Dialogue? 
 Against this background, the judicial invoking of the concept of ‘dialogue’ is significant. 
The popularity of this concept within the academic literature is partly explained by its 
legitimising potential. Tremblay notes that ‘the idea that some form of dialogue, discussion, 
communication, deliberation, or discourse may confer legitimating force on political authority 
and decision making has been a recurrent theme in contemporary legal, political, and social 
philosophy’.287  
 The long-running debates over the ‘counter-majoritarian’ difficulty associated with the 
judicial review of democratically-enacted legislation are a case in point. Here, the idea of 
constitutional dialogue has become a common, albeit disputed, retort to the contention that courts 
lack the legitimacy to interfere with legislation. The crux of constitutional dialogic theory, as 
explained by Briant, is that ‘the judiciary is not (or should not be) the final arbiter of the content 
of rights, but rather interacts with the legislature through “constructive dialogue” to determine 
their content’.288 Instead of one dictating to the other, the two ‘participate in a dialogue regarding 
the determination of the proper balance between constitutional principles and public policies, 
and, this being the case, there is good reason to think of judicial review as democratically 
legitimate’.289  
 The legitimising force of this idea has not only attracted academic attention, however. 
The seminal article on ‘dialogue’290 between the Canadian Supreme Court and legislature by 
                                                          
284
 Dean Spielmann, ‘Opening Address’ in European Court of Human Rights, Subsidiarity: a Two-Sided Coin? 
(Dialogue between Judges, Council of Europe 2015) 43, 45 
285
 Lord Justice Laws (n 7) 
286
 ibid 
287
 Tremblay (n 10) 617  
288
 Briant (n 12) 250-251 
289
 Tremblay (n 10) 617 
290
 Hogg and Bushell, ‘The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures’ (n 10)  
29 
 
Hogg and Bushell was written, as the authors later put it, ‘to challenge the anti-majoritarian 
objection to the legitimacy of judicial review’.291 Their suggestion was that a judicial decision 
which strikes down legislation could be considered part of a dialogue if the decision could be 
‘reversed, modified, or avoided by the ordinary legislative process’.292 Where this was the case, 
they argued, ‘any concern about the legitimacy of judicial review is greatly diminished’.293 
Carolan notes that the article was ‘an empirical riposte to allegations of judicial supremacy in the 
exercise of the courts’ judicial review powers’.294 However, its ‘implicit support ... for the 
democratic legitimacy of judicial review’295 gave the concept an allure that proved irresistible 
even to the Canadian courts themselves,
296
 not merely as a descriptive choice but as a ‘normative 
template for the legislative–judicial relationship’.297 The Canadian Supreme Court began to 
declare that ‘the law develops through a dialogue between courts and legislatures’298 and that the 
judiciary’s was ‘not necessarily the last word on the subject’.299 Further, it was reasoned that the 
‘...dialogue between and accountability of each of the branches have the effect of enhancing the 
democratic process, not denying it’.300 
 Thus, the UK Supreme Court is not the first to have been tempted by this concept. The 
parallels, however, mean that it can be plausibly asked whether that court, like its Canadian 
counterpart, invoked the concept of dialogue as a response to the legitimacy challenges which 
they faced regarding a particular inter-institutional relationship. Their particular challenges, of 
course, concerned their relationship with another court, but the thinking appears similar: an 
attempt to rebut allegations of an over-concentration of power in one (judicial) institution at the 
expense of another, and thereby confer legitimacy.   
 The question is particularly merited given that both the UK courts and the ECtHR have 
shown themselves responsive to challenges to their legitimacy. As mentioned earlier, Poole has 
contended that the conferral of the expanded powers of judicial review under the HRA may well 
have fostered an increasingly strategic form of decision-making as the public scrutiny of the 
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courts intensified.
301
 In this regard, Clayton has observed that s.2 HRA posed ‘immense practical 
difficulties’302 to the UK courts in the early years of the HRA after the UK government appeared 
to resile from its support for the HRA in its commitment to the ‘war on terror’, and became 
particularly critical of judicial decisions under that legislation.
303
 With Tomlinson, he argues that 
the strict approach of the UK courts to the Strasbourg jurisprudence, particularly regarding the 
duty to do ‘no more’ than the ECtHR, was their way of seeking ‘democratic legitimacy by means 
of a self-denying ordinance’.304 Amos has written to similar effect: ‘By making it clear that they 
were merely doing what the ECtHR required, their Lordships effectively absolved themselves 
from direct responsibility’.305 The ECtHR has also shown itself adept to responding to legitimacy 
challenges. Madsen has argued that early in the life of the ECtHR it was the sensitivity of its 
judges to the court’s lack of legitimacy which allowed it to thrive and expand in later years. To 
this end, it employed a ‘self-constrained legal diplomacy’,306 whereby ‘jurisprudential 
developments were clearly balanced with diplomatic considerations’.307 Madsen suggests that 
this was made possible by the ‘legal-political reflexivity of the small legal elite inhabiting the 
Court during the first 20 years or so, who implicitly understood when to hold back and when to 
push for European human rights’.308  
4. The Thesis and its Structure 
The thesis argues that the UK courts and the ECtHR have utilised the judicial ‘dialogue’ between 
their courts as a means of legitimising their respective judgments in response to the direct 
challenges to their human rights adjudication.  It will seek to demonstrate that the manifestations 
of dialogue, both through judgments and through meetings, embody the mutual participation, 
mutual accountability and the ongoing revision and refinement of arguments by these courts, 
each of which can contribute to judicial legitimacy at the domestic and European levels. 
However, it will also make the case that this legitimising potential is limited, with one particular 
                                                          
301
 Poole (n 257) 557 
302
 Richard  Clayton, ‘Should the English Courts under the HRA Mirror the Strasbourg Case Law?’ in Ziegler, 
Wicks and Hodson (eds), (n 189) 95, 113 
303
 ibid 113 
304
 Richard Clayton and Hugh Tomlinson, ‘Lord Bingham and the Human Rights Act 1998: The Search for 
Democratic Legitimacy during the “War on Terror”’ in Mads Andenas and Duncan Fairgrieve (eds), Tom Bingham 
and the Transformation of the Law: A Liber Amicorum (OUP 2009) 65 
305
 Amos (n 13) 580 
306
 Mikael Rask Madsen, ‘The Challenging Authority of the European Court of Human Rights: From Cold War 
Legal Diplomacy to the Brighton Declaration and Backlash’ (2016) 79(1) LCP 141, 152  
307
 Mikael Rask Madsen, ‘The Legitimization Strategies of International Judges: The Case of the European Court of 
Human Rights’ in M. Bobek (ed), Selecting Europe’s Judges: A Critical Review of the Appointment Procedures to 
the European Courts (OUP 2015) 259, 269 
308
 ibid 273 
31 
 
manifestation of dialogue – the open disagreement by national courts with a judgment of the 
ECtHR – carrying a delegitimising potential for the Convention-based system of human rights 
protection. As outlined above, the thesis develops these arguments by addressing four questions. 
First, what is judicial ‘dialogue’ in the context of the decision-making of the UK courts and the 
ECtHR? Second, what are its functions? Third, what is the role of the informal dialogue between 
these courts? Finally, what is the role of judicial dialogue in legitimising the judgments of the 
UK courts and the ECtHR? 
 Chapter 2 sets out the methodology which underpinned the research. It offers an overview 
of the conceptual difficulties in the existing literature on the concept of judicial dialogue, as well 
as the different functions which have been ascribed to it. In doing so, it seeks to provide the 
justification for a qualitative, interview-based study with the judges at the centre of the dialogue 
between these courts. It sets out the research design and justifies the methodological decisions 
taken during the course of the research.  
 Drawing upon the interviews with the judges, the domestic and Strasbourg case law, and 
extra-judicial literature, Chapters 3 to 6 sequentially explore the four research questions. Chapter 
3 attempts to clarify the form of dialogue through judgments, as understood by the judges. While 
a precise definition proves elusive, it concludes that this form of ‘dialogue’ refers to a process by 
which the courts, subject to practical and normative constraints, exchange views and seek to 
influence one another through their judgments. This definition does not differ radically from 
existing understandings of judicial dialogue. However, the data make clear the extent of the 
strategic thinking on the part of the judges in their efforts to persuade one another.  
 In Chapter 4, the thesis explores the functions attributed by the judges to the judgment-
based dialogue between their courts. It argues that dialogue purports to mitigate the tensions 
arising from their differing institutional perspectives, prevailing legal traditions and overlapping 
jurisdictions in the interpretation and application of the Convention rights. Dialogue is used as a 
way of increasing the procedural flexibility of the Convention system, challenging domestic 
judicial complacency, improving the quality of the principles applied by the ECtHR and, in the 
case of the UK courts, bolstering judicial identity.  
 In Chapter 5, the focus shifts to the dialogue taking place through periodic meetings 
between the UK and ECtHR judges. As with the discussion of dialogue through judgments, it 
examines the form of the meetings – the frequency of their occurrence, the participants involved, 
and the format and tone of the discussions – and their significance. It identifies a number of 
procedural, substantive and diplomatic functions; each possesses its own value but also appears 
aimed at furthering the realisation of a relationship of subsidiarity between the courts. 
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 In Chapter 6, the various conclusions on the nature and functions of judgment-based and 
informal dialogue between these courts are drawn together in order to arrive at the conclusions 
on its legitimising role. The chapter sets out in greater detail the nature of the legitimacy 
challenges confronting the UK courts and the ECtHR: the jurisdictional pluralism that defines 
their relationship, the need for the ECtHR to maintain the consent of the national authorities 
across the Council of Europe, demonstrate respect for national legal traditions and decision-
making, while maintaining the guise of legal as opposed to discretionary decision-making. The 
UK courts face the charges of undue deference to the ECtHR and the lack of ‘ownership’ 
ascribed to the rights under the HRA which it is their responsibility to uphold. It argues that three 
features of discourse, as understood in political theory, permeate the processes of dialogue 
described by the judges and which manifest through the case law: mutual participation, mutual 
accountability and the ongoing revision and refinement of arguments, each performing 
legitimising functions within the context of the relationship between the courts and the particular 
legitimacy challenges which they face. It places these arguments into a wider context to argue 
that ‘dialogue’ simply reflects one part of two broader, parallel legitimacy strategies pursued by 
the courts: the strengthening of subsidiarity by the ECtHR, on the one hand, and the enhancement 
of domestic judicial autonomy in human rights adjudication, on the other.  
 Having explored the legitimising potential of dialogue between these courts, the final 
chapter of the thesis offers a normative critique of the principal form of dialogue through 
judgments – a sequential process by which the national courts disagree with the ECtHR and the 
ECtHR, in turn, revises its jurisprudence. It argues that this practice carries the potential to 
delegitimise the ECHR system by promoting a disposition to disobey on the part of national 
courts and indeed other addressees of ECtHR rulings across the Council of Europe. It submits 
that repeated challenges to the judgments of the ECtHR has placed its reasoning under strain as it 
has sought to accommodate domestic judicial concerns, and that the apparent salience given to 
the political climate in the UK at the time of key judgment has fuelled concerns with an 
abandonment of legal principle, diluting its authority and risking further challenge by other 
national authorities.   
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Chapter 2  
Methodology  
To restrict one’s inquiry to the judgements of the courts, the end-products of the 
decision-making process, rather than scrutinising the dynamics of the process 
itself, is in some sense no more intellectually satisfying than attributing Christmas 
presents to Santa Claus, or babies to storks.
1
 
- Alan Paterson, The Law Lords 
1. Introduction 
The introductory chapter outlined the four research questions addressed by this thesis. First, what 
is judicial ‘dialogue’ in the context of the decision-making of the UK courts and the ECtHR? 
Second, what are its functions? Third, what is the role of the informal dialogue between these 
courts? Fourth, what is the role of judicial dialogue in legitimising the judgments of the UK 
courts and the ECtHR?  
 The task of answering these questions was undertaken using a qualitative research design 
consisting of in-depth interviews, thematic analysis, case law, and desk-based and library 
research. The traditional methodology of doctrinal legal research in the use of statutes and case 
law ‘…to identify, analyse and synthesise the content of the law’2 was deemed to be an 
inadequate strategy for answering the research questions. As was shown in the opening chapter, 
both ‘dialogue’ and ‘legitimacy’ are disputed concepts which extend beyond law. ‘Dialogue’ in 
particular has been attached to interactions between judges which occur both within and outside 
of the context of their judgments. It was thus felt that the use of case law alone would provide 
limited insights in reaching an understanding as to the role of these interactions in legitimising 
the judgments of these courts. Paterson’s quip over the limitations of relying solely on case law 
was made specifically in the context of his seminal study of the decision-making process of the 
former Judicial Appellate Committee of the House of Lords. Nonetheless, his words underline 
the importance of seeking to understand judicial interactions, which transcend the narrow 
confines of written judgments, using a methodology which also looks beyond those judgments. 
 The aim of this chapter is to justify the methodological decisions which guided the 
research. Parts 2 and 3 outline the existing research on the two forms of dialogue – judgment-
based and face-to-face – discussed in the introductory chapter and its limits. With regards to 
dialogue through judgments, Part 2 observes divergent understandings within the scholarship as 
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to the form of the interactions, the degree of reciprocity involved in those interactions, and the 
presence of varied normative positions as to how dialogue through judgments should proceed, 
based on different views as to the nature of the judicial role under the Human Rights Act (HRA) 
1998.  In Part 3, the chapter observes the wide-ranging functions which have been ascribed to the 
idea of judicial dialogue, alluded to in the introductory chapter. In respect of the functions of 
face-to-face dialogue between judges of the courts, however, it notes an information gap 
necessitating further research into this area. In Part 4, the chapter offers a justification for the 
research design and the interpretivist approach to the study of judicial dialogue based on the 
limitations of the existing research, and the qualitative method which structured the research 
process. The remaining parts of the chapter justify each aspect of the research design. Part 5 
addresses the use of in-depth interviewing and its limitations in this context, while the sampling 
choices and issues of access are set out in Part 6. An explanation of the choice of interview 
questions is provided in Part 7, and the method of thematic analysis applied to the interview 
transcripts is set out in Part 8. The other materials which were relied upon for this research are 
addressed in Part 9. The research-ethical considerations can be found in the Appendices.  
2. Discerning Dialogue in the Judgments of the UK Courts and the ECtHR  
2.1 What counts as ‘dialogue’?  
Dialogue through the medium of judgments is generally considered to be defined by two 
features. First, it involves interaction between courts in the form the explicit citation by one court 
of the judgments of courts from outside of its jurisdiction.
3
 A court might cite the judgment of a 
national or supranational counterpart for its ‘minor relevance’,4 as a point of discussion in the 
reasoning before ‘distinguishing’5 it or because they are ‘‘following’ ... [the judgment] as some 
sort of authority’,6 and it thus ‘contributes directly to the holding of the case’.7 The act of 
citation, however, is said to allow judges ‘to comment on foreign courts' interpretations of a 
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particular norm’8 and to thereby signal ‘judicial willingness (and even eagerness) to become part 
of a broader international discourse’.9 
Second, what is said to distinguish dialogue from isolated citations is the ‘element of 
reciprocity’10 between the courts involved in the form of an ‘exchange of views and 
experiences’.11 In this respect, dialogue is often distinguished from the ‘one-way transmission’,12 
‘one-way traffic’,13 ‘reception’14 or ‘monologues’15 of ideas between courts, each referring to the 
situation where ‘a court whose ideas or conclusions are borrowed by foreign courts, whether on 
the national or supranational level, is not a self-conscious participant in an ongoing 
conversation’.16 Dialogue, instead, is said to be characterised by courts ‘mutually reading and 
discussing each other’s jurisprudence’.17 According to Pérez, it consists of ‘an ongoing exchange 
of arguments’18 albeit one which ‘develop[s] in a fragmented manner since the exchanges ... 
occur case by case’.19 De Witte similarly notes that ‘a real dialogue, with mutual exchange of 
arguments, requires a series of subsequent references in different cases raising similar 
problems’.20 For this reason, Slaughter, the ‘most visible and influential proponent’21 of the 
concept, suggests that ‘direct dialogue’22 between courts consists of ‘communication between 
two courts that is effectively initiated by one and responded to by the other’,23 and underpinned 
by ‘an awareness on the part of both participants of whom they are talking to and a 
                                                          
8
 Melissa A Waters, ‘Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating 
and Enforcing International Law’ (2005) 93 Geo LJ 487, 507 
9
 ibid 
10
 Tor-Inge Harbo, ‘Legal Integration through Judicial Dialogue’ in Ole Kristian Fauchald and André Nollkaemper 
(eds), The Practice of National and International Courts and the (De-)Fragmentation of International Law (Hart 
2012) 167, 169  
11
 Allan Rosas, ‘The European Court of Justice in Context: Forms and Patterns of Judicial Dialogue’ (2007) 1(2) 
EJLS 121, 131 
12
 Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, ‘The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the Impact of the Rehnquist Court’ 
(1998) 34(1) Tulsa L Rev 15, 21 
13
 Gelter and Siems (n 3) 88 
14
 L’Heureux-Dubé (n 12) 17 
15
 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’ (1994) 29 U Rich L Rev 99, 113; Antonios 
Tzanakopoulos, ‘Judicial Dialogue in Multi-level Governance: The Impact of the Solange Argument’ in Fauchald 
and Nollkaemper (n 10) 185, 188 
16
 ibid 
17
 L’Heureux-Dube (n 12) 21 
18
 Aida Torres Pérez, Conflicts of Rights in the European Union: A Theory of Supranational Adjudication (OUP 
2009) 112 
19
 ibid 111 
20Bruno De Witte, ‘The Closest Thing to a Constitutional Conversation in Europe: the Semi-Permanent Treaty 
Revision Process’ in Paul Beaumont, Carole Lyons and Neil Walker (eds.), Convergence & Divergence in European 
Public Law (Bloomsbury 2002) 39, 41 
21
 Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., ‘“I’d Like to Teach the Word to Sing (in Perfect Harmony)”: International Judicial 
Dialogue and the Muses – Reflections on the Perils and the Promise of International Judicial Dialogue’ (2006) 
104(6) Mich L Rev 1321, 1328 
22
 Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’ (n 15) 112 
23
 ibid 112 
36 
 
corresponding willingness to take account of the response’.24 Thus, the idea is that the cross-
citations between particular courts are ‘characterized by such a degree of mutual engagement and 
substantive debate that it amounts to an ongoing conversation conducted through the medium of 
judicial opinions’.25  
Turning to the context of interest, however, academic accounts vary as to the form of 
judgment-based dialogue between the UK courts and the ECtHR. There are three issues here. 
The first two are descriptive. First, while dialogue is generally thought to be characterised by 
explicit interactions, the nature of the interactions to which the term dialogue has been applied is 
extremely wide. Second, although dialogue through judgments is usually defined by reciprocity 
between the courts involved, there are differences of view as to the directness of that reciprocity. 
The third issue is normative. There are striking differences of view as to how a dialogue between 
these courts should take place, based on divergent views as to the nature of the domestic judicial 
role under the HRA.  
2.2. A Spectrum of Dialogic Interactions  
In the introductory chapter, it was seen that ‘dialogue’ refers to a ‘discussion between two 
or more people or groups, especially one directed towards exploration of a particular subject or 
resolution of a problem’,26 with connotations of discussion, collaboration, agreement, 
disagreement and opposition. This malleability has allowed the term to be applied to a wide 
range of judgment-based interactions between the UK courts and the ECtHR. One way of 
categorising these interactions is via a spectrum of cooperation and contestation
27
 or, as the 
former ECtHR President, Jean-Paul Costa has put it, between ‘consensual’28 dialogue and 
dialogue based on ‘conflict’.29  
There are two broad forms of interaction that might be considered to reflect consensual 
dialogue. First, it is said that such a dialogue can take place where the national courts apply the 
judgments of the ECtHR. Young suggests that ‘dialogue between the two courts can be facilitated 
when national courts take account of decisions in the Strasbourg court, recognising the way in 
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which the court has interpreted Convention rights in the past and predicting future refinements of 
the definition of Convention rights’.30 Similarly, Costa observes such a dialogue where a national 
court ‘coordinates its decisions with the Strasbourg caselaw, adhering to it and, above all, being 
guided by it’.31 Second, it has been suggested that a consensual dialogue takes place where the 
ECtHR agrees with a judgment of national courts; it ‘not only endorses the decision of a 
constitutional court but uses the reasoning in its own decision’.32 Masterman construes dialogue 
in this way as the process of ‘upward influence of national courts’.33 Particular emphasis has thus 
been placed on the potential for consensual dialogue on those occasions where the UK courts 
develop the Convention principles in areas where there is no ‘clear and constant’34 jurisprudence 
from the ECtHR. In the view of the former Lord Chancellor and leading architect of the HRA, 
Lord Irvine, such areas in which the ECtHR has not reached a settled view offer the UK courts 
‘the greatest scope to enter into a productive dialogue with the ECHR, and thus shape its 
jurisprudence’.35  
Dialogue based on contestation, or ‘conflictual’36 dialogue, could also be said to 
encompass two broad forms of interaction. First, such a dialogue is thought to manifest where the 
UK courts criticise or disagree with a decision of the ECtHR.
37
 This disagreement ‘may be based 
on the different reading of the facts or the law by a national court that in effect reviews the merits 
of a judgment of an international court’.38 Masterman defines this form of dialogue as ‘critical 
engagement with the Strasbourg jurisprudence in domestic adjudication... lead[ing] to a 
reconsideration and refinement of the European Court’s position’.39 It is this form of interaction 
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which is subject to the dialogue label most frequently.
40
 Second, it has also been suggested that a 
conflictual dialogue arises in those instances where the ECtHR disagrees with a decision of the 
national courts. Sales observes that the role of the ECtHR in dialogue with the UK courts is in 
‘correcting’41 domestic judgments that it considers to have reached a mistaken interpretation of 
the Convention rights. Thus, it is thought that the ECtHR engages in conflictual dialogue ‘if and 
to the extent that domestic courts have failed to apply (the substance of) ... [ECHR] law 
properly’.42  
It must be noted that these categories are not easily demarcated. The interactions between 
the courts over a particular issue can involve both consensus and conflict. A domestic judgment 
which criticises an ECtHR judgment, for example, might nonetheless apply it, thus reflecting 
conflict and consensus simultaneously. Further, whether a given interaction is to be considered 
consensual or conflictual is a matter for interpretation. Indeed, many of the UK cases where the 
UK courts either contested or considered contesting an ECtHR decision have stressed the 
cooperative nature of their endeavour: the criticisms are always expressed as ‘constructive’,43 
‘valuable’44 and ‘meaningful’.45 Equally, those judgments which apply the Strasbourg principles, 
or further develop the protection which they accord to the Convention rights, have the potential 
to be considered a form of conflict. Kavanagh, for example, has warned that attempts by national 
courts ‘to give a more generous interpretation of Convention rights ... would weaken and dilute 
the authority of the Strasbourg court and undermine the duty of judicial comity which exists 
between the domestic and Strasbourg Courts’.46 Likewise, Young warns that ‘To do so may be 
interpreted as an assertion of the domestic courts to challenge the role of the Strasbourg court to 
define rights’.47 Nonetheless, while these are not watertight categories, they demonstrate the 
breadth of judgment-based interactions to which the term ‘dialogue’ has been applied. 
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2.3 Reciprocity  
 The second descriptive issue arising from the way that the term ‘dialogue’ has been 
applied concerns the directness of the reciprocity required between the courts in order for the 
dialogue label to be considered appropriate. A difficulty noted by Bjorge is that ‘all cases’48 that 
are subject to adjudication both in the domestic legal system of an ECHR Member State and then 
the ECtHR, affording both the opportunity to issue their opinion, ‘make up a dialogue’.49 In this 
respect, accounts diverge as to whether dialogue can take place within or between what Bjorge 
calls a ‘factual complex’.50 Dialogue within a factual complex occurs where a particular case 
‘first comes before the domestic courts and then before the European Court’.51 Exemplifying the 
first view is the Court of Appeal judge, Lord Justice Sales. Dialogue, in his view, should allow 
domestic judicial conclusions on a particular case to be ‘test[ed] ... by argument in Strasbourg’.52 
He observes that UK cases which, instead, are resolved in the claimant’s favour at the domestic 
level do not ‘readily give rise to a dialogue with the ECtHR’.53 
 Dialogue between factual complexes, on the other hand, is said to occur where a 
judgment of a national court is subsequently considered by the ECtHR, however in the context of 
a different case and set of facts.
54
 Commentators in this second camp have a more flexible view 
of the reciprocity involved in dialogue. Bjorge, among them, points out that dialogue between the 
courts takes place between factual complexes as well as within them.
55
 The same view is also 
evident in Amos’ account of ‘deliberative dialogue’56 between the UK courts and the ECtHR. On 
this view, dialogue involves the courts ‘taking decisions in common; reaching agreement; solving 
problems or conflicts collectively; determining together which opinion or thesis is true, the most 
justified or the best’.57 Applying this understanding, Amos observes that dialogue ‘is not as 
widespread as might be thought’58 because ‘in practice the majority of HRA claims are 
determined via the application of the clear and constant jurisprudence of the ECtHR’.59 On this 
basis, ‘[i]t is not in every HRA judgment that every UK court seeks to enter into a dialogue with 
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the ECtHR’.60 For Amos, the key opportunities for deliberative dialogue have arisen where the 
domestic courts believe the ECtHR has taken the wrong approach,
61
 where they have a margin of 
appreciation in how to decide an issue,
62
 and where the relevant Strasbourg principles lack 
clarity.
63
 In these scenarios, she suggests, the UK courts issue their judgments and either 
expressly or by implication ‘seek eventual confirmation from the ECtHR’,64 leaving it ‘open to 
the ECtHR to give its view on the position adopted either in proceedings brought by an 
unsuccessful claimant or in unrelated proceedings’.65 Thus, Amos acknowledges that where the 
UK courts have adjudicated on a Convention right, the ECtHR might engage with the views of 
the UK courts not simply if the same case subsequently reaches the ECtHR but also in ‘unrelated 
proceedings’.66   
 A third and wider category which could be added here is dialogue beyond factual 
complexes. On this view, even the mere potential of a domestic judgment to influence the ECtHR 
in its determination of the European consensus on the minimum level of protection to be 
accorded to a particular Convention rights can be considered to reflect dialogue. It has thus been 
argued that domestic judgments which accord protection to the Convention rights, even where 
the ECtHR is yet to make a similar finding, also form part of a dialogue between the courts, 
irrespective of whether those judgments have discernibly influenced judgments of ECtHR. In this 
regard, Lord Irvine cites several such domestic judgments as evidence of dialogue.
67
 Here, what 
appears to be important is the possibility that the ECtHR might make use of those judgments at 
some unspecified point in the future or in its determination of where the European consensus lies 
on particular issues.
68
 It is dialogue beyond factual complexes to the extent that it is seen as 
immaterial whether the ECtHR has commented on the domestic judicial conclusion, either by 
considering the same case or in an unrelated case raising the same issue. Notably, however, this 
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is directly disputed as a category of dialogue by Sales on the basis that the ECtHR is not able to 
subsequently consider and comment on the accuracy of the conclusions.
69
 
2.4 Competing Normative Perspectives 
The third issue concerning the form of dialogue through judgments arises from the 
discussions on the duty to ‘take into account’ judgments of the ECtHR under s.2 HRA. Here, 
there are various suggestions as to how dialogue between the courts should take place, in both 
normative and practical terms, based on particular understandings of the judicial role under the 
HRA. It is in this respect that the most significant differences of view on dialogue through 
judgments have emerged, with Fenwick noting a ‘polarisation of opinion’.70  
On one side of this polarisation are those adhering to what is labelled the 
‘incorporationist’71 view, who argue that the HRA was designed as a ‘conduit’72 to give effect 
only to those rights which could be enforced before the ECtHR.  Proponents of this view stress 
the explicit intention behind the Act to relieve potential ECtHR applicants from having to take 
the ‘long and hard’73 road to Strasbourg and point to the HRA provisions which refer explicitly 
to the Convention.
74
 Alternative views of the HRA, however, understand the legislation either as 
a tool for ‘blend[ing] Convention and common law protections’75 or as having ‘created anew a 
distinctly domestic species of legal rights’.76 They point out that the rights contained in the HRA 
are contained in a domestic statute,
77
 and highlight the ‘purely domestic concepts’78 within the 
HRA, such as the declaration of incompatibility and the ‘hybrid public authorities’79 to which 
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HRA obligations apply. They also point to the flexibility contemplated by the s.2 duty.
80
 These 
distinct understandings largely shape their adherents’ conceptions of how dialogue between the 
courts should proceed. In particular, the accounts differ in their level of support for the two 
stipulations of the Ullah
81
 principle, encountered in the introductory chapter, that the UK courts 
should accord ‘no more’82 and ‘no less’83 protection to the Convention rights than the ECtHR.  
Some adopting an incorporationist view of the HRA defend the ‘no more’ dimension of 
the Ullah approach and suggest that for a ‘fruitful dialogue’84 to take place the UK courts should 
not outpace the protection that has so far been accorded to Convention rights by the existing 
ECtHR case law. The most prominent advocate of this view is Lord Justice Sales, who places 
great weight on the fact that any judgment-based dialogue between the UK courts and the ECtHR 
has to take place within ‘the highly formal procedural limits of litigation in the domestic courts 
and before the ECtHR’85 with ‘no scope for a direct exchange of views ... before resolution of a 
particular case’.86 For this reason, he suggests that a dialogue demands from the UK courts a 
‘relatively cautious approach ... where there is no clear lead given by the ECtHR’.87 Echoing 
Lord Brown’s thinking in Al-Skeini,88 he points out that where the UK courts apply the 
Convention rights too generously, ‘the ECtHR cannot readily correct the error’89 and thus the 
situation does not ‘readily give rise to a dialogue with the ECtHR’.90  
Other authors adhering to an incorporationist view, however, are equally strict that that 
the UK courts should do ‘no less’ than the ECtHR. Draghici, for example, criticises the 
conception of dialogue made apparent in the Horncastle
91
 line of cases, where the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly asserted its freedom to pursue dialogue with the ECtHR by refusing to apply 
judgments which have caused concerns, as ‘peculiar’92 and ‘not the way a dialogue between 
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courts should take place’.93 In her view, dialogue should not be conducted through a domestic 
court ‘frustrating the purpose of the creation of a binding supra-national court’.94 Instead,  ‘[t]he 
input of domestic courts and the constructive dialogue ... should take place at the stage of 
scrutiny, by the Strasbourg judges, of domestic jurisprudence clarifying the opinio juris of the 
member states on a particular aspect of a right’.95   
Those who understand the HRA as more than an incorporationist statute, however, argue 
that dialogue with the ECtHR requires that the UK courts should be willing to go further than the 
ECtHR. Exemplifying this view, Clayton has argued that ‘[w]hile, as a matter of judicial comity, 
it is necessary for the domestic courts to comply with Strasbourg jurisprudence as a minimum 
requirement, no principle requires the ECtHR to define the ceiling of Convention rights under the 
HRA’.96 By recognising this, he suggests that the national courts can, ‘in the absence of pre-
existing jurisprudence, stimulat[e] a dialogue with the ECtHR’.97 In the same vein, Masterman 
suggests that where the UK courts accord protection to a Convention right, notwithstanding the 
absence of a directly applicable ECtHR judgment, they provide ‘one of the key indicators of 
emerging consensus (or otherwise) among Convention signatories’98 and thereby facilitate ‘the 
upward influence of national courts in this dialogue’.99  
 At the same time, some commentators viewing the HRA as more than an incorporationist 
statute maintain that dialogue requires a willingness by the UK courts not only to go further than 
the ECtHR but to disagree with it in some circumstances. Among these is Lord Irvine, who 
argues that the UK courts hinder rather than create dialogue with the ECtHR when they treat its 
judgments as binding precedents: ‘A court which subordinates itself to follow another's rulings 
cannot enter into a dialogue with its superior in any meaningful sense’.100 Fenwick takes a 
similar view, arguing that where UK courts ‘merely implement a Strasbourg judgment, as in the 
most obvious example – AF No3,101 such a dialogue is not promoted’102 because it ‘tends to 
mean that the domestic judges remain outside any process of development of a European 
jurisprudence to which they contribute a fresh voice’.103    
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 Thus, the varied normative positions at work within this context have created divergent 
understandings of the nature of dialogue between these courts and how it should take place, with 
authors variably defending or disputing the desirability of the UK courts doing ‘no more’ and ‘no 
less’ than the ECtHR in the protection which they accord to Convention rights.  
3. The Functions of Judicial Dialogue 
What the chapter has established thus far is the breath of judgment-based interactions between 
the UK courts and the ECtHR to which the term ‘dialogue’ has been applied in the academic 
literature, the differences of view as to the directness of the reciprocity required for this label to 
be considered appropriate, and the divergent normative positions as to how the dialogue should 
unfold. There are two further dimensions to the literature, however, which merit attention. First, 
as mentioned in the introductory chapter, a considerable range of functions have been attributed 
to the idea of judges engaging in dialogue through judgments. Second, there is, by comparison, a 
lack of information regarding the functions of informal judicial dialogue in this context. The 
following sections address these points. It will be argued later in the chapter that, combined with 
the issues explored so far, they justify a research methodology which focuses on the insights of 
the judges involved. 
 3.1 Dialogue through Judgments 
 Five functions commonly attributed to judicial dialogue are cross-influence, the 
enhancement of the quality of judicial reasoning, mutual accommodation, judicial empowerment 
and the strengthening of human rights protection. These insights provide a framework against 
which the judicial understandings of dialogue between the UK courts and the ECtHR can be 
compared in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 3.1.1 Cross-influence  
 First, judicial dialogue is thought to manifest in cross-influence between courts. Waters 
conceives it as ‘the engine by which domestic courts collectively engage in the co-constitutive 
process of creating and shaping international legal norms and, in turn, ensuring that those norms 
shape and inform domestic norms’.104 In the same way, dialogue between the UK courts and the 
ECtHR is often understood as cross-influence in the development of Convention rights. Young 
suggests that ‘dialogue is not best understood in terms of a clash of sovereign rights’105 but rather 
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‘as a means of refining the definition of Convention rights’106 through the respective judgments 
of the national courts and the ECtHR.  According to Lord Irvine, dialogue purports to ‘influence 
Strasbourg's approach to decisions of our Supreme Court’107 and ‘influence the approach which 
the Strasbourg Court ultimately adopts’.108  
 3.1.2 Enhancing the quality of judicial reasoning 
 Second, judicial dialogue is said to enhance the quality of judicial reasoning. Regular 
interaction between judges is thought to ‘produce a better solution than can be arrived at by any 
one individual’,109‘enrich[ing] the debate with participants adding arguments not thought of by 
others’.110  In the present context, Sales suggests that the ECtHR can correct erroneous thinking 
by the UK courts in their determination of the content of Convention rights.
111
 Equally, he notes 
that UK courts can, through their interactions with the Strasbourg case law, correct judgments of 
the ECtHR where the latter has misunderstood domestic law, and also provide ‘detailed 
reasoning’112 to assist the Court in the development of its principles at the supranational level.113  
 3.1.3 Mutual accommodation 
 Third, judicial dialogue is linked to the mutual accommodation of overlapping sites of 
judicial authority in instances of conflict. Kuo explains that ‘Through their decisions, the 
different judicial and quasi-judicial bodies involved in this interplay are expected to signal to 
their counterparts on what conditions and to what extent judicial self-restraint will be exercised 
in order to avoid sitting in judgment on other constitutional orders’.114 On this view, each side 
seeks to ‘locate a point of convergence between constitutional orders through its own judicial 
rulings’.115 Here, ‘a successful dialogue begins with contestation and then proceeds in a spirit of 
cooperation, leading to the resolution of potential conflicts between distinct orders’.116 In the 
same vein, Feldman suggests that where a UK court ‘consciously limits the application of 
Strasbourg case law ... to protect domestic legal and constitutional arrangements’,117 this ‘can 
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produce some uncertainty, but it also allows dialogue with the Strasbourg court which can lead to 
a realignment of the jurisprudence in each jurisdiction to re-establish consistency’.118 
 3.1.4 Judicial empowerment 
 Fourth, commentators point to the potential of dialogue to empower the judges involved. 
Amos argues that dialogue between the courts has the potential for ‘a dramatic increase in the 
power of the judiciary’,119 noting that ‘UK judges have been enabled by their relationship with 
the ECtHR to take many decisions that they might not have been prepared to take without it’.120 
Related to this is the view that dialogue can cultivate a transformation in judicial identity.
121
 It is 
argued that increasing interaction between judges from different systems might encourage a shift 
from ‘a narrow, "nationalist" conception of the judicial role characterized by judicial deference to 
both domestic public opinion and to executive branch prerogatives in foreign relations’122 
towards ‘a more expansive, "internationalist" conception of the judicial role ... as mediators 
between international and domestic legal norms, and as protectors of individual rights under 
international law’.123 Going further, Slaughter has famously argued that through regular 
interaction, through judgments and face-to-face, judges would come to conceive themselves as 
part of a ‘global community of courts’.124 Here, ‘the institutional identity of all these courts, and 
the professional identity of the judges who sit on them, is forged more by their common function 
of resolving disputes under the rule of law than by the differences in the law they apply’,125 
characterised by a ‘self-awareness’126 as ‘participants in a common judicial enterprise’.127 While 
the judges do not shed their identities as national or international judges, they become 
‘increasingly part of a larger transnational system’.128 
 3.1.5 Enhancing the protection of human rights 
 A further function attributed to judicial dialogue is the enhancement of human rights 
protections. Mazzone notes that judicial dialogue is ‘routinely celebrated for its rights-enhancing 
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effects’.129 At the forefront of this view is Slaughter, who argues that ‘regular and interactive 
tranjudicial communication’130 can lead to the ‘spread and enhanced protection of human 
rights’.131 On this view, the common sense of judicial identity as members of a community of 
courts charged with upholding individual rights forged by regular judicial interaction leads to a 
greater judicial willingness to uphold the separation of powers and check abuses of executive 
power, as ‘courts bolstered by communication with other national and supranational courts will 
be bolstered in their efforts to make their own voices heard’.132 Commentators here frequently 
point to the Solange
133
 exchanges between the German Constitutional Court and the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) – described as the ‘paradigmatic example’134 of judicial dialogue – which 
are credited with catalysing the latter’s development of its fundamental rights jurisprudence.135 
The constitutional court insisted that it would continue to exercise its constitutional power to 
review the compatibility of European Community legislation with the fundamental rights 
contained in the German Constitution ‘so long as’ equivalent protection of those rights was not 
available at Community level. The ECJ responded over a series of decisions by ‘blending a 
mixture of national and international human rights guarantees’.136 This was to the eventual 
satisfaction of the German constitutional court. Tzanakopoulos explains that in its Solange II
137
 
decision, the court held that it would ‘refrain from reviewing Community acts for conformity 
with the German Constitution’138 so long as equivalent protection continued to be offered at the 
Community level.
139
 
 3.2 Informal Judicial Dialogue 
 In contrast to dialogue through judgments, the role of informal meetings between ECtHR 
and national judges has received less attention. At first glance these interactions perhaps raise 
suspicion, appearing ‘at once both glamorous and vaguely conspiratorial’,140 conjuring ‘an image 
of judges trotting the globe to chart the course of constitutional law behind closed doors before 
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returning home to impose this master scheme on their unwitting compatriots’.141 McCrudden, 
however, advises caution when approaching this aspect of inter-judicial relationships. In his 
view, informal dialogues between judges from different jurisdictions ‘[n]o doubt ... result in 
some influences (such as a country’s culture of rights) being inculcated. But such influences, 
whilst important, are difficult to pin down and prone to over- (or under-) estimation’.142 
Slaughter suggests that such meetings perform several of the same functions as dialogue through 
judgments. They lead to cross-influence (‘educate and ... cross-fertilize’),143 enhance judicial 
reasoning (‘broaden the perspectives of the participating judges’)144 and can assist in the 
transformation of judicial identity (‘socialize their members as participants in a common global 
judicial enterprise’).145 Further, she argues that they provide an important buffer to the 
interactions through judgments as ‘regular relations and knowledge of one another provides 
assurance that conflict will not escalate and rupture the underlying relationship’.146   
 There are few insights available into the role of informal judicial dialogue within the 
ECHR system, however, and even less analysis of their role between the UK courts and the 
ECtHR. Paterson’s research on the Supreme Court observes that during meetings between 
members of these courts ‘discussions ensue of actual cases and points of debate’.147 Interestingly, 
Mak observes different levels of enthusiasm on the part of the Justices for face-to-face 
engagements with their counterparts from other jurisdictions.
148
 Some reportedly described 
themselves as ‘insular’149 and claim to finding such exchanges ‘boring’,150 while viewing some 
of their colleagues as ‘extreme networkers’151 and more ‘outward looking’.152 Echoing Slaughter, 
some of the judges interviewed for Mak’s research reportedly valued the meetings for their 
potential to ‘open one’s view’.153 Further, Mak observes that a principal motivation of the 
Supreme Court Justices is ‘connected to specific interests, in particular concerning their role in 
the development of the common law and concerning the application and development of EU law 
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and the ECHR’.154 Beyond these insights, however, there has been little research to date on the 
role of these meetings.  
4. Research Design  
 4.1 The Case for a Different Methodological Approach 
 The discussion in Parts 2 and 3 established a number of points from the academic 
literature addressing judicial dialogue between the UK courts and the ECtHR. First, the term 
‘dialogue’ has been applied to a wide range of judgment-based interactions. Second, there are 
differences of view as to the directness of the reciprocal interaction required for the dialogue 
label to be appropriate, varying from interactions between the courts over the same case and set 
of facts to the more general process by which the interpretation of Convention rights evolves 
over time. Third, there are divergent normative positions as to how judgment-based dialogue 
between the courts should take place. Fourth, a wide range of functions have been ascribed to the 
idea of dialogue through judgments and, fifth, there is little information or research concerning 
the functions of informal dialogue between the UK courts and the ECtHR.  
 These points created certain difficulties. Taking the broad spectrum of judicial 
interactions to which the term dialogue has been applied, it might be argued that the judgment-
based dialogue between the UK courts and the ECtHR is, to misappropriate John Griffith’s 
famous description of the UK constitution, ‘no more and no less than what happens’.155 Since the 
passing of the HRA, it could be said, everything that happens between the courts is dialogue, and 
if nothing happens that would be dialogue also.
156
 Combined with the differences of view as to 
the reciprocity required for the ‘dialogue’ label to be appropriate, and the divergent normative 
views on how dialogue should take place, what manifests is the puzzle of judicial dialogue, 
encountered in Chapter 1. The content of the concept becomes opaque; its apparent malleability 
serving to ‘mystify the meaning’.157 
 A further difficulty is that the existing research had yet to explore in-depth the judicial 
understanding of the nature of dialogue between the courts or why reliance upon this concept and 
the practices underpinning it has become central to their relationship. Academic accounts have 
either sought to explain how a dialogue can take place or have made arguments as to how it 
should place. It can be argued that less consideration has been given to why the judges feel that it 
should take place. The various functions ascribed to the idea of judges engaging in dialogue 
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through their judgments illuminate some of its potentially far-reaching possibilities. However, 
what remains to be explored is which of those possibilities the judges of the UK courts and the 
ECtHR seek to actualise.  
 It is submitted that these issues justify a different methodological approach to the study of 
dialogue between the UK courts and the ECtHR, based on the direct insights of the judges 
themselves. This is not the first piece of research to adopt this view. Two notable studies, 
mentioned already in this chapter, which have explored the judicial perspectives on the subject of 
dialogue between the UK courts and the ECtHR are Mak’s Judicial Decision-making in a 
Globalised World
158
 and Paterson’s Final Judgment.159 Mak’s study explored the judicial 
practices in the use of comparative legal materials in the senior courts of the United Kingdom, 
Canada, the United States, France and the Netherlands.
160
 It is based on interviews conducted 
with thirty-three judges, among them seven UK Supreme Court Justices and a retired Law Lord, 
which were conducted in November 2009.
161
 In Final Judgment, drawing from interviews 
conducted with twenty-seven former Law Lords and Justices, Paterson examines the decision-
making of the UK Supreme Court through the lens of the various dialogues which take place 
between the Justices themselves, with legal counsel, judicial assistants, UK domestic courts, 
academics, Parliament, the government and, most importantly for present purposes, the ECtHR.  
 As seen in the introductory chapter, both of these studies underlined that the Justices of 
the Supreme Court conceive of their relationship with the ECtHR as among the most interactive 
and influential of any which they share with a court outside of the UK, and the Justices seek to 
write their judgments in a manner which is persuasive to the ECtHR.
162
 Further, these works 
provide a number of useful insights which are drawn upon throughout this thesis. Nonetheless, 
they have limitations for the present enquiry. Crucially, the concept of judicial dialogue between 
the UK courts and the ECtHR was not the focus of the interviews conducted for either study. As 
outlined above, Mak explores the use of foreign law by a number of senior courts across five 
jurisdictions. Further, the interviews for Mak’s study were conducted prior to the UK Supreme 
Court’s landmark decision in Horncastle, a point reflected in Mak’s observations. She observes 
that only one of the Justices interviewed at the time felt that it was permissible for the Supreme 
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Court to depart from relevant case-law of the ECtHR.
163
 It would be reasonable to suggest that 
these views have since changed following the Horncastle judgment, which is said to provide ‘the 
most compelling authority to date for the suggestion that domestic courts will not simply apply 
even relevant and clear Strasbourg case law as a matter of course’.164 While Paterson’s study, on 
the other hand, did explore the subject of dialogue with the ECtHR in his interviews with the 
Justices, this constituted a small feature of the work.
165
 What is more, the interview extracts 
formed a supplementary feature of his analysis of the relationship between the courts. In total, his 
work contains only a small collection of direct interview insights from the judges on their views 
of their relationship with the ECtHR. There was thus much room for further exploration of how 
the judges view their dialogue with the ECtHR. 
 4.2 A Qualitative Methodology  
 This thesis adopted an interpretivist approach to its subject matter. Interpretivism derives 
from Weber’s notion of verstehen: ‘the method of understanding people’s meaning’.166 
Interpretivist approaches seek to understand social phenomena ‘from the perspectives of those 
involved’:167 ‘...knowledge takes the form of explanations of how others interpret and make 
sense of their day-to-day life and interactions’.168 An in-depth exploration of the judicial 
perspective arguably holds the potential to enhance understanding of judicial dialogue between 
particular courts. It not only offers a methodologically unique way of approaching this topic but a 
useful means of determining how judicial dialogue might be used by the judges as a means of 
conferring legitimacy on their judgments.  
 In line with this interpretivist approach, the research was guided by a qualitative 
methodology, focusing on ‘words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of 
data’.169 It followed a flexible, inductive method in seeking to develop an understanding of 
judicial dialogue between the UK courts and the ECtHR. This process is summarised by Webley: 
[Q]ualitative research unfolds – it develops as the researcher learns more; in other 
words the experiment is not usually set up and then allowed to run along a 
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predetermined course. Instead, the research may be redesigned to meet changing 
conditions, perceptions and findings.
170
  
In line with this approach, the research for this thesis consisted of a qualitative interview-based 
study conducted with eight Justices of the UKSC and four judges of the ECtHR, along with 
ongoing desk-based and library research of UK and ECtHR case law, extra-judicial commentary 
and academic literature. The flexible, inductive approach was crucial given that the research 
sought to explore judicial understandings of dialogue rather than test a pre-determined hypothesis 
on this subject. The remit of the research, originally focused only on dialogue through judgments, 
was expanded during the process to encompass exploration of informal judicial dialogue. It had 
become apparent during the interviews with the Justices that this form of dialogue was a 
significant dimension of their relationship with the ECtHR. Thus, the interviews conducted with 
the ECtHR judges, along with further desk-based and library research, sought to gain more 
detailed insights into this aspect of the relationship between the courts.  
5. In-depth Interviews 
 5.1 The Advantages of In-depth Interviewing 
 The thesis relies on data produced from the use of qualitative, in-depth interviews 
conducted with eight Justices of the UK Supreme Court and four judges of the ECtHR, 
respectively carried out in July 2014 and May 2015 at the judges’ offices in London and 
Strasbourg. This method consists of one-to-one, open-ended questioning of participants. It allows 
the researcher to obtain ‘rich and detailed information’171 from participants rather than ‘yes-or-
no, agree-or-disagree responses’.172 It seeks to draw out ‘examples, experiences … narratives and 
stories’.173  
 There are a number of advantages to this approach. In-depth interviews are ‘extremely 
effective at garnering data on individuals’ perceptions or views’.174 They allow for exploration of 
the ‘...understandings, experiences and imaginings of research participants’,175 and can enable 
access to detailed descriptions on ‘how social processes, institutions, discourses or relationships 
work’176 and the ‘significance of the meanings that they generate’.177 Mak argues in her 
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interview-based study with various judges of senior national courts that this style of interviewing 
has the advantage of allowing ‘participants to express themselves with more nuance’178 than is 
possible under the structured format of quantitative interviewing.  
 The use of in-depth interviewing was particularly valuable for the present study. 
Paterson’s early research with the Law Lords notes that ‘Judicial self-concepts and motivations 
can be derived from semi-structured interviews with judges’.179 For the present study, they 
enabled detailed insights into how the judges understand the judicial dialogue between their 
courts and the practices which they associated with the term, the key examples of such practices, 
the judicial motivations behind them and their potential disadvantages. Speaking to the judges 
themselves also had the advantage that it facilitated access to the views of judges that have not 
written or spoken extra-judicially on the subject of the dialogue between the UK courts and the 
ECtHR. It also enabled access to information regarding the role of the informal meetings 
between these judges, for which there is little information available as no minutes are taken. 
Further, as stated in the introductory chapter, this research sought a better understanding of why 
the judges have come to place such explicit emphasis on dialogue as a foundation of their 
relationship. The use of qualitative interviews, by definition ‘retrospective accounts that often 
explain and justify behaviour’180 offered a useful means of achieving this.  
5.2 The Limitations of Interviewing  
The use of qualitative interviewing, however, has its limitations. Certain issues arise in 
connection with interviewing judges in particular. Flanagan and Ahern suggest that it might be 
thought ‘pointless’181 to ask judges to express their views on an issue which they have addressed 
in published judgments. Because their legal reasoning will have already been provided in those 
judgments, the judges will be either unable or unwilling to provide further insights and thus 
would be unlikely to reveal them to a researcher. Additionally, Flanagan and Ahern note the 
concerns which have been expressed over ‘judicial self-reporting’:182  
People often do not know, or cannot articulate, why they act as they do. In other 
situations, they refuse to tell, and in still others, they are strategic both in acting and 
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in answering the scholar’s question. This is obvious from the example of asking 
justices about how they reach decisions . . . 
183
 
Taken together, these criticisms encompass three problems. First, the notion that people do not 
know or cannot articulate why they act as they do connects to the broader methodological 
argument noted by Silverman that ‘...[q]ualitative interviews make the problematic assumption 
that what the interviewees say can be treated as a report on events, actions, social processes and 
structures, and cognitions’.184 Next, the criticisms point to the problem, identified by Paterson, of 
‘partial disclosure or limited candour due to a lack of trust on the part of the interviewee’.185 
Finally, the concern with judicial self-reporting also contemplates the potential for social 
desirability bias: ‘saying what the audience wants to hear or the speaker wants them to hear’.186 It 
is useful to consider each of these issues in turn. 
 The suggestion that judges will be unwilling or unable to provide insights on subjects 
addressed in their judgments is contentious for a number of reasons. First, it is now 
commonplace for judges to offer reflections in extra-judicial lectures or academic writings on 
aspects of the law or their work which would not necessarily feature in their judgments. Thus, if 
the notion that a judicial decision contains the full extent of a judge’s legal thinking or 
candidness on a particular subject might have been true in the past, it is arguably no longer 
accurate. Further, ‘judicial dialogue’ between the UK courts and the ECtHR is said to take place 
through face-to-face meetings as well as through judgments. It is generally accepted that such 
meetings have some potential, albeit one which is empirically difficult to ascertain, to influence 
judicial decisions.
187
 Paterson’s work on decision-making at the Supreme Court makes clear that 
the deliberations between the judges often has a considerable influence over the eventual 
conclusions reached, often swaying judges from one view to another and determining the 
outcome of a case.
188
 Nonetheless, the resulting judgments will often not be explicit about those 
influences. Meetings between UK and ECtHR judges, of course, are of an entirely different 
nature to the deliberations which precede a decision by the Supreme Court. The point remains, 
however, that it is unlikely that any influence resulting from those meetings will be explicitly 
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attributed in the context of the judgments. The use of in-depth interviews thus enabled more 
insights on these issues to be obtained. 
With regard to the view that people do not know and cannot explain what they do, 
Flanagan and Ahern offer a compelling retort. They note that ‘...there is a distinction in the kinds 
of questions that may be asked about judicial decision-making’.189 There are those which address 
the ‘cognitive processes’190 underpinning judicial decisions, to which King and Epstein’s critique 
is directed, and those which seek to gauge ‘what [the judge] thinks is important, how [they] feels 
toward X, or what would justify something’.191 They argue that obtaining direct answers to the 
latter ‘advance efforts to explain judicial behaviour merely if judges are more likely to think in 
accordance with their views and dispositions than not’.192 The interviews for this study can be 
justified in the same way. They did not seek to grapple with the cognitive processes of decision-
making within the UK or Strasbourg courts but rather their understanding of the dialogue 
between their courts and their motivations in that dialogue. What is more, each of the 
participating judges was asked to provide case law examples and much of what they described in 
their responses could be cross-referenced with the case law. Thus, as both Mak and Paterson 
found with their research, much of what the judges described could be supported with verifiable, 
practical examples, thus guarding against the assumption, that Silverman warns of,
 
that 
qualitative interview data can be treated as a reliable report on events and processes.
193
  
As to the issue of partial disclosure, there were few indications during the interviews that 
the judges were not being transparent in their responses. It must be acknowledged that judges 
have a duty of independence and that this duty will in some way shape how they respond to 
questions about their views, particularly on such a topical issue as their relationship with the 
ECtHR. Occasionally, the discussions turned to points which were deemed by some participating 
judges to be too politically sensitive either for comment or for citation in this thesis, the main 
examples being the potential repeal of the HRA 1998, potential modifications to the s.2 HRA 
duty for UK courts to ‘take into account’ ECtHR judgments, and the optional Protocol 16 
ECHR
194
 for the provision of advisory opinions on ECHR interpretation, which is yet to be 
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ratified by the UK government. Generally, however, as Paterson found with his interviews with 
the Law Lords and Justices, assurances that no section of the interview would be published 
without the approval of the participants helped to create an open discussion.
195
 In terms of the 
possibility of strategic responses, there was no evidence of group strategy. There was no 
indication of conferral among Justices or Strasbourg judges as to how they would respond to the 
questions. One Justice made this particularly clear during an interview:  
The views I’m expressing are entirely personal to me. We haven’t had discussions 
among ourselves about how we should respond to your questions. These are my 
personal views; they don’t claim to be representative of anybody else’s.196 
With regard to the possibility of social desirability bias, there was again nothing during the 
interviews to suggest that the judges were not being open in their responses. Indeed, several of 
the judges did not hesitate to voice their criticisms of the use of the concept of ‘dialogue’ in this 
context. In this respect, it must also be borne in mind, as others have noted, that the interviews 
with the Supreme Court Justices took place in the context of what is widely recognised as the 
dramatic effort to increase the transparency of the workings of the UK’s most senior court and its 
judges
197
 since the Supreme Court came into operation in 2009.
198
 Paterson notes that ‘The 
Supreme Court is far more accessible than the House ever was’.199 What is more, it is worth 
noting again that it has become increasingly common for senior judges to deliver public lectures, 
often on contentious issues. It might be argued that these developments point to a growing 
openness and candour in the voicing of extra-judicial opinions which reduces the possibility of 
strategic responses in an interview setting. Nonetheless, the possibility of social desirability bias 
remains. As seen in the Chapter 1, research on judicial decision-making by authors such as Baum 
in the United States and Paterson in the UK underline the fact that judges often write with 
particular audiences in mind, including academic audiences.
200
 Thus, it is possible that the judges 
who participated in this study gave their responses with a particular academic or judicial 
audience in mind. This is an important caveat to the findings. 
                                                          
195
 Paterson, Final Judgment (n 147) 6 
196
 Interview with Justice of the UK Supreme Court (London, United Kingdom, 8 July 2014) 
197
 The Supreme Court, ‘Biographies of the Justices’ <https://www.supremecourt.uk/about/biographies-of-the-
justices.html> accessed 20 January 2016 
198
 Penny Darbyshire, Sitting in Judgment: The Working Lives of Judges (OUP 2011); Paterson, Final Judgment (n 
147) 3 
199
 ibid 
200
 Lawrence Baum, Judges and Their Audiences: A Perspective on Judicial Behavior (Princeton University Press 
2006) 100; Paterson, Final Judgment (n 147) 220: ‘Most of them also, when asked whom they wrote their judgments 
for, would mention academics along with other audiences’.  
57 
 
6. Sampling 
 6.1 Sampling Method 
 The interview participants were selected using purposive, or non-probability, sampling. 
This is the selection of participants on the basis that they are ‘relevant to the research questions 
being posed’.201 A purposive sample consists of ‘groups, settings and individuals where … the 
processes being studied are most likely to occur’.202 The participants for this study consisted of a 
total of twelve judges drawn from two purposive samples. The first consisted of eight Justices of 
the UK Supreme Court and the second consisted of four judges of the ECtHR. In accordance 
with the guidelines of the UK Judicial Office (JO), an application for the participation of the 
Justices in the research project was sent to the JO by email on 26
th
 February 2014. 
Correspondence with Judicial Assistants to the Justices of the UKSC concerning their 
willingness to participate then commenced on 11
th
 March 2014. In total, eight Justices agreed to 
take part in interviews. One Justice was unable to commit to the interview but felt that their 
views on the subject were provided in an extra-judicial lecture on the subject, which was 
provided by email. Interestingly, another Justice felt unable to participate because the study 
explored issues which the court might be required to rule on in the near future. The remaining 
two Justices did not respond to the request.  
 The second sample consisted of four judges of the ECtHR. The specific participants were 
determined on the basis of convenience. A convenience sample is one simply ‘available by 
means of accessibility’.203 Burton observes that access to judges can be extremely difficult, often 
requiring ‘a large element of luck’.204 In total, five judges at the ECtHR were contacted with 
participation requests for this study. Four of these judges were based on a convenience sample of 
contacts of one of the project supervisors. All four of these judges initially agreed to participate 
but unfortunately one judge later had to withdraw due to a last-minute schedule conflict. Using 
the ‘snowball method’205 an interview with an additional judge with experience of UK cases was 
arranged after one judge kindly agreed to pass details of the study on.  
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 6.2 The Participants: UK Supreme Court Justices  
 A potential disadvantage to the use of non-probability sampling methods is that ‘…it can 
be difficult for the reader to judge the trustworthiness of sampling if full details are not 
provided’.206 Thus, it is useful to set out why the Justices and the ECtHR judges were deemed the 
most relevant to answering the research question. The pertinence of the Justices of the UK 
Supreme Court to a study of judicial dialogue between the UK courts and the ECtHR is obvious. 
However, there are two particular reasons why the insights of the Justices are particularly crucial. 
The first is that it is the UK Supreme Court which is the final domestic judicial arbiter of 
fundamental rights in the UK, whether contained under the HRA or common law. It is thus the 
Supreme Court which issues the most authoritative domestic judgments in any dialogue with the 
ECtHR and determines whether, and to what extent, judgments of the ECtHR are to be followed. 
In this respect, it is worth recalling that the House of Lords held in Kay
207
 that the lower courts 
remain bound by domestic decisions on questions of ECHR interpretation, notwithstanding any 
recent judgments of the Strasbourg court which appear to be inconsistent with those earlier 
rulings.
208
 It is thus for the UK’s most senior court alone to determine whether previous positions 
should be departed from in light of the new Strasbourg decisions. In this respect, it is the 
Supreme Court which has the greatest flexibility in any dialogue with the ECtHR. Second, it will 
be clear from the outline of the relevant domestic case law in the first chapter that virtually all of 
the explicit judicial invocations of the term ‘dialogue’ have come from acting or retired Justices 
of the Supreme Court and former Law Lords. This group of judges is therefore uniquely placed 
to comment on its inclusion and significance within the case law.  
 A difficulty with a sample of this kind, however, as noted by Mak, is that the 
participating judges may have agreed to take part because of a favourable attitude towards the 
topic of research.
209
 This relates to the broader issue that non-probability sampling will not 
produce data which is strictly representative of the views of the group or section of the 
population of interest. An important limitation to stress, therefore, is that the views of the 
participating Justices which are analysed in Chapters 3-6 of this thesis are not representative of 
the whole Supreme Court, nor of the UK judiciary – a point which Lord Justice Moses has 
emphasised given the rise of extra-judicial lectures by senior UK judges: ‘Each of us has an 
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independent view, the others do not speak for us’.210 With eight of the twelve Justices having 
participated, however, they provide a wealth of valuable insights into how judicial dialogue with 
the ECtHR is perceived at the most senior level of the UK judiciary. Further, while the sample is 
not representative, this should not diminish entirely the pervasiveness of some of the views 
expressed during the interviews. Paterson’s research with the Law Lords and Justices draws 
attention to the fact that individual judges on the UK’s most senior court can wield considerable 
influence over its direction and decisions.
211
 It could therefore be argued that the views of eight 
of its judges on the subject of dialogue with the ECtHR are likely to have proven influential in 
recent years.  
 6.3 The Participants: ECtHR Judges 
 Once again, the relevance of the views of ECtHR judges to a study of judicial dialogue 
between the ECtHR and the UK courts is self-evident. In the interests of transparency, however, 
it is worth pointing out a number of issues with this particular sample. First, the non-
representativeness of the data gathered must be borne in mind. A sample determined by 
convenience alone is not representative of ECtHR and the findings are thus not generalizable.
212
 
What is more, it should be noted that the sample represents only 9% of the total number of sitting 
judges at the ECtHR in May 2015. A further caveat relates to the division of labour at the 
ECtHR. The Strasbourg Court is divided into five administrative ‘Sections’ to which its judges 
are allocated.
213
 Sections are allocated the caseloads from specified ECHR signatories. Cases 
which require full judgments are decided by ‘Chambers’ of seven judges, drawn from a particular 
Section.
214
 At the time of the interviews, it was the Fourth Section of the Court which managed 
petitions against the UK.  Thus, those working outside of the Fourth Section at the time generally 
did not hear UK cases unless they had been allocated to a Grand Chamber hearing of a UK case. 
An important limitation to the interview insights for this research therefore is that the 
participating ECtHR judges were drawn from different Sections of the ECtHR. Of the four 
judges who participated in recorded interviews, two judges were drawn from the Fourth Section, 
in its composition at that time, while the other two came from different Sections of the court. 
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Thus, it was anticipated that the latter might not have had much experience with UK judgments. 
In the same respect, it was unclear whether those judges would have had any involvement in 
face-to-face meetings with UK judges.  
These are important considerations but they do not diminish the value of the interviews 
entirely. It is often observed that ‘opportunistic’215 samples such as this can be valuable 
particularly where, as Bryman notes, the sample represents ‘too good an opportunity to miss’.216 
For a study of judicial dialogue between the UK courts and the ECtHR, the opportunity to 
interview any judge of the ECtHR was not one which could be overlooked. Regardless of their 
particular Section, each judge was able to offer valuable insights on the subject of dialogue 
between national courts and the ECtHR, even if not specifically on dialogue with the UK courts.   
7. Interview Designs 
7.1 Interview Format 
The aims of the research were outlined prior to the commencement of the interviews in 
order to ensure that the participants had the benefit of sufficient context. The interviews followed 
a semi-structured format whereby a list of questions was drafted in advance based on the insights 
from the academic literature, explored above and in the case law, discussed in Chapter 1. The 
interview guides for both sets of interviews can be found in the Appendices to this thesis. While 
these guides ensured a general consistency in the topics covered, the questions were executed 
flexibly and in a variable order in light of the direction of the discussions. Sometimes, the 
thoroughness of the responses on certain topics rendered certain questions in the interview guide 
obsolete.
217
 The flexible questioning was integral to the interpretivist and exploratory nature of 
the research, allowing the discussions to expand into those areas which the judges deemed to be 
most significant. The clearest example of this arose during the interviews with the Justices. 
Although the diverse legal traditions of the Member States of the Council of Europe and of the 
judges sitting on the ECtHR was not initially covered in the interview guide, in the first interview 
with a Supreme Court Justice it arose several times and in every subsequent interview.   
 7.2 Interview Guide for the Supreme Court Interviews 
There is not scope here to justify each of the questions listed in the interview guide. The 
following sections will therefore concentrate on the key topics explored with the judges. The 
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central topics for the interviews with the Justices were: concept, appraisal and future. With 
regards to concept, the interviews sought to explore how the Justices understand and define the 
term ‘judicial dialogue’ in the context of their relationship with the ECtHR. The following 
question opened each interview: 
The term ‘judicial dialogue’ has been used in a variety of ways within the academic 
literature, judicial lectures and court decisions, so I’d like to begin by simply asking: 
what is your understanding of the term? 
As the question itself makes explicit, this line of inquiry was based on the differences observed 
within the academic literature and UK case law in the way the term has been used. In order to 
further clarify the Justices’ understandings, they were also asked for examples of judicial 
dialogue.  
 The appraisal section of the interviews engaged the judges critically on the subject of 
their dialogue with the ECtHR:  
Do you think it is important that the UK courts should engage the ECtHR in 
dialogue? Why? 
Are there any potential disadvantages to judicial dialogue between the courts? 
Do you agree that there has been a resurgence of the common law in human rights 
adjudication in the UK? Do you think this will influence in any way the dialogue 
with the ECtHR? 
It will be recalled from the review of the literature earlier in this chapter that numerous functions 
have been attributed to judicial dialogue. The first two questions thus purported to gain a clearer 
insight into what functions dialogue serves in the minds of the judges and whether they had any 
concerns with the practices which they associated with the term. It was seen in the introductory 
chapter how the common law ‘resurgence’ in UK human rights adjudication218 concerns the 
series of judgments by the UKSC which ‘re-emphasise the utility of the common law, and the 
rights inherent in it, as tools of constitutional adjudication’.219  The third question cited thus 
sought to explore whether and how the Justices thought this resurgence might affect the dialogue 
with the ECtHR.  
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 In terms of future, the interviews explored the Justices’ views of whether and how 
dialogue could further develop. The following was the key, concluding question:  
In 2009, Lord Bingham remarked that his hope that a ‘constructive dialogue’ would 
develop between the courts had been ‘part[ly]’220 realised. Do you think that 
assessment still applies? If so, how could a dialogue between the courts be fully 
realised? 
 7.3 Interview Guide for the ECtHR Interviews 
 The interview guide for the Strasbourg judges generally mirrored the topics covered in 
the interviews with the Justices, with some important revisions in order to explore in greater 
detail certain points raised by the Justices. The key topics covered were: concept, face-to-face 
meetings, judgments and future.  
 The first topic, concept, again explored how the judges define ‘dialogue’ in respect of the 
ECtHR’s relationship with national courts:  
Could you briefly summarise your understanding of judicial dialogue between this 
court and the courts of Member States? 
In contrast to the interviews with the Justices, however, the second topic focused directly on 
face-to-face meetings between judges of national courts and the ECtHR, particularly the judges’ 
understanding of their structure and purpose: 
Which members of this court will usually be present at the meetings? Would a 
delegation to the UK, for example, typically involve judges from the Fourth 
Section? 
Do you think such meetings have an impact on the decision-making of this court 
or the domestic courts? 
The decision to structure the interviews with a section explicitly on dialogue through face-to-face 
meetings and judgments was informed both by the data generated from the interviews with the 
Justices and the lack of literature on the topic, as discussed above. While the face-to-face 
meetings in particular had not been a major area of interest at the outset of the study, it became 
apparent during the interviews with the Justices that they were an important aspect of the 
relationship between the judges and worthy of further exploration. The Strasbourg interviews 
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thus presented an opportunity to gain more insight into this aspect of their relationship. While 
only one of the judges had direct experience of the meetings with UK judges, two of the other 
judges had been involved in meetings with other national judges at the ECtHR and were able to 
offer useful comments as to the general role of these meetings.  
The third section asked the judges directly about dialogue through judgments: what it 
involves, and the advantages and disadvantages which they perceived in the practices to which 
they understood the term to apply. The final section again explored the future of dialogue, in 
particular the potential impact of the common law resurgence from the Strasbourg point of view. 
8. Analysis of Interview Transcripts  
 8.1 Recording and Transcription  
 The interviews varied in length from roughly thirty-seven to seventy-one minutes. With 
the written permission of each of the participating judges, the interviews were recorded using a 
dictaphone and subsequently transcribed for the purposes of analysis. This enabled a detailed 
examination of the participating judges’ responses.  
 8.2 Thematic Analysis  
Qualitative analysis involves ‘...making choices about what to include, what to discard 
and how to interpret the participants’ words’.221 Rubin and Rubin explain that ‘By putting 
together descriptions from separate interviewees, researchers create portraits of complicated 
processes’.222 The interview transcripts in this instance were subject to a thematic analysis. King 
and Horrocks define themes as ‘recurrent and distinctive features of participants’ accounts, 
characterising particular perceptions and/ or experiences, which the researcher sees as relevant to 
the research question’.223 The analysis was conducted using the three-stage process which they 
propose.
224
 This consists of descriptive ‘coding’,225 interpretive coding, and the construction of 
overarching themes.
226
 The process was assisted by the use of the CAQDAS (Computer Aided 
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Qualitative Data Analysis) software, NVivo, which provided a useful means of organising and 
visualising the interview data.
227
  
 It is useful to provide an illustration of the coding process here. The first stage requires 
the researcher ‘to identify those parts of [the] transcript data that are likely to be helpful in 
addressing [the] research question’.228 The focus here is on highlighting the features of interest 
rather than their interpretation, using descriptive codes which ‘stay relatively close to the data’.229 
Some of the initial descriptive codes employed here were used as indicators to highlight the key 
areas covered during the interview: ‘concept’, ‘judgments’, ‘examples’, ‘J2J’,230 ‘purpose’, ‘pre-
HRA’, ‘criticism’, ‘advantages’, ‘disadvantages’, ‘lower courts’, ‘common law resurgence’. 
Additionally, the initial coding relied on in vivo codes, using the language of the data itself, and 
non in vivo codes.  Typical examples of in vivo coding were: 
Misunderstanding: ‘... it’s undoubtedly the case that they don’t always understand 
the nature of a common law system’231 
Explanation: ‘It’s a statement that you make which you hope will explain the 
approach of the national court to the supranational court in Strasbourg’232 
Non in vivo coding included: 
Workload: ‘Given the problematic backlog of cases at Strasbourg...’233  
Coherence: ‘... there have been occasions where Strasbourg has produced a range of 
different decisions which are, frankly, difficult to reconcile with one another’234  
 The second stage of thematic analysis set out by King and Horrocks moves from 
description to the interpretation of the initial codes. It involves ‘grouping together descriptive 
codes that seem to share some common meaning, and creating an interpretive code that captures 
it’.235 The researcher during this process will ‘add to, redefine and reapply’236 interpretive codes 
as they move between transcripts.
237
 The interpretive coding of the interview transcripts with the 
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judges thus consisted of several layers. The descriptive codes ‘coherence’ and 
‘misunderstanding’, described above, for example, were respectively placed under the 
interpretive codes of ‘formal quality’ and ‘substantive quality’ to reflect what they described 
about the ECtHR jurisprudence. ‘Formal quality’ and ‘substantive quality’ were then subsumed, 
with others, under the additional and wider interpretive code of ‘issues’, encompassing various 
difficulties which were identified by the Justices in connection with the ECtHR case law.  
 The final stage involves the construction of overarching themes which ‘characterise key 
concepts’238 within the analysis. These are ‘built upon the interpretive themes, but are at a higher 
level of abstraction than them’.239 Staying with the examples used so far, the interpretive code of 
‘issues’ was combined with two other interpretive codes. The first of these is ‘sources of tension’ 
which encompassed numerous interpretive codes relating to points of difference between the UK 
and the ECtHR courts which were deemed by the judges to give rise to the difficulties coded 
under ‘issues’. The second interpretive category / code was ‘mitigation’, which included various 
interpretive and descriptive codes based on the judges accounts of how they seek to address the 
‘issues’ raised by the ECtHR case law through dialogue. Combined, these three categories 
formed the theme of judgment-based dialogue as the mitigation of tensions.  
 This method of analysis allowed for the development and exposition of a ‘rich and 
detailed ... account of the data’.240 Nonetheless, there are some limitations. A common criticism 
of this method is that it lacks a systematic approach. Bryman notes that it is ‘a remarkably 
underdeveloped procedure’,241 despite its popularity, with no ‘identifiable heritage’.242 Further, 
as an exercise in interpretivism, it could of course be argued that the ‘researcher’s own values 
and biases may lead them to prioritise certain accounts over others – even if unwittingly’.243 The 
three-stage process described sought to introduce a degree of systemisation into the analytical 
process. In the interests of transparency, the thesis relies extensively on direct quotations from 
the interviews with the judges in order to improve the trustworthiness of the arguments 
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developed from the data. However, due to guarantees of confidentiality, none of the judges are 
identified by name.
244
 
9. Other Documentary Sources 
 9.1 Extra-judicial Literature 
 While the thesis relies extensively on the insights from the interview transcripts, it also 
draws upon a number of other documentary sources. Among these is the growing body of extra-
judicial commentary made by acting or retired judges through published speeches and academic 
contributions. The topic of the relationship between the UK courts and the ECtHR in particular 
has been the subject of much extra-judicial commentary and discussion. Bjorge notes that these 
‘interventions’245 will often further ‘explicate the way in which they apply the ECHR’.246 They 
thus provide valuable insights on how they view the dialogue between their courts. During the 
research process, these were used to supplement and refine the thematic analysis of the interview 
data.   
 9.2 Case Law  
 In addition to the interviews, this thesis relies on the case law of the UK courts, primarily 
the UK Supreme Court and former Judicial Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, and the 
ECtHR. The case law was gathered on an ad hoc basis using the Westlaw, BAILII and HUDOC 
databases. Given the interpretivist emphasis of this research on understanding how the judges 
understand the dialogue between their courts, many of the examples cited in this thesis were 
suggested by the judges themselves. Ongoing research of academic literature and extra-judicial 
lectures using Westlaw, Heinonline, Web of Knowledge, Google Scholar, websites of the UK 
courts and the ECtHR and library research aided the process of identifying and adding suitable 
cases to the sample. Additionally, various blogs were used to provide alerts on new cases. In 
particular, the UK Supreme Court Blog,
247
 the UK Constitutional Law Blog,
248
 the UK Human 
Rights Blog,
249
 Public Law for Everyone,
250
 the ECHR blog,
251
 Strasbourg Observers,
252
 and 
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European Courts
253
 all provided valuable updates on developments in the case law at the 
domestic and European levels.  The purpose of the case law research was to both corroborate and 
supplement the insights from the interview data. In this regard, the research sought to take heed 
of the advice given by Neil MacCormick: ‘The judicial self-perception is an important piece of 
evidence, but not a conclusive one. It remains, therefore, important to look beyond what they say 
they do to what they do’.254   
 9.3 Desk-based and Library Research of Academic Literature 
  Finally, the thesis relies upon a wealth of academic literature gathered through desk-
based and library research. The desk-based research was conducted using Westlaw, Heinonline, 
Web of Knowledge and Google Scholar, with email subscriptions to numerous academic blogs 
providing valuable updates on new and forthcoming academic scholarship. The library research 
was relied upon for relevant monographs and edited volumes. Cotterrell argues that ‘…legal 
theory, as the attempt to understand law as a social phenomenon, should require that the limited, 
partial perspectives of particular kinds of participants in legal processes – for example, lawyers, 
judges, legislators … – be confronted with wider theoretical perspectives on law which can 
incorporate and transcend these more limited viewpoints in order to broaden understanding of the 
nature of law’.255 Thus, the thesis combines the partial perspectives of the judges on dialogue 
gleaned from the interviews, extra-judicial commentary and case law with the insights of the 
academic literature in order to draw conclusions on its role in legitimising their judgments.  
10. Conclusion  
This chapter has provided a detailed account of the methodological considerations which guided 
the research for this thesis. By drawing attention to the limitations of the existing research on 
dialogue between the UK courts and the ECtHR, it has sought to provide the justification for an 
interpretivist approach to the study of this topic, focusing on the direct perspectives of the judges 
involved. It has argued that this provides not only a unique methodological way of exploring this 
contentious area but, through its focus on the judicial perspective, an effective means of 
understanding how judicial dialogue can perform a legitimising role. Further, the chapter has 
offered a detailed description and justification for the various features of its research design: its 
use of in-depth interviews with judges of the UK Supreme Court and ECtHR, the purposive 
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sampling which guided the selection process, the avenues of inquiry explored during the 
interviews, the thematic analysis of interview transcripts and its reliance on case law, extra-
judicial commentary and academic literature. With the four research questions and the 
methodology employed to answer them now established, the thesis turns to begin its exploration 
of the nature of judicial dialogue between the courts. 
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Chapter 3  
Defining ‘Formal’ Judicial Dialogue  
I firmly believe that, in the modern world, openness, transparency, discussion, on 
a reasonable basis, ought to be regarded as productive. ... I think lawyers, above 
all, ought to be able to discuss things rationally and to influence each other 
through openness and dialogue.
1
 
- Justice of the UK Supreme Court 
1. Introduction  
The methodology chapter explored the academic perspectives on the concept of ‘judicial 
dialogue’, observing a variety of views as to its form and functions. In terms of form, it drew 
attention to the distinction between judgment-based and face-to-face  dialogue and made the case 
for a closer examination of these within the context of the relationship between the UK courts 
and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) using a qualitative, interview-based study. 
This chapter, the first of three examining the interviews conducted with the Supreme Court 
Justices (“the Justices”) and judges of the ECtHR (“the Strasbourg judges”), the case law and 
extra-judicial commentary, aims to elucidate the characteristics attributed to the judgment-based 
(‘formal’) dialogue which has taken root at these institutional levels. Its focus is on the form of 
the interactions, while the next chapter addresses their functions.  
 In doing so, this chapter seeks to answer the first research question set out in Chapter 1: 
what is judicial ‘dialogue’ in the context of the decision-making of the UK courts and the 
ECtHR? The answer offered here is that this disputed term refers to a process by which the 
courts, subject to practical and normative constraints, exchange views and seek to influence one 
another through their respective judgments. The three parts of this chapter deconstruct and 
examine the various aspects of this definition. Part 2 sets out the characteristics of judgment-
based dialogue as a process consisting of mutual listening, explanation and influence. It outlines 
the features of the decision-making of the UK courts and the ECtHR which were felt to facilitate 
cross-influence between their courts, and the use of judicial diplomacy by the judges to increase 
the prospect of influence. In Part 3, the chapter draws upon the spectrum of dialogic interactions 
set out in Chapter 2 and the case law examples cited by the judges interviewed to explore in more 
detail the nature of the interactions which the judges understood as dialogue. It observes a 
consensus that dialogue refers to the conflictual interactions whereby national courts criticise or 
disagree with judgments of the ECtHR. Further, while notable differences regarding other types 
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of interaction were evident both amongst the Justices and between the Justices and the 
Strasbourg judges, it observes that the differences of emphasis can be understood as reflective of 
the judges’ desire for their court to influence the judgments of the other: the Justices emphasised 
dialogue as the influence of the UK courts upon the judgments of the ECtHR, while the ECtHR 
judges emphasised dialogue as the influence of the ECtHR upon the judgments of the national 
courts. In Part 4, the chapter explores the practical and normative constraints which were 
associated with judgment-based dialogue. Practically, the process is indirect and case-dependent. 
Normatively, the UK’s political constitution and the UK courts’ adherence to the international 
rule of law set limits on their judgment-based dialogue with the ECtHR. The chapter concludes 
in Part 5 with a review of the findings, providing the background against which the functions of 
formal dialogue are explored in Chapter 4.  
2. The Process of Formal Dialogue 
 2.1 A Process  
 Across the interviews, ‘judicial dialogue’ was consistently regarded as a multi-
dimensional concept. As one Justice put it, ‘it does all depend on the context ... because judges 
have conversations with one another in a lot of different contexts’.2 It was considered ‘a phrase 
which can mean different things to different people in different contexts’.3 Judgments, however, 
were frequently described by the judges as the medium of ‘formal’4 or ‘jurisprudential’5 
dialogue. Along with face-to-face meetings, which were described as the medium of ‘informal’6 
or ‘personal’7 dialogue, this was said to constitute one the ‘two basic dialogue levels’8 between 
the UK courts and the ECtHR.  It is worth noting here that a few of the Justices questioned 
whether ‘dialogue’ was an appropriate label for the judgment-based interactions between the 
courts. It was felt that the term ‘doesn’t really represent practical reality’9 and is ‘not “dialogue” 
                                                          
2
 Interview with Justice of the UK Supreme Court (London, United Kingdom, 8 July 2014). Throughout the 
interviews, references were variably made to face-to-face meetings between judges, judgments, judicial conferences 
and seminars, extra-judicial lectures, Protocol 16 ECHR, and even case-law databases, all as potential mediums of 
judicial dialogue. Protocol No. 16 to the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(not in force at the time of writing). Once in force, it will allow national courts of ratifying countries to request 
advisory opinions from the ECtHR on the interpretation of Convention rights. 
3
 Interview with Justice of the UK Supreme Court (London, United Kingdom, 8 July 2014) 
4
 Interview with Justice of the UK Supreme Court (London, United Kingdom, 11 July 2014) 
5
 Interview with Judge of the European Court of Human Rights (Strasbourg, France, 28 May 2015) 
6
 Interview with Justice of the UK Supreme Court (London, United Kingdom, 8 July 2014) 
7
 Interview with Judge of the European Court of Human Rights (Strasbourg, France, 28 May 2015) 
8
 Interview with Justice of the UK Supreme Court (London, United Kingdom, 11 July 2014) 
9
 ibid  
71 
 
in the sense that somebody in the street would understand dialogue to be’.10 There was, however, 
an underlying consensus as to the meaning behind the term.  
 As indicated by the definition above, formal dialogue was understood as a ‘continuing 
process’.11 Through their respective judgments on issues concerning the interpretation and 
application of Convention rights, contained respectively under the Human Rights Act (HRA) 
1998 Sch 1 and the ECHR, it was said that the courts can engage in a ‘genuine interchange’,12 
consisting of ‘toing and froing’13 and the ‘ping pong’14 of arguments through ‘the interplay of 
judicial decisions’.15 As one Justice explained: ‘We set out in public what we think, they set out 
in public what they think, then we perhaps return to it at some later case’.16 Numerous 
characteristics were attributed to this process. It was said to consist of an exchange of views: each 
court listens to the reasoning of the other and, in turn, explains its own views through its 
judgments. In the same vein, the former ECtHR President, Dean Spielmann, has observed that 
dialogue between the ECtHR and national courts requires ‘a continuing openness to listen and 
willingness to explain’17 on both sides. During the interviews, these appeared to be both 
descriptive and normative characteristics, describing actual practice and also reflecting the 
judges’ expectations of how they ought to interact through their decision-making. Further, formal 
dialogue appears to be defined by both courts seeking to influence one another through their 
exchange of views. To this end, a number of features of the decision-making of the UK courts 
and the ECtHR were considered by the judges to facilitate a space for cross-influence: their 
shared language, the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998, their styles of reasoning and their 
flexibility in the development of the law in their respective systems. From the judges’ accounts, 
the courts seek to utilise this space through the use of judicial diplomacy – framing their 
judgments with an awareness of how their decision might be received by the other court. The 
following sections explore each of these in turn.  
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 2.2 Mutual Listening  
 Formal dialogue between these courts was said to be predicated on each listening to the 
views pronounced in the judgments of the other. The idea behind the term, according to one 
Justice, is that ‘each court should endeavour to understand what’s led the other to decide the case 
in the way it has and should pay serious regard to it’.18 For the Justices, this was considered 
intrinsic to their s.2 HRA duty to ‘take into account’ the judgments of the ECtHR. However, the 
requirement to listen went beyond the fulfilment of legal obligations. It was deemed important to 
not only listen but to be seen listening. One Justice stressed the importance of each court being 
able to see that the other is considering their views. It was considered to be ‘very important for 
them [the ECtHR judges] that they see that we are taking them seriously’.19 Likewise, it was 
crucial for the UK judges to see that the ECtHR judges are ‘listening to us, taking into account 
our concerns and interests’.20 Lord Kerr has written pointedly here of ‘the need [for the ECtHR] 
to attend closely to the articulation by a national court of the difficulties that the propounding of a 
general rule might have in the domestic setting’.21  
 The same emphasis on listening pervaded the interviews with the Strasbourg judges. One 
judge, for example, remarked that ‘the natural partner for us is the national judges... You can’t 
have a partner and not listen to what the partner says’.22 Similarly, another judge remarked that 
‘this court – maybe even more than any national court – looks into the national interpretations of 
national law’.23 It was said to be ‘crucial for us to know what their legal thinking is based on’.24  
A close regard for the decisions of the national courts was deemed integral to the ECtHR’s 
decision-making: ‘...obviously any decision is likely to be more reliable if you listen to what the 
person who’s going to be affected by your decision has to say, don’t you think?’.25 Echoing these 
views, the ECtHR judge, Françoise Tulkens, has argued that ‘the Court can and must enrich its 
own scrutiny by reflecting on national decisions in which Convention law is analysed. The Court 
does not have a monopoly on understanding the Convention’.26 
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 2.3 Mutual Explanation of Views  
 The second feature of formal dialogue described by the judges is that it takes place 
through the explanations set out in the respective judgments of the UK courts and the ECtHR. 
According to the former ECtHR President, Dean Spielmann, ‘the national judge details their 
analysis of the human rights issues at stake in the case, and their application of the corresponding 
jurisprudential principles’27 and ‘the European Court assesses, and, as the case may be, rectifies 
or validates the analysis’.28 The duty to explain a judicial decision was said to be owed 
principally to ‘the litigants and towards the public’.29 To this extent, the communication between 
the courts was said to be secondary to the resolution of the particular legal disputes confronting 
them. However, it was made clear that the courts regard one another as key audiences to their 
respective judgments. This was made particularly apparent during the interviews with the 
Justices. The task of the UK courts, it was said, is to ‘signal to them [the ECtHR] that we think 
we’re following them or we’re not following them ... so when it goes to Strasbourg they can see 
what we’re doing and why’.30 Further, the Justices described the practices of ‘putting in a 
judgment material which you hope that Strasbourg will have regard to next time round’31 and 
producing ‘a statement ... which you hope will explain the approach of the national court to the 
supranational court in Strasbourg’.32 Here, Lady Justice Arden has also suggested that ‘[t]he 
national court can in effect send a message to the Strasbourg court by reflecting its views on the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence in its judgment either in the case before it goes to Strasbourg or some 
other case raising the same issue’.33  
 It would appear, however, that the twin expectations of being heard and receiving an 
explanation in reply occasionally collide with reality. One Justice suggested that, in practice, 
formal dialogue ‘tends to be one way’:34 
Strasbourg can indulge in the dialogue but, on the whole, that dialogue tends to 
be one way, in the sense that we’re making points, rather like a barrister to a 
judge, if you like, and Strasbourg can ignore them, can answer them, can 
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specifically refer to them, can deal with them in general terms, can half deal with 
them.
35
 
A notable example of the ECtHR not responding directly to the signals sent by domestic courts 
arose in one of the most fraught and well-known exchanges between the UK courts and the 
ECtHR. The courts repeatedly reached differing conclusions as to whether Art.8 ECHR could be 
invoked by social housing tenants facing eviction to challenge the proportionality of the decision 
before a court making the order for possession. In the first major domestic judgment on the issue, 
Qazi v Harrow LBC,
36
 a divided (3:2) decision by the House of Lords concluded that Art.8 could 
not be invoked to this end.
37
 Lord Steyn, however, dissenting, argued that the conclusion 
‘empties article 8(1) of any or virtually any meaningful content’38 and remarked pointedly that 
‘[i]t would be surprising if the views of the majority ... withstood European scrutiny’.39 This 
‘putative invitation’,40 however, drew no direct response from the ECtHR on the two subsequent 
occasions that it considered UK cases on this matter, prompting some consternation when the 
issue next returned to the Law Lords:  
The question is not made easier by the fact that when Qazi's case reached the 
Strasbourg court it was dismissed as inadmissible without any reasons having 
been given, and by the absence of any mention of the House's decision in Qazi in 
the court's judgment in the Connors
41
 case. Lord Steyn's declaration in Qazi ... 
that it would be surprising if the views of the majority ... withstood scrutiny 
cannot have escaped attention in Strasbourg.
 42
 
The lack of explicit engagement by the ECtHR with the divided views of the Law Lords 
appeared to prolong domestic judicial difficulties in that area, as the judges were left to debate 
which arguments the ECtHR had implicitly accepted or rejected.
43
 There was, however, a view 
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among the Justices that the ECtHR had become more receptive in recent years: ‘...in relation to 
the Strasbourg court, there is a real sense of increasing dialogue. They are listening to what is 
said about their decisions’.44 
 2.4 The Space for Cross-Influence  
 The next feature of formal dialogue described by the judges is that it involves the courts 
actively seeking to influence one another. In this respect, it is predicated on a space for cross-
influence between the courts. The ongoing presence of such influences in the decision-making of 
the UK courts and the ECtHR is well-recognised in the extra-judicial commentary. Lord Reed 
observes ‘a dialectical process at work, as the European Court and national courts each influence 
the work of the other’.45 Likewise, Paul Mahoney, the former UK judge at the ECtHR, notes a 
‘two-way adjudicatory traffic’46 by which the courts have engaged in ‘a continuing exchange on 
the subject of a specific human rights problem in the country, with the position on each side 
progressively evolving in the light of the other’s judgments’.47 
 During the interviews, several features of the decision-making of the UK courts and the 
ECtHR were identified as facilitating the potential for mutual influence. One such feature was the 
shared language of the courts. A Strasbourg judge felt that this placed the UK courts in a 
considerably stronger position to engage with the Strasbourg case law than many of their 
European counterparts whose first language is neither English nor French.
48
 They face no 
‘linguistic hurdle’49 in their efforts to apply the Convention rights. A second and much more 
significant feature, however, was the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998. The legislation was deemed 
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by several Justices to have directly facilitated formal dialogue with the ECtHR by granting the 
UK courts the ability to interpret the ‘Convention rights’50 and engage extensively with the 
ECtHR’s case law. Prior to the Act, it was said that the situation was ‘unsatisfactory on all sorts 
of levels, not least because it meant that Strasbourg considered a case without the benefit of the 
thinking of the national court’.51 Another Justice explained:  
[Dialogue] certainly didn’t exist in the way that it does now because the UK 
courts weren’t able to apply the Convention rights directly, so human rights 
tended to be very much a policy argument in support of a statutory or common 
law argument. ... That’s much less of a dialogue because we weren’t able to 
engage with Strasbourg on Strasbourg’s terms, and now we can.52 
Lord Reed similarly notes here that ‘for good or ill, [the HRA] compels our courts to analyse the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence to a greater extent than the courts of other contracting parties’.53 The 
same sentiments have been voiced by several former ECtHR Presidents. Sir Nicolas Bratza has 
observed that ‘...the Strasbourg Court has, in my perception, been particularly respectful of 
decisions emanating from courts in the United Kingdom since the coming into effect of the 
Human Rights Act and this because of the very high quality of the judgments of these courts, 
which have greatly facilitated our task of adjudication’.54 Similarly, Spielmann has remarked that 
‘...the distinctive English approach to human rights, which rest on that great landmark that is the 
Human Rights Act, has never ceased to command my attention’.55 
 A third feature which was deemed to facilitate the potential for cross-influence is the 
particular styles of reasoning which characterise the judgments of the UK courts and ECtHR. 
According to the Justices, the ability to interpret Convention rights and reason with the 
Strasbourg case law combines with the ‘narrative and argumentative form’56 and ‘profoundly 
explanatory’57 method of analogical reasoning in common law judgments to enable the UK 
courts to explain their analysis of the applicable Convention rights and the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence in considerable detail to the ECtHR. For this reason, one Justice suggested that 
‘our own relationship with Strasbourg is different from any other country’.58 The ECtHR 
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judgments were deemed to broadly share this explanatory style. One Justice observed that ‘[t]hey 
reason in quite a common law way … they're fairly explicit, they try and reason things out’.59 
Likewise, the Strasbourg judges observed that the ‘the whole machinery [at the ECtHR] is an 
imitation of the common law system’,60 mirroring ‘the very pattern of law-making through 
judicial law-making’.61 There was a clear view among the Justices that this provides the UK 
courts with an advantage in their relationship with the ECtHR over the courts in jurisdictions 
which either provide shorter, formalistic reasoning for their decisions or do not explicitly analyse 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence, which placed them in ‘a strong position to influence Strasbourg’.62 
Several Strasbourg judges here testified to the influence of the reasoning of the UK courts. One 
judge remarked:  
… in every British case that I was part of there were long citations from British 
judgments that everybody has read with great interest, precisely because Britain 
and, of course, Cyprus, Ireland, are the common law countries that are well 
versed in the applications of the case law.
63
 
Another judge referred to the ‘very influential’64 and ‘excellent reasoning of the UK judges’65 
and described it as a ‘very rewarding learning exercise … to see how our case law was 
interpreted in the British cases’.66 
 A fourth feature of the decision-making of the UK courts and the ECtHR which was 
deemed to facilitate cross-influence is their mutual flexibility. There was a shared view that 
because both courts develop their legal principles on a case-by-case basis, they are afforded a 
degree of flexibility with which to mutually adapt in response to their respective positions. The 
UK courts, on the one hand, enjoy what Lord Justice Laws has described as the common law’s 
‘power of continuous self-correction’67 and its ‘catholicity’:68 its ‘...capacity to draw inspiration 
from many different sources’.69 To this end, the UK courts were deemed well-equipped to adjust 
to changes in the thinking of the ECtHR. One Justice observed that ‘the idea of developing 
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thinking and principles through case law and the interaction of decisions on particular facts is one 
that we all like and are comfortable with’.70 Again, there was a view that this places the UK 
courts at an advantage. One Strasbourg judge, for example, observed ‘a big difference between 
the common law countries that are used to assimilating the precedents and, in a sense, integrating 
them into their own judicial system, and … other countries that are not able to assimilate those 
judgments’.71 In the same vein, it was noted by several of the Strasbourg judges that the ability of 
the ECtHR to develop its jurisprudence case-by-case enables it to modify its position where 
necessary in the light of arguments made by national courts. Lady Justice Arden has referred to 
this as the ECtHR’s ‘plasticity’:72 ‘...its genuine desire to respond to the needs of the contracting 
states’ legal systems, in other words its receptivity of the need for change ... [its] coping strategy 
... adapting itself when need arises’.73 Each of these features was deemed to facilitate the 
potential for cross-influence between the courts. 
 2.5 Seeking Influence through Judgments 
 It was described earlier how the judges regard one another as key audiences to their 
respective judgments. For this reason, a number of the judges stressed the need for what can be 
termed judicial diplomacy:
74
 sensitivity to how the language and framing of their judgments is 
likely to be received by the judges of the other court. One Justice described how the manner in 
which views are presented in Supreme Court judgments is influenced by ‘political 
considerations’:75 their sense of ‘how will this go down in Strasbourg’.76 In this regard, it was 
said that the expression of views tends to be more ‘guarded’77 in judgments compared to the 
‘frank’78 exchanges between the judges which reportedly take place during their bilateral 
meetings, where the contents of discussions are not published. Another Justice explained this in 
similar terms:  
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Obviously we have to have respect for them and they have to have respect for us, 
and so it would be quite inappropriate for us to write a sort of polemical judgment 
in which we set out a Strasbourg judgment, then analysed it in order to show in 
harsh terms that it was a lot of rubbish – that would be quite inappropriate.79 
It was not only the Justices, however, who observed this need for judicial diplomacy. A 
Strasbourg judge interviewed stressed the importance of ‘having a certain awareness as to what 
the impact of judgments is going to be and what the people who are affected by the judgments 
actually think about them’,80 including the national judges. This echoes the remarks of 
Spielmann, quoted in the Chapter 1, that ‘it goes without saying that we do think about how our 
judgments will be received’.81  
 It appears that this diplomacy is intended as a way of increasing influence. This is fairly 
explicit in the remarks of the former ECtHR President, Jean-Paul Costa: 
We need to be pragmatic. There is no point in chanting the maxim “pacta sunt 
servanda” on which Grotius based international law. The Court could only have 
been influential and it can only avoid the danger of being misunderstood, or even 
rejected, so long as it observes a degree of restraint and explains again and again 
to judges and other national authorities the basis for its decisions.
82
 
Likewise, the use of diplomacy to achieve influence was evident in the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Nicklinson,
83
 where Lord Neuberger remarked that ‘Dialogue or collaboration ... can be carried 
on with varying degrees of emphasis or firmness, and there are times when an indication, rather 
than firm words are more appropriate and can reasonably be expected to carry more 
credibility’.84 At a more general level, Lord Reed has remarked that ‘national courts can and do 
seek, through their judgments, to encourage or persuade the European Court to develop its 
jurisprudence in particular ways’.85 To this end, one Justice suggested that ‘you influence people 
much better by reasoning with them calmly and in a constructive way than by either remaining 
silent or by hectoring’.86 Likewise, another Justice made the point that ‘sometimes you will get a 
more favourable response if you tread gently than if you wave a big stick’.87  
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 Two examples provided by the Justices were said to illustrate the different manifestations 
of this diplomacy. On the one hand, the ‘big stick’ approach was evidenced by the Supreme 
Court’s judgment in Horncastle.88 As discussed in Chapter 1, the question there was whether a 
criminal conviction would be compatible with the fair trial requirements of Art.6 ECHR where 
hearsay evidence constituted ‘sole or decisive’ evidence against the accused. The ECtHR 
Chamber judgment in Al-Khawaja v UK,
89
 finding against the UK, had ruled that such a 
conviction would not be compatible with Art.6. The government subsequently requested a 
referral of the judgment to the ECtHR Grand Chamber, however the Court postponed its 
consideration of the request until after the Supreme Court had issued its Horncastle judgment 
which addressed the same issue. The Supreme Court held that the admission of hearsay evidence 
under domestic law would be compatible with Art.6. It refused to apply the judgment in Al-
Khawaja, and criticised the decision at length for its inflexible application of the sole or decisive 
rule, for the lack of clarity in the rule itself, and for having misunderstood the existing fair trial 
protections in domestic law. One Justice interviewed explained here that ‘the whole point of 
Horncastle was to persuade the Grand Chamber to take Al-Khawaja
90
 on and then to persuade 
the Grand Chamber that they need to modify the Chamber’s91 approach’.92 The effort was largely 
successful. Al-Khawaja was relinquished to the Grand Chamber and the eventual judgment,
93
 
which reversed the decision of the Chamber in part,
94
 ruled that a conviction based decisively on 
hearsay evidence could still be compatible with Art.6 provided there were sufficient 
counterbalancing measures to offset the disadvantage to the defendant and the ‘overall fairness’ 
of the proceedings was not undermined.
95
  
 By contrast, an example cited by one Justice of the UK courts ‘treading gently’, by 
sending subtler signals to the ECtHR, was the decision of the Supreme Court in Whiston.
96
 One 
of the issues there was whether the right to have a detention reviewed under Art.5(4) ECHR 
renews when a person, serving a determinate custodial sentence, is granted discretionary early 
release but subsequently recalled to prison. Holding that it did not renew, the majority reasoned 
that the result ‘clearly appears to be the conclusion which the Strasbourg court would reach’.97 
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Lady Hale, however, while agreeing with the ratio, was unconvinced by the majority’s 
reasoning.
98
 In light of this difference of view, the ECtHR was invited to clarify the position at 
the next opportunity: ‘…it may be that the Strasbourg court would want to reconsider their 
jurisprudence’.99  
 On the basis of these insights, judgment-based dialogue appears to be actively shaped by 
the judges’ awareness of one another as audiences to their respective judgments, with the UK 
courts in particular having tailored their reasoning in specific instances in order to increase the 
prospect of influence.  
3. Categories of Interaction 
 3.1 Conflict and Consensus 
 The chapter has so far explored the general characteristics ascribed by the Justices and 
ECtHR judges to the formal dialogue between their courts. These characteristics – mutual 
listening, mutual explanation and the reciprocal effort to influence – were fairly uncontroversial. 
It will be recalled from the methodology chapter, however, that a variety of judgment-based 
interactions between these courts have been labelled ‘dialogue’. Drawing upon the case law cited 
by the judges interviewed, this next part of the chapter uses these categories of interaction to 
further scrutinise the nature of the judgment-based interactions which the judges understand as 
dialogue. If formal dialogue is a process by which the courts mutually listen and explain their 
views, seeking to influence one another through the medium of their judgments, does it 
encompass all judgments made respectively by the courts on matters concerning the Convention 
rights, or does it involve specific types of decision only?  
 Here, there were different views both amongst the Justices and between the Justices and 
the ECtHR judges. Drawing upon the concepts introduced in the previous chapter, it can be said 
that two broad categories emerged from the interviews, which can be supported with additional 
extra-judicial insights: first, what has been labelled ‘conflictual’100 dialogue, based on 
disagreement or ‘differences of opinion’101 between the courts; second, ‘consensual’102 dialogue, 
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based on influences at work between the courts in the absence of disagreement. As seen in the 
Chapter 2, conflictual dialogue can be divided into two subcategories: disagreement by the UK 
courts with a judgment of the ECtHR, and disagreement by the ECtHR with a judgment of the 
UK courts. Consensual dialogue can also be divided into two subcategories: judgments by the 
UK courts with which the ECtHR agrees, or could potentially agree with in future (influence or 
the prospect of influence by the UK courts) and the application of ECtHR judgments by the UK 
courts (influence by the ECtHR). It should be recalled, however, that these are neither strict nor 
mutually exclusive categories. Conflictual dialogue, for example, also has the potential for 
subsequent agreement and influence.
103
 Nonetheless, these categories help to illuminate the 
differences of emphasis in the judicial understandings of dialogue between these courts which 
were encountered during the interviews and which have manifested in the extra-judicial 
commentary.  The following sections consider each of the categories in turn and the level of 
consensus surrounding them.  
 3.2 Conflictual Interaction 
 3.2.1 Disagreement by the UK courts  
 This first category of conflictual dialogue was the subject of the only clear consensus 
across the interviews. There was a common understanding among the judges interviewed that 
formal dialogue involves a decision by a national court which signals concerns regarding, or 
even disagrees with, a particular aspect of the Strasbourg jurisprudence. One Justice defined 
dialogue as  
… a polite way of saying that a national court can express disagreement with a 
decision by a Strasbourg section or even the Grand Chamber when it feels that 
there’s been a failure to understand the domestic law sufficiently or where they 
feel the decision hasn’t been adequately reasoned.104 
Another Justice similarly explained: ‘We are saying to Strasbourg “Think again” or “What about 
this problem?” or “We don’t think you’ve really dealt with this”’.105 These views echo similar 
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statements made by senior UK judges in extra-judicial lectures
106
 and reflects the dominant 
conception of dialogue apparent within the UK case law, neatly encapsulated in the judgment of 
Lord Mance in Chester
107
 as the process by which the national courts ‘express their concerns 
and, in an appropriate case ... refuse to follow Strasbourg case-law’.108    
 In such instances, there is a clear expectation that the ECtHR will undertake a review of 
its own position. Lady Justice Arden has argued that the ECtHR must be ‘willing in an 
appropriate case to reconsider an earlier decision in the light of disagreement by the superior 
national court.’109 This expectation has been made clear in the case law on a number of 
occasions. In Horncastle, Lord Phillips concluded his judgment: ‘I have taken careful account of 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence. I hope that in due course the Strasbourg Court may also take 
account of the reasons that have led me not to apply the sole or decisive test in this case’.110 
Likewise, in Chester, Lord Mance reasoned that where a national court disagrees with a 
judgment of the ECtHR, it could do so ‘in the confidence that the reasoned expression of a 
diverging national viewpoint will lead to a review of the position in Strasbourg’.111 
 A number of the Strasbourg judges shared with the Supreme Court Justices the view that 
formal dialogue can involve this type of conflictual exchange. One judge, for example, observed: 
‘I think that it is quite right that national superior courts should have a second bite at the cherry, 
should at least be allowed to react to a judgment by the ECtHR concerning their country and to 
say to the ECtHR, in polite terms and explaining why, “Sorry, but we think that you have got it 
wrong.”  This is so particularly where the disagreement goes to assessment of domestic law’.112 
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Further, as seen in Chapter 1, in calling for ‘increased dialogue’113 between the courts, the former 
ECtHR President, Sir Nicolas Bratza, has similarly remarked that it is ‘right and healthy that 
national courts should continue to feel free to criticise Strasbourg judgments where those 
judgments have applied principles which are unclear or inconsistent or where they have 
misunderstood national law or practices’,114 even refusing to follow them in order to provide the 
ECtHR the ‘opportunity to reconsider the decision in issue’.115  
 By far the most frequently cited example of formal dialogue during the interviews with 
the Justices was the Horncastle / Al-Khawaja exchange concerning the admissibility of hearsay 
evidence and the right to a fair trial under Art.6 ECHR. This appears to be widely considered the 
paradigmatic example of dialogue between these courts. As seen in the introductory chapter, Sir 
Nicolas Bratza used his concurring judgment to applaud the decision as ‘a good example of the 
judicial dialogue between national courts and the European Court on the application of the 
Convention’.116 Likewise, another former ECtHR President, Dean Spielmann, has hailed this 
exchange as the ‘example par excellence of judicial dialogue’.117  
 Another example frequently cited by the Justices has been encountered already in this 
chapter: the repeated conflict between the UK courts and the ECtHR as to whether a person’s 
right to respect for their home under Art.8 ECHR required the courts to be able to determine the 
proportionality of an eviction from social housing or local authority sites before issuing a 
possession order. Contrary to Strasbourg’s view, the House of Lords repeatedly held that Art.8 
made no such requirement,
118
 maintaining instead that the availability of judicial review (and, 
later, expanded grounds of judicial review to allow for greater factual sensitivity,
119
 developed in 
response to the adverse ECtHR case law) provided an adequate safeguard against the risk of 
evictions which would violate a person’s right to respect for their home. The ECtHR, however, 
repeatedly disagreed with that assessment.
120
 In its view, the loss of a home resulting from a 
possession order required the courts to be able to determine whether it was a proportionate 
interference with Art.8.
121
 Judicial review, it reasoned, did not provide the opportunity for the 
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courts responsible for making possession orders to make that assessment.
122
 At the culmination 
of a resistance by majorities in the House of Lords spanning three separate decisions,
123
 however, 
a situation which Paterson describes as ‘reminiscent of trench warfare’,124 the Supreme Court 
unanimously decided to accept the Strasbourg view that an applicant facing eviction from social 
housing must be able to challenge the proportionality of that decision.
125
 One Justice described 
the saga: ‘It certainly was a dialogue. They decided something, we decided something, they 
decided something, we decided something, and it was definitely a catch-up going on’.126  
 3.2.2 Disagreement by the ECtHR 
 The second, and more controversial, category of conflictual dialogue which emerged 
from the interviews is the decisions by the ECtHR which disagree with judgments of the 
domestic courts. During the interviews with the Justices, two examples of such interaction were 
cited. The first example was the disagreement stemming from the UK’s former policy of 
retaining the biometric data of individuals previously suspected, though not convicted, of 
criminal offences.
127
 In S and Marper,
128
 the House of Lords unanimously held that the policy 
was not a disproportionate restriction on the Art.8 rights of the appellants.
129
 However, when the 
case was taken to Strasbourg,
130
 the Grand Chamber unanimously disagreed. It found that the 
data retention was an indiscriminate and thus disproportionate restriction on the right to a private 
life. Dickson observes that this was particularly striking given that all ten UK judges who heard 
the case at the domestic level found no violation of Art.8 and had declined to make a declaration 
of incompatibility, whereas all seventeen ECtHR judges found a violation.
131
 When the Supreme 
Court was next confronted with the matter, faced with the unequivocal view from the ECtHR and 
an ‘irreconcilable conflict’132 between the UK and Strasbourg positions, it accepted and applied 
the reasoning of the Grand Chamber.
133
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 The second example cited turned on the meaning of ‘jurisdiction’ under Art.1 ECHR and 
the extent to which it gave the Convention rights extra-territorial effect. In the case of Al-
Skeini,
134
 the House of Lords held that questions relating to the interpretation of Art.1 ECHR and 
thus the entire reach of the Convention were for the Strasbourg court alone.
135
 However, it 
concluded from the Strasbourg jurisprudence that generally a state could only be said to have 
extra-territorial jurisdiction within the meaning of Art.1 where it had ‘such effective control of 
the territory of another state that it could secure to everyone in the territory all the rights and 
freedoms in section 1 of the Convention’.136 Later, in Smith (no.1),137 a (6:3) majority at the 
Supreme Court held that the armed forces of a contracting state operating outside of its territory 
are not within its jurisdiction within the meaning of Art.1. When the Grand Chamber delivered 
its Al-Skeini decision,
138
 however, it disagreed with that assessment. While a state’s jurisdiction 
under Art.1 was to be considered ‘primarily territorial’,139 it could also arise by reason of acts 
which are performed or produce effects outside of its territory,
140
 where a state exercises 
effective control over an area outside of its territory as a result of its military action,
141
 but also 
from a state’s use of force outside of its territory which brings individuals under the control of 
the state’s authorities. Where a state’s agents exercise control over an individual through force, 
there was an obligation to secure only the Convention rights which are ‘relevant to the situation 
of that individual’.142 In Smith (no 2),143 the Supreme Court was unanimous in the view that a 
state’s armed forces abroad fell within its jurisdiction for the purposes of Art.1 and that the 
appropriate course was to depart from Smith (no 1).
144
 
 As with domestic judgments which disagree with a position taken by the ECtHR, there is 
a shared understanding that the national courts must undertake a review of their position in the 
face of an adverse ECtHR judgment.
145
 It should be stressed, however, that there are differences 
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of judicial view as to whether this type of interaction reflects dialogue. On the one hand, for 
example, Lady Justice Arden has suggested that it does. In her view, dialogue between the courts 
purports to ‘give both the national and supranational court the chance to think again’.146 In the 
same vein, the former ECtHR President, Jean-Paul Costa, has written of dialogue as 
‘divergences’147 by the ECtHR with the judgments of national courts: ‘We have the utmost 
respect for constitutional courts, but if we always agreed with them, what would be the point of 
our Court?’.148 During the interviews, however, very few Justices cited such instances as 
dialogue. Additionally, the former UK judge at the ECtHR, Paul Mahoney, has suggested that 
these examples do not reflect ‘dialogue’ but ‘instances of the Strasbourg Court in effect reversing 
the national ruling on a human rights issue’.149  
 3.3 Consensual Interactions 
 3.3.1 National courts influencing the ECtHR  
 Turning to the consensual interactions, several Justices and ECtHR judges identified 
dialogue as the domestic judgments which have either influenced, or are considered to have the 
prospect of influencing, the judgments of the ECtHR, in the absence of disagreement. For the 
Justices, this category was associated particularly with UK judgments which make novel 
contributions to the development of Convention rights, either in areas upon which the ECtHR has 
yet to make a ruling or where there is no settled approach to the issue within the case law. Here, a 
number of the Justices cited the case of Rabone.
150
 The question there was whether an 
operational duty exists on states under Art.2 ECHR to protect informal psychiatric patients 
against the risk of suicide. In deciding that there was such a duty, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that its conclusion was effectively going further than the existing Strasbourg 
jurisprudence but was, nonetheless, one which flowed from it.
151
 In Reynolds v UK,
152
 a 
subsequent Strasbourg case concerning the same issue but arising from facts which occurred 
prior to the Rabone judgment, the ECtHR endorsed the Supreme Court’s approach. Noting that 
the Court of Appeal in 2010 had held that the operational duty did not apply to informal 
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patients,
153
 it welcomed the fact that the ‘underlying reasoning [of the domestic courts] ... 
changed over the years’.154 Lady Hale subsequently inferred from this decision that the ECtHR 
‘clearly thought that we were right’.155 Several Justices considered such cases to reflect a form of 
dialogue because they enable the UK courts to ‘help [Strasbourg] to develop the law’156 and thus 
offer ‘opportunities for influence’157 at the European level.  
 A number of ECtHR judges have also identified dialogue in such terms. A manifestation 
of the consensual dialogue suggested by the former ECtHR President Jean-Paul Costa, for 
example, is where the Strasbourg Court ‘not only endorses the decision of a constitutional court 
but uses the reasoning in its own decision’.158 The former UK judge at the ECtHR, Paul 
Mahoney, points to the exchange between the courts concerning the question of whether any of 
the Convention rights affords a ‘right to die’. In Pretty,159 the House of Lords concluded on the 
basis of the available Strasbourg jurisprudence that none of the Convention rights
160
 could be 
interpreted in such a way, even in the extreme case of a person suffering from a degenerative 
illness (though Lord Hope considered that the right to a private life under Art.8 was at least 
engaged).
161
 When the case was subsequently considered in Strasbourg,
162
 the reasoning of the 
Law Lords was emphatically endorsed, with the court citing no fewer than forty paragraphs from 
Lord Bingham’s judgment alone.163 However, it also pointedly endorsed Lord Hope’s view that 
Art.8 was engaged.
164
 Mahoney argues that the ‘Careful analysis of the relevant human rights 
case-law by the domestic, British courts in Pretty clearly helped the Strasbourg Court to develop 
its own interpretation when the case subsequently came to Strasbourg’.165 
 Interestingly, however, it was only a minority of the Justices interviewed who considered 
such cases to reflect a form of dialogue, with several others contesting the view. One Justice, for 
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example, remarked that ‘if you regard those as dialogue, then every case in which we look at 
Strasbourg jurisprudence and seek to apply it is an example of dialogue’.166 It was clear that, for 
a number of the Justices, disagreement is intrinsic to the dialogue metaphor in this context. 
Referring to the Rabone-type case, three Justices remarked:  
There was no question of a disagreement with Strasbourg so I would not see that 
as a dialogue case.
167
 
I don’t think that’s what’s normally being meant by it. What’s normally being 
meant by it is a genuine interchange where Strasbourg says something, we say 
something slightly different.
168
 
I think it really would be a misrepresentation to suggest that this was the outcome 
of some form of dialogue. It was simply a question of our looking at the relevant 
jurisprudence, considering it, having regard to it and coming up with our own 
conception of what the Convention right meant in the particular circumstances of 
the case.
169
 
Such remarks point to a specific conception of dialogue centred strictly upon disagreement by the 
domestic courts with a decision of the ECtHR. Relating these observations back to the question 
posed at the outset of this part of the chapter suggests that, for a number of the Supreme Court 
Justices, ‘dialogue’ does not connote the communication of all views by the domestic courts to 
the ECtHR but rather those which either disagree with a particular aspect of the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence or, on the most generous view, develop it in areas upon which the ECtHR has yet 
to make a direct ruling.  The difference is consistent with the understandings of dialogue which 
have manifested in the case law, explored in Chapter 1. On the one hand, the dominant 
conception is centred on disagreement by the UK courts with a decision of the ECtHR.
170
 
Alongside this, however, is a conception of dialogue visible in Rabone and Ambrose
171
 which 
stresses the ability of the UK courts to contribute proactively to the development of ECHR 
principles where there is no ECtHR case law dealing directly with the point in issue. 
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 3.3.2 The ECtHR influencing national courts 
 The fourth and widest category of interaction, one which emerged only from the 
interviews with the Strasbourg judges, is the decisions by domestic courts which implement 
ECtHR jurisprudence into the domestic legal system. There was a strong consensus amongst the 
ECtHR judges interviewed that dialogue refers to the process by which national judges 
‘translate’,172 ‘integrate’173 or ‘assimilate’174 through their decision-making the judgments of the 
ECtHR into domestic law. One Strasbourg judge interviewed explained that it represents ‘a 
different kind of dialogue’:175 
In this context it is not a question of the national courts saying to the ECtHR, 
“We are asking you to reconsider this point because we think that you have got it 
wrong.”  Rather, it is a dialogue in the sense of: “We take notice of the ECtHR’s 
finding that this or that aspect of our domestic law has given rise to a violation of 
the Convention.  What can we, the national courts, do to execute the ECtHR 
judgment, to translate it into practice in our legal system?”  This participation by 
the national courts in facilitating an effective execution of the ECtHR judgment 
within their legal system, quite apart from any measures of execution by the 
national parliament or government, represents another form of dialogue.
176
 
These insights are reinforced by other extra-judicial comments from former ECtHR judges. For 
Costa, for example, the most welcome form of dialogue is where the national court ‘coordinates 
its decisions with the Strasbourg caselaw, adhering to it and, above all, being guided by it’.177 
This is echoed by Spielmann, who argues that the dialogue ‘at the heart of vindicating 
Convention rights’178 is where the national courts ‘...appropriate the principles and methodology 
of the European case- law, notably proportionality, in the determination of the cases that present 
before them’.179 According to one Strasbourg judge interviewed, this form of interaction is 
‘dialogue at its best’.180    
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 3.4 Judicial Understandings of ‘Dialogue’: Reconciling the Divergences 
 In light of the preceding sections, it is reasonable to qualify the understanding of formal 
dialogue developed so far. In total, it has been described how four categories of interaction 
emerged: conflictual dialogue, either in the form of UK judgments which disagree with ECtHR 
judgments or ECtHR judgments which disagree with UK judgments; and consensual dialogue, 
either in the form of UK judgments which influence ECtHR judgments in the absence of 
disagreement, or ECtHR judgments which influence UK judgments. Among these categories, 
there were areas of consensus and points of difference between the judges. There was a strong 
consensus that this type of ‘dialogue’ refers to the situation where a national court expresses 
disagreement with a decision of the ECtHR. However, there was an explicit difference of view 
between the Justices as to whether the decisions of the UK courts which further develop ECHR 
principles in the absence of direct ECtHR case law could be considered a form of dialogue. 
Further, it was only the ECtHR judges who considered the general effectuation of ECHR 
principles into national law by domestic courts as a form of dialogue. None of the Justices 
interviewed conceived of the term in such a broad way. Thus, it would appear that there are 
diffuse judicial understandings at work as to the precise nature of the dialogue between these 
courts.  
 The differences in emphasis, however, are not irreconcilable. What was consistently 
stressed by all of the interviewed Justices was the capacity of the UK courts to express their own 
views on questions related to the interpretation of Convention rights, whether by criticising or 
departing from a particular strand of ECtHR jurisprudence, or by developing the Convention 
principles in areas which have not been directly ruled upon by the ECtHR, and thereby create the 
prospect of influencing that court.    
 In terms of the differences between the Justices and the ECtHR judges, the categories of 
dialogue emphasised by the respective judges simply reflected influence of their courts upon the 
judgments of the other. Thus, what the Justices emphasised were the domestic judgments which 
either influence or have the prospect of influencing the ECtHR. Dialogue is understood 
principally by the Justices as the ‘upward influence of national courts’,181 to borrow a phrase 
from Masterman. What the Strasbourg judges emphasised as dialogue, in contrast, was the 
downward influence of their court upon the domestic courts. The different understandings are 
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thus consistent with the notion of dialogue based on ‘reciprocal influences’182 which, as 
discussed in previous chapters, is at the core of the concept.  
4. The Practical and Normative Constraints  
 4.1 The Practical Constraints 
 The chapter has established that formal dialogue is understood by the judges as a process 
by which the courts exchange views and seek to influence one another through their respective 
judgments. Further, while there is some variation as to the nature of the interactions which are 
considered to reflect dialogue, the judges tended to emphasise the type of judgment-based 
interaction in which the court to which they belong exerts influences upon the other. As indicated 
by the definition provided at the outset of this chapter, however, both practical and normative 
constraints were identified. At the practical level, this form of dialogue was considered an 
‘indirect’183 exchange of views, taking place via the ordinary process of litigation in the 
respective courts.
184
 As such, it was viewed as a case-dependent process. One Justice remarked: 
‘[t]he trouble is that – certainly this kind of dialogue – depends upon the cases which happen to 
come to us ... We don’t go out looking for cases’.185 Likewise, another Justice observed: ‘...we’re 
a second or third-tier appellate court dealing with things sometime after they’ve become urgent 
down below or notorious down below, and we deal with cases as they come to us’.186 In addition 
to having little control over the issues that become the subject of adjudication, Lady Justice 
Arden has pointed out that the UK courts have little say over the issues which merit the attention 
of the ECtHR: 
The domestic court has no control over which cases become the subject of an 
application to the Strasbourg court, or over which cases are held to be admissible 
by the Strasbourg court. Thus it may not be able to conduct a dialogue with the 
Strasbourg court through its judgments so as to indicate to that court what the 
domestic court thinks the answer should be.
187
 
Thus, formal dialogue is not a fluid discussion but one confined to the particular issues arising 
from a given case, taking place on what one Strasbourg judge described as an ‘ad hoc, case-by-
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case basis’,188 as and when particular issues happen to arrive consecutively at the UK courts or 
the ECtHR for consideration.  
 4.2 Normative Constraints 
 Aside from the practicalities of formal dialogue, two normative constraints were 
identified. These arise from two institutional relationships: the relationship between the UK 
courts and Parliament, on the one hand, and the relationship between the UK courts and the 
ECtHR, on the other.   
 4.2.1 The UK courts and Parliament 
 The first constraint stems from the constitutional relationship between the judicial and 
legislative branches of government under the separation of powers in the United Kingdom. As 
seen in the introductory chapter, the UK’s particular tradition of constitutionalism is considered 
to be political rather than judicial in character. For the Justices, formal dialogue with the ECtHR 
was therefore seen within the context of their relationship with Parliament: in particular, the need 
to respect the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty. While one Justice alluded to the ‘the most 
extreme margins’189 whereby the UK courts might consider not following an Act of Parliament, it 
was said that the UK courts are bound by the decisions of the legislative branch. One Justice 
explained: ‘whatever Parliament decides, the UK courts will follow and they will have no 
problem in doing that – it’s something which we’ve always done’.190 To this extent, the formal 
dialogue with the ECtHR was conceived as effectively subject to parliamentary oversight; the 
outcomes contingent upon Parliament not subsequently legislating to the contrary. For this 
reason, one Justice observed: ‘“dialogue” suggests just a two-way process but, actually, it’s a 
multi-way process … It’s often a tripartite thing: court here, court there, Parliament. It goes 
on’.191 Parliamentary sovereignty also appeared to play a role to the extent that a number of the 
Justices expressed awareness that the HRA 1998 did not bestow legislative authorisation upon 
them to take the protections of the Convention rights under the HRA significantly beyond those 
laid down in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.
192
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 4.2.2 The international rule of law  
 The second normative constraint upon formal dialogue, this time upon the relationship 
between the UK courts and the ECtHR, is the international rule of law.
193
 Two principles were 
cited by the Justices in this connection. First, that it is their presumptive duty to adhere to a ‘clear 
and constant line’194 of Strasbourg jurisprudence, particularly when this line has been confirmed 
by a decision of the Grand Chamber.
195
  Second, and connected to the first, is the long-standing 
principle of the common law that UK courts will attempt to interpret and apply domestic law in a 
way that does not place the UK in breach of its international obligations.
196
 One Justice explained 
the combined effect of these principles on the way that they interpret the HRA: ‘Unless we pull 
out of the Council of Europe, the legislation would be there to reflect our international 
obligations, and there is a principle of interpretation that Parliament intended to act consistently 
with our international obligations’.197 With this in mind, it was considered to be ‘futile ... to 
refuse to follow a Grand Chamber decision which reflects a clear and constant approach, because 
we’ll only be putting the UK in breach of its international obligations for no good purpose’.198  
 On the one hand, a number of the Justices interviewed described a shift away from the 
first of the two principles. One Justice, for example, observed that ‘the past fourteen years have 
seen a development of our approach. I think that we are somewhat moving away from Ullah’.199 
Similarly, another Justice noted: ‘The possibility exists that you may get courts taking different 
views. I sense that among our courts there is a greater readiness to recognise that that may 
happen from time to time’.200 The case law on s.2 HRA, discussed in Chapter 1, certainly reflects 
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this view.
201
 Further, each of the eight Justices interviewed felt that it was technically open to the 
UK courts to refuse to follow a decision of the ECtHR, with several indicating explicitly that this 
remains the case even where a decision has been issued by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR. 
While the UK courts have yet to openly depart from a Grand Chamber ruling, there were 
indications by some of the Justices that the option is technically open. One Justice remarked that 
‘even if we had three absolutely clear, consistent decisions of the Grand Chamber, it would still 
be open to us, as a matter of principle, to say “We’re not following it”’.202 The Strasbourg judges 
interviewed were comfortable with the notion that domestic courts can disagree with ECtHR 
decisions. Indeed, it was described earlier how one judge felt it was the prerogative of national 
courts to take ‘a second bite at the cherry’203 where they have concerns with a particular decision 
of the ECtHR. Further, as seen in Chapter 1, Sir Nicolas Bratza has stressed that ‘“Strasbourg has 
spoken, the case is closed”204 is not the way in which I or my fellow judges view the respective 
roles of the two courts’.205   
 Nonetheless, there appears to be a consensus that there are limits to the extent to which 
national courts can disagree with the ECtHR. Despite the emphasis of a shift away from Ullah, 
several Justices expressed a strong inclination to avoid disagreements with the ECtHR, based on 
considerations of ‘the value of the rule of law internationally’:206 the view, to quote another 
Justice, that ‘the whole point of the Convention is that there should be a general standard across 
the whole of Europe’207 and that ‘it’s desirable to have a European court basically laying down 
the principles’.208 References were made to the ‘benefits of having shared norms across a 
continent, the benefits that that can bring to this country in terms of the stability and the creation 
of shared values’.209 Similarly, another Justice expressed the view that the uniformity harnessed 
by the Convention is ‘one of the things which has maintained peace, if you like, for many 
years’.210 Further, several showed consideration for the goals of the Strasbourg court itself. It was 
felt that the UK courts should be mindful of the ‘imperatives that the European court is 
facing’,211 just as the Strasbourg court should take heed of the concerns expressed by the national 
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courts: ‘they have to address other socio-political circumstances than those which are current in 
our society so, in a sense, you have to tolerate what are essentially minor interventions for the 
greater good’.212 Another of the Justices similarly remarked: ‘I think we should certainly not 
think that it’s only us they’re dealing with – there’s a slight feeling of that in the United 
Kingdom’.213  
 This commitment to the international rule of law appears to act as a constraint in two 
ways. First, it appears to demand that national courts depart from ECtHR rulings only 
‘exceptionally’.214 Regular divergences from the standards set in the caselaw of the ECtHR were 
felt to pose damaging implications from an international rule of law perspective. As one Justice 
explained:  
If you take too much advantage and you regularly disregard Strasbourg decisions, 
then the thing does start to fall apart because, well, it’s contrary to the rule of law. 
Nobody knows where they are, the general hierarchy is not being observed and 
the consistency across the Council of Europe countries goes.
215
 
Equally, there is a consensus that that disagreements between the courts ‘can’t go on 
indefinitely’216 – that ‘[d]ialogue cannot go on for ever’.217 To this extent, there appears to be a 
mutual understanding among judges that a Grand Chamber judgment should mark the end of any 
dialogue between the courts. This perhaps explains why few of the judges considered final 
ECtHR judgments, particularly from the Grand Chamber, which directly contradict domestic 
judgments, to reflect dialogue. In Chester, Lord Mance was explicit that dialogue as 
disagreement by the national courts is subject to ‘limits’218 where a Grand Chamber decision had 
been delivered, requiring ‘some truly fundamental principle of our law or some most egregious 
oversight or misunderstanding before it could be appropriate for this Court to contemplate an 
outright refusal to follow Strasbourg authority at the Grand Chamber level’.219 Endorsing Lord 
Mance’s views in Chester, Spielmann has argued:  
... one must sincerely hope never to find a situation in which a domestic court is 
placed in such a dilemma as to have no option but to defy the authority of the 
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European Court. It would signal the clear failure of dialogue, which can only be 
detrimental to the full observance of the Convention’.220     
Thus, formal dialogue does not reflect a free-flowing exchange of views and unhindered 
opportunities for influence between the courts. The practicalities of decision-making mean that it 
is necessarily an opportunistic process, while the normative constraints guide and limit the ways 
in which the UK courts are able to engage with the ECtHR case law, steering them away from 
outright conflict with final judgments of the ECtHR and confining disagreements to exceptional 
circumstances.   
5. Conclusion 
This chapter, the first of three drawing upon the interviews with the Justices and Strasbourg 
judges, has addressed the first research question: what is judgment-based (‘formal’) dialogue in 
the context of the relationship between the UK courts and the ECtHR? The answer proposed is 
that while the disputed notion of formal ‘dialogue’ – described as one of the ‘two basic dialogue 
levels’ between the UK courts and the ECtHR – eludes any precise definition, it can be said to 
refer to a process by which the courts, subject to practical and normative constraints, exchange 
views and seek to influence one another through their respective judgments. By exploring the 
different aspects of this definition, this chapter has produced three sets of conclusions as to how 
the judges understand the form of this judgment-based dialogue.  
 First, it has shown that the process of formal dialogue is considered, in both descriptive 
and normative terms, to involve mutual listening on the part of both courts and mutual 
explanation for the respective positions which they adopt on particular issues. To this end, their 
shared language, the HRA 1998, the detailed, explanatory methods of reasoning and the 
flexibility of each court in the development of the law in their respective systems are regarded by 
the judges as enabling cross-influence. It is clear from the judges’ accounts, however, that this 
dialogue does not consist of one ‘diktat versus the other court’s diktat’221 or ‘competing 
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monologues’.222 Indeed, despite that some of the judges question whether ‘dialogue’ is the most 
appropriate description, what they essentially describe is ‘direct dialogue’223 as conceived by 
Slaughter: ‘communication between two courts that is effectively initiated by one and responded 
to by the other’,224 underpinned by ‘an awareness on the part of both participants of whom they 
are talking to and a corresponding willingness to take account of the response’.225 Each court is 
certainly conscious of the other as an addressee to their judgments and engages in judicial 
diplomacy – tailoring their reasoning in consideration of how their judgments will be received by 
the other court – in order to enhance the prospect of influence. The observations in this way 
reinforce previous interview-based research noting the eagerness at the UK Supreme Court to 
influence the ECtHR through the reasoning of its judgments.
226
  
 Second, by drawing upon the categories of interaction set out in Chapter 2 and the case 
law cited by the interviewed judges, the chapter has illuminated varied judicial understandings at 
work as to the specific forms of judgment-based interaction thought to reflect dialogue between 
these courts, and has sought to reconcile these differences. To varied degrees, both conflictual 
and consensual forms of interaction are associated with the term, with differences of view both 
among the Justices and between the Justices and the ECtHR judges. To this extent, the 
differences of view among the judges could be said to amplify those differences within the 
academic literature, explored in Chapter 2. However, there was also much commonality in what 
the judges described. Reinforcing academic opinion to this effect,
227
 there is a clear consensus 
that ‘dialogue’ between the UK courts and the ECtHR refers to a conflictual interaction whereby 
the national courts either criticise or disagree with a judgment of the ECtHR. Further, underlying 
the interactions identified by the Justices –domestic judgments which criticise or disagree with 
judgments of the ECtHR and domestic judgments which exert influence upon the ECtHR in the 
absence of disagreement – is an emphasis on the ability of the UK courts to offer a distinct 
contribution to the interpretation of Convention rights. On this basis, Amos is right to observe 
that ‘[i]t is not in every HRA judgment that every UK court seeks to enter into a dialogue with 
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the ECtHR’.228 Further, unifying the different emphases by the Justices and the Strasbourg 
judges is the desire for the court to which they belong to influence the other. The emphasis in the 
Justices’ accounts was in the domestic judgments which have the prospect of influencing the 
ECtHR – a process of ‘upward influence of the national courts’229 – while the interaction stressed 
by the Strasbourg judges – the effectuation of Strasbourg jurisprudence at the national level by 
domestic courts – stressed the downward influence of the ECtHR on domestic judicial decisions. 
Rather than reflecting any substantive differences, therefore, the different judicial understandings 
underlined the judges’ desire for their court to influence the other: to influence rather than be 
subject to influence.  
 Third, the chapter has observed practical and normative constraints on the formal 
dialogue between these courts. Practically, the process occurs indirectly through judgments and 
is thus dependent on cases which the courts cannot hand-pick for the purposes of engaging in 
dialogue. Normatively, parliamentary sovereignty and the international rule of law combine to 
limit the ways in which the Justices engage with the Strasbourg case law. In one respect, the 
observations made in this chapter underline the eagerness of the Justices to move away from a 
role of simply applying the existing ECtHR jurisprudence.  However, this eagerness appears to 
be tempered by a shared regard for the international rule of law and the potential implications for 
the stability of the Convention system, manifesting in a mutual understanding that a Grand 
Chamber decision should ordinarily mark the end of any conflictual dialogue between the courts. 
Indeed, the reticence described by the Justices in interview to depart frequently from the 
standards set by the ECtHR also lends support to Bjorge’s argument that the UK courts perform 
their role within the ECHR system as ‘faithful trustees of the Convention rights, ... applying the 
Convention rights loyally, with a focus on the principles underlying those rights and the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence which sets them out’.230 As faithful trustees, the courts adhere to the 
rule of ‘pacta sunt servanda, according to which states must comply with their obligations in 
good faith’.231 Observing that the UK courts have set clear limits on the scope for permissible 
disagreement with the ECtHR, particularly where the Grand Chamber has issued a judgment, 
Bjorge argues that ‘The principle pacta sunt servanda, and the attendant standard of faith, could 
be taken to explain the approach taken by the national courts to dialogue with the European 
Court’.232  
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 The analysis here, however, presents only a partial picture of the dialogue between these 
courts. In order to understand whether it can perform a legitimising role, what remain to be 
addressed are the functions which were attributed to the process of formal dialogue by the 
Justices and ECtHR judges and the role of the informal dialogue between their courts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
101 
 
Chapter 4  
The Functions of Formal Judicial Dialogue  
Perhaps the most potent source of tension and the greatest inhibition to dialogue 
between Strasbourg and national courts is the circumstance that Strasbourg is a 
supranational court and the influences that come to bear on its decisions are 
inevitably disparate. ... [I]neluctably, the decisions that it reaches present 
challenges as to their workability in the domestic setting.
1
 
- Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore   
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter constructed a definition of judgment-based (‘formal’) judicial dialogue 
within the context of the relationship between the UK courts and the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) based on insights provided by the UK Supreme Court Justices and the ECtHR 
judges interviewed for this study. It was defined as a process by which the courts, subject to 
practical and normative constraints, exchange views and seek to influence each other through 
their respective judgments. Having thus defined the form of this type of dialogue, the present 
chapter aims to answer the second research question outlined in Chapter 1: what are the functions 
of judicial dialogue in the context of the decision-making of the UK courts and the European 
Court of Human Rights? Drawing from the interview insights, it submits that the principal 
function of formal dialogue is the mitigation of tensions arising from the overlapping, multi-
layered systems for the judicial protection of human rights in Europe. The chapter develops this 
argument in five parts. Part 2 sets out the reasons why the judges seek to influence one another 
through their judgments. In doing so, this section provides key insights as to the motivations of 
the judges in their interactions with one another which are drawn upon throughout the rest of the 
chapter. In Part 3, the chapter sets out the multiple sources of tension within the relationship 
between the UK courts and the ECtHR which were described by the judges, along with the issues 
which were perceived to arise from those tensions. This provides the necessary context for Part 4 
which explains the tension-mitigating functions of formal dialogue. Here, the chapter explores 
how the judgment-based interactions which the judges associated with the term ‘dialogue’ are 
used to perform this alleviating role. In Part 5, the analysis turns to another development: the 
‘resurgent’ common law. It examines how this development in the UK case law appears, in the 
light of the interview insights, to coincide with and compliment the mitigating functions of the 
dialogic interactions identified in Chapter 3. The concluding remarks are offered in Part 6.  
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2. Motivations for Influence   
In Chapter 3, formal dialogue was defined as a process by which the courts, subject to practical 
and normative constraints, exchange views and seek to influence one another through their 
respective judgments. Four categories of interaction were, with varied degrees of consensus, 
identified as dialogue: conflictual interactions, manifesting in disagreement by either the UK 
courts or the ECtHR with a judgment of the other, and consensual interactions, manifesting in 
agreement and influence in either direction. Underlying each of these categories, however, was 
the shared desire on the part of the Justices and the Strasbourg judges for the UK courts and the 
ECtHR to mutually influence their respective decision-making.  
 The ECtHR judges seek to influence the judgments of the domestic courts as a means of 
making the Convention rights effective at the national level, ensuring that those rights are not 
‘theoretical or illusory but ... practical and effective’.2 As one Strasbourg judge put it, once the 
ECtHR has ‘stated the principle’,3 there is ‘nothing much more the Court can do’.4 In order for 
the principle to become effective in the domestic context, action is required on the part of the 
national authorities. A sufficient influence upon the judgments of the domestic courts was thus 
said to facilitate ‘direct execution’5 of the principles. This is reflected in the type of judgment-
based interaction which the Strasbourg judges associated with the term ‘dialogue’: the 
appropriation and effectuation of Convention law by the national courts, seen in Chapter 3. The 
former ECtHR President, Dean Spielmann, expresses this view where he notes that the 
application of the Court’s jurisprudential principles by the domestic courts is the ‘form of 
dialogue that is at the heart of vindicating Convention rights’6 – a ‘necessity’7 to the success of 
the Convention.  
 The Justices, on the other hand, valued the prospect of influencing the development of the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence. Several shared a perception that the development of human rights 
norms in Europe is a ‘cooperative venture’8 to which the UK courts have a valuable contribution 
to make. Since the enactment of the HRA, it was pointed out, the UK courts are ‘working on the 
same material [as the ECtHR] and sometimes we have insights and thoughts … [and] 
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developments which are ahead of theirs’.9 They thus attached value to the notion that they are, 
through their decision-making, able to have, in one Justice’s words, ‘an input into the way in 
which Strasbourg thinks’.10 There was a desire for the Supreme Court to have a role as ‘one of 
the opinion-formers at the international level’.11 In this way, their judgments were valued for 
providing them with a voice reaching beyond their jurisdiction. More importantly, however, the 
desire to influence the development of the European human rights jurisprudence stemmed from a 
shared self-perception amongst some of the Justices as representatives of the common law 
tradition in a European human rights system largely dominated by variations of the civil law 
tradition. This crucial point is returned to in the next part of the chapter.  
 A motivation for cross-influence which was common to both the Justices and the ECtHR 
judges was a desire for mutually compatible standards of human rights protection. As one Justice 
put it, ‘it’s simply each learning from the other and trying to make sure that, on the whole, both 
courts are singing from, broadly speaking, the same hymn-sheet’.12 In the absence of such cross-
influence, it was felt that the respective courts would effectively retreat into judicial ‘isolation’13 
to the detriment of the development of common European standards. To this extent, the influence 
which the judges desired their courts to exert upon one another was motivated by the need for a 
broad convergence of standards. To this extent, mutual accommodation was deemed necessary in 
instances of disagreement between the courts. One Justice was explicit that where the UK courts 
disagree with the ECtHR, it was desirable for there to be ‘a modification of Strasbourg’s view 
with which ... we can live’14 and a ‘satisfactory compromise’.15 Equally, it is expected of the 
national courts that where they find occasion to disagree with the ECtHR, to quote one 
Strasbourg judge, they ‘must aim to find a solution ... otherwise it’s monologue’.16 They cannot 
simply appeal to some ‘special position and say “No, we are different, we are unique”’.17  
3. The Sources of Tension between the UK courts and the ECtHR 
What the chapter has thus far established from the interviews is three motivations underpinning 
the judges’ respective desires for influence between their courts: for the Strasbourg judges, the 
need to make Convention rights effective at the national level; for the Justices, the need to have a 
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voice in the development of European human rights law, in particular to represent the common 
law tradition; and, for both the Justices and the ECtHR judges, the need to have a broad 
convergence of standards of human rights protection. In Chapter 3, it was seen how the 
Strasbourg judges have emphasised an understanding of dialogue based on the effectuation of the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence into domestic law by national courts. This form of interaction allows 
the first of the three motivations to be achieved. 
The application of the ECtHR case law, however, is not a straightforward task. The 
effectuation of the Strasbourg jurisprudence by the domestic courts is not always possible, or at 
least to the satisfaction of the national judges, and neither, therefore, is a convergence of 
standards. In this way, the relationship between the courts was said to be complicated by certain 
‘tensions’.18 These are key points of difference between the courts in their institutional 
perspective, modes of operating and the legal traditions of their judges which were perceived by 
the judges to have implications for the ability of the UK courts to apply the Strasbourg judgments 
in the domestic context. It is these tensions which bring to the fore the Justices’ desire to 
influence the development of the Strasbourg jurisprudence in order to mitigate either existing or 
potential difficulties. The following sections set out the sources of those tensions and their 
manifestations which were described during the interviews. As will be shown later, the dialogue 
judgments proposed during the interviews with the Supreme Court Justices (signalling 
disagreement or the development of Convention law in the absence of pre-existing Strasbourg 
jurisprudence) purport to counter these tensions in numerous ways.  
3.1 National Courts and a Supranational Human Rights Court 
 The first source of tension described between the UK courts and the ECtHR stems from 
their respective roles as national and supranational human rights courts.
19
 This was considered 
by the judges to be a tension inherent to the relationship between all national courts within the 
Council of Europe and the ECtHR. As one Justice observed, ‘there is an element of tension 
between national courts and Strasbourg ... and that’s inevitable and it’s healthy tension’.20 
 First, the difference in the perspectives of the courts was noted. The UK Supreme Court is 
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the final court of appeal for cases within the particular constitutional setting of the UK.
21
 In 
contrast, it was observed that the ECtHR provides a system of individual justice for allegations of 
human rights violations emanating from forty-seven countries, developing the ECHR principles 
for application across those countries. To this extent, while the UK courts and the ECtHR are 
both engaged in the interpretation and application of Convention rights, the perspectives from 
which they approach those questions were seen as institutionally distinct, with ‘legitimate 
interests on both sides’.22 The former ECtHR President, Dean Spielmann, observes that the 
perspective of the national courts is the embodiment of the rule of law and ‘guardian of the 
constitutional order’.23 The perspective of the ECtHR, in contrast, is one of external review.24 
According to Lord Kerr, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, this difference reflects ‘the most 
potent source of tension’,25 as ‘the influences that come to bear on [ECtHR] decisions are 
inevitably disparate’26 and thus ‘present challenges as to their workability in the domestic 
setting.
27
 
In addition to their distinct institutional perspectives, differences in their respective modes 
of operation were also highlighted. It was observed that the Supreme Court addresses roughly 
eighty cases per year
28
 via a single court, whereas the ECtHR has a significantly larger caseload 
divided amongst the Sections responsible for its Chamber decisions.
29
 A common observation 
amongst the Justices and Strasbourg judges here was that the Supreme Court thus has the benefit 
of more time for deliberation over its cases,
30
 whereas the examination of cases at the ECtHR, 
according to one Strasbourg judge, is by comparison ‘less intense’.31 A further, related difference 
which was noted in this regard was in the procedural mechanisms for reviewing areas of 
problematic case law.
32
 A number of the Justices felt that while domestic legal systems provide a 
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structure of appellate courts through which to address problems within the case law, there is a 
comparatively more limited appeal system for raising and resolving problems within the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence. In a similar vein, one Strasbourg judge observed that the Convention 
system lacks the inter-institutional balance provided to national courts by national parliaments:  
In most national systems, parliament does have the opportunity to come back if it 
disagrees with the courts. The elected representatives of the people can change the 
law as interpreted by the courts; they can even change the constitution. That kind of 
on-going, working relationship between the legislature and the courts (the existence 
of such ‘checks and balances’) is not really found in the Convention system. In 
practice there is little or no scope for the Contracting States to reverse unwanted 
interpretation of Convention rights by the ECtHR through exercise of their 
legislative power, that is by amending the text of the Convention – so that in that 
sense the ECtHR, and likewise the EU Court of Justice in Luxembourg, have more 
power than the national superior courts.
33
   
 3.2 Common Law v Civil Law Traditions 
 The second source of tension which was perceived between the courts lay in the two 
broad legal traditions of the states within the Council of Europe: namely, the common law and 
civil law traditions. To this extent, it extends from the tension explored in the previous section, 
arising from differences between a domestic court comprised of judges of the same legal 
tradition, on the one hand, and, a supranational court consisting of judges of multiple and various 
legal traditions, on the other. Gelter and Siems note a growing scepticism from comparative law 
scholars towards this classification:  ‘Since law is becoming international, transnational, or even 
global, looking at legal families is seen as less important’.34 Nonetheless, the influence of civil 
law systems, traditionally understood, interwoven into the Strasbourg jurisprudence and the 
decision-making of the ECtHR, were deemed by a number of the Justices and Strasbourg judges 
to be an acute feature of the relationship between the UK courts and the ECtHR and even 
between the different judges sitting at the ECtHR. Indeed, it has been a recurring feature of 
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lectures by senior UK judges.
35
 A number of the Justices interviewed shared a perception that the 
Convention system is dominated by civil law legal systems from which the ECtHR also draws 
most of its judges. As one Justice remarked, ‘they’re primarily dealing with civil law legal 
systems and they mostly come from civil law legal systems’.36 It was thus felt that the UK’s 
common law system is a ‘minority interest in Europe’37 and that ‘the mind-set of the Strasbourg 
court is very much on the civilian law system’.38 With regard to the same tension amongst the 
ECtHR judges, one interviewed Strasbourg judge described at the ECtHR ‘a built-in cultural 
conflict between common law mentality, on the one hand, and the continental mentality: between 
reasoning by analogy, in very reductive terms, and legal formalism on the other’.39  
3.3 Jurisdictional Pluralism 
 What was said to make the differences in institutional perspective, modes of operation, 
and legal tradition more acute, is the overlapping jurisdictions of the courts, with the UK being a 
signatory to the ECHR and with both courts adjudicating on an identical set of rights in respect 
of the UK. As one Justice observed, both the Supreme Court and the ECtHR occupy the position 
of a ‘final court in area where there is another final court with its own jurisdiction’.40 With the 
UK courts required by s.2 Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 to ‘take into account’ the decisions of 
the ECtHR when deciding upon the meaning of Convention rights, the overlapping jurisdictions 
confront them with the question of the extent to which the ECtHR decisions should determine the 
content of their own judgments. Lady Justice Arden here describes the relationship between 
domestic and European courts as resembling ‘an ill-fitting jigsaw’41 where there are ‘pieces 
jostling to occupy the same space from different directions’.42  
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4. Issues arising from the Tensions 
The tensions between the UK courts and the ECtHR were perceived to manifest in three issues. 
The first and second issues concern, respectively, the formal and substantive quality of the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence, while the third issue concerns the judicial identity of the UK courts, in 
particular the UK Supreme Court.   
 4.1 The Formal Quality of the Strasbourg Jurisprudence 
The differences in institutional perspective and modes of operating between the UK 
courts and the ECtHR were said to occasionally manifest with ECtHR decisions which lack the 
required clarity and coherence for immediate application at the domestic judicial level. One 
Justice explained: ‘there have been occasions where Strasbourg has produced a range of different 
decisions which are, frankly, difficult to reconcile with one another’.43 In this regard, one 
Strasbourg judge acknowledged the potential for inconsistencies due to the workload of the 
court: ‘because of the pressure under which we work, the speed with which we have to deal with 
cases, I think the risk of making mistakes is higher’.44 
Adding to this problem was felt to be the verbatim declaration of legal statements across 
cases: ‘part of Strasbourg jurisprudence tends to involve certain passages in judgments being 
repeated consecutively in other judgments and so you can find yourself reading exactly the same 
thought in ten different authorities’.45 It was explained that this has created particular difficulties 
for UK judges who, under the common law doctrine of stare decisis, are accustomed to explicitly 
reasoning with and reconciling bodies of cases on the basis of their discernible legal principles. 
The problem was said to be particularly acute in areas where there are a large number of 
Strasbourg cases, which were said by the Justices to add to the challenge of coherent application 
at the domestic level.
46
 It was pointed out that such difficulties manifested in the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kennedy,47 which concerned an Art.10 challenge to an exemption on 
journalistic access to information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 s.32(2). There, 
Lord Mance, with whom Lord Neuberger and Lord Clarke agreed, remarked:  
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The Strasbourg jurisprudence is neither clear nor easy to reconcile. In ... AF (No 3) ... 
Lord Rodger said famously: “Argentoratum locutum: iudicium finitum – Strasbourg 
has spoken, the case is closed”. In the present case, Strasbourg has spoken on a 
number of occasions to apparently different effects. Further, a number of these 
occasions are Grand Chamber decisions, which do contain apparently clear-cut 
statements of principle. But they are surrounded by individual section decisions, 
which appear to suggest that at least some members of the Court disagree with and 
wish to move on from the Grand Chamber statements of principle. ... It is not helpful 
for national courts seeking to take into account the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights to have different section decisions pointing in directions 
inconsistent with Grand Chamber authority without clear explanation.
48
 
Another case which was repeatedly cited in this regard was Sturnham.
49
 This case concerned how 
damages are to be assessed in respect of breaches of Art.5(4) ECHR for individuals whose 
continued detention was not subject to a prompt review following their tariff expiry. Under s.8(4) 
of the HRA, courts have a duty ‘to take into account the principles applied by the [ECtHR] in 
relation to the award of compensation under article 41 of the Convention’. However, the 
Supreme Court observed a number of difficulties within the Strasbourg jurisprudence which 
complicated this task. Giving the lead judgment of the court, Lord Reed observed that ‘...the 
European court does not often articulate clear principles explaining when damages should be 
awarded or how they should be measured’.50 Several Justices indicated that this difficulty was 
exacerbated by the huge volume of Strasbourg cases which had been considered by the court on 
that occasion. The judgment gives voice to the court’s frustration with the ‘time-consuming 
process’51 required to survey ‘around 75 Strasbourg authorities’,52 prompting the Supreme Court 
to issue guidance to counsel as to the future presentation of large volumes of Strasbourg case 
law.
53
  
It was, however, stressed that these were not intended as general criticisms of the ECtHR. 
It was observed that areas of the common law suffer problems of coherence and that it would be 
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unfair to criticise occasional problems at the ECtHR in the light of its workload. Nonetheless, the 
issues faced by the Supreme Court in Sturnham were perceived by several Justices as a product 
of the legal-cultural differences described above. They recognised their own common law habits 
contributing to the difficulties: ‘I think probably we may be a bit too concerned to try and 
reconcile every single Strasbourg authority’.54 Likewise, another Justice saw Sturnham as ‘an 
example of the common law system and the civilian law system uncomfortably trying to work 
together’.55  
 4.2 The Substantive Quality of the Strasbourg Jurisprudence 
 The tensions within the relationship between the courts were also said to occasionally 
give rise to issues concerning the substantive quality of the reasoning in Strasbourg judgments, in 
particular the understanding of UK law. There was a consensus amongst the Justices and the 
Strasbourg judges that occasional misunderstandings arise because the judges of the ECtHR, 
drawn largely from countries with civil law traditions and primarily addressing cases from those 
countries, are likely to have had little direct experience of the common law system.
56
 Here, one 
Strasbourg judge explained that, to many judges at the ECtHR, the common law system is 
‘alien’.57 In particular, a number of the Strasbourg judges pointed out that the content of judicial 
precedents will not always appear ‘clear as daylight’58 to judges from civil law traditions. A 
number of the Strasbourg judges also highlighted that because of the organisation of the ECtHR 
into Sections which deal with particular countries, the many judges outside of the particular 
Section dealing with UK cases will not be exposed to those cases unless they sit on a UK case at 
the Grand Chamber. Even then, however, it was said that the possibility exists of ECtHR judges 
not hearing UK cases. One interviewed judge, for example, confirmed that they were yet to 
decide a UK case despite having been a judge at the ECtHR for several years.  
 4.3 Questions of Domestic Judicial Identity 
 The third issue arising from the tensions appeared to be one of judicial identity: ‘the 
characteristics determining who or what’59 the Supreme Court and its judges are, or what Gearty 
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calls ‘judicial culture ... the sort of body the judiciary has become’.60 The question for domestic 
judicial identity in the face of the ECtHR jurisprudence has been eloquently stated by Lord 
Mance:  
 No one has a single identity. We have mixed characteristics, inter-relating with 
those possessed by others in a confusion of overlapping circles. ... Unfortunately, 
however, identities are, in public discourse, often over-simplified, and often 
presented in unitary and conflictual terms. When changes to domestic law are 
impelled from outside, fears can in this way be raised about loss of identity. The 
European project raises questions about identity - for societies and individuals 
and how they view themselves.
61
 
The courts, too, are ‘...confronted with novel issues and tensions. ... How far is their system part 
of a larger system? How far is their system subsumed, consumed, superseded, by another?’.62 For 
Lord Mance, the answer is clear: ‘While there are some unresolved issues and tensions at a 
European level, ...I have no sense at all that the United Kingdom’s legal system or we, its 
common lawyers, judges and courts, are about to be over-whelmed or lose our identity’.63 The 
same questions explored by Lord Mance’s lecture, however, were pervasive during the 
interviews with the Justices. Since the enactment of the HRA, the UK courts have been 
confronted with the related questions of the extent to which they should follow the decisions of 
the ECtHR and how they should make use of the common law when considering questions of 
human rights.  These concerns are not new. Lord Goff expressed his concern in 1997: ‘There is a 
whole new area of jurisprudence in which we find ourselves acting more like civil lawyers than 
common lawyers. I speak of the enforcement of fundamental human rights which are recognised 
under the constitutions of many common law countries’.64 
 A view amongst a number of the Justices interviewed was that the approach of the UK 
courts under the HRA had at times been excessively deferential to the views of the ECtHR. There 
was a sense that the UK courts had lacked assertiveness or had, as one Justice put it, ‘been too 
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slavishly following Strasbourg’.65 To this extent, one Justice expressed the view that the UK 
courts had been ‘rightly criticised’66 where they have treated the Strasbourg court ‘as a higher 
level in a human rights hierarchy i.e. a supra-supreme court, as it were, when that isn’t what its 
role is and it’s not, I think, the role it would claim’.67 Interestingly, there were suggestions by the 
Justices that the UK courts had been too deferential both to views which they disagreed with and 
also to the Strasbourg jurisprudence which is yet to address certain types of rights claim.
68
  
Of greater concern to a number of the Justices, however, was that the UK courts had 
adopted an approach which is over-reliant upon the Strasbourg jurisprudence as the primary 
source of law for decisions on fundamental rights, at the expense of the common law. It was 
observed that an ‘imbalance’69 had emerged, which had in turn created a Strasbourg-focused 
culture of advocacy before the courts: 
… [W]e’re sometimes presented with a pantechnicon of Strasbourg cases with 
comparatively little analysis of what is the principle for which they actually stand. 
Conversely, we’ve had, sometimes, a neglect of what is to be found within the 
common law.
70
 
Between the Justices, there was a clear difference in the degree to which this was a cause for 
concern. According to one Justice, this disparity mirrored the views of UK judges generally since 
the passing of the HRA: ‘I think that some judges are more inclined to hark back to the common 
law, others simply say, “Why do you need to do that? You’ve got the Convention, it’s part of 
English law, we’ll just decide what the Convention says and be done with it”’.71 Nonetheless, for 
a number of the Justices the lack of attention which they perceived to have been paid to the 
development of the common law since the HRA came into force was a clear source of regret. The 
common law, it was said, had played a crucial historical role in protecting certain fundamental 
rights, with ‘a very strong and very long standing libertarian tradition’,72 and had formed the 
basis for many of the ECHR rights. For these Justices, it was a proud source of constitutional 
heritage, closely linked to their sense of judicial identity. One Justice, for example, suggested 
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that ‘human rights, in various ways, permeate the common law and have done for centuries’.73 
Similarly, another Justice explained:  
…our domestic system hasn't gone to sleep. It's had a long history of protection of 
certain types of rights and just because now we have a Convention or Convention 
rights which are part of our domestic law doesn't mean to say that we forget that the 
common law itself has certain principles.
74
 
In respect of the right to a fair trial and press freedom, it was argued that the UK courts have 
‘longer experience of dealing with these issues than any other court in Europe’.75 What is more, 
it was suggested that scepticism over the common law’s historical capacity to protect human 
rights is the result of viewing the UK’s legal history through ‘twentieth century spectacles’:76  
…[T]he twentieth century, largely as a result of the development of government 
powers in two world wars, was a period of relative judicial subservience at a time of 
very significant developments in the powers of government. But looking at it over a 
longer period, it seems to me that English law has an approach which is, although 
over a narrower range of subjects, at least as liberal as many parts of the 
Convention.
77
  
The link between the common law as a source of constitutional heritage and some of the 
Justices’ sense of judicial identity was made further apparent by their choice of language when 
referring to the common law, with several identifying with it in terms of direct ownership. 
Frequent references were made to ‘our common law’,78 ‘our common law approach’79 and ‘our 
public law ... fashioned on the anvil of decided cases’.80 In contrast, only one Justice referred to 
the Convention in such terms, describing those rights included in HRA Sch.1 as ‘emphatically 
British law’.81 This hints at a much stronger link among some of the Justices between their sense 
of judicial identity and the common law than the Convention rights under the HRA.  
 In view of these insights, it is apparent that the tensions within the relationship between 
the UK courts and the ECtHR have for a number of the Justices too often resulted in deference 
to, and overreliance upon, the Strasbourg jurisprudence. There was an evident dissatisfaction 
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amongst these Justices that the views and approaches of the UK courts in respect of the 
protection of human rights had, at times, been too closely defined by an uncritical application of 
the views and activities of another court. These issues of judicial identity generated by the 
relationship between the UK courts, the Strasbourg jurisprudence and the common law, however, 
were more than a matter of professional pride for the individual Justices. It was also one which 
was perceived to affect the legitimacy of the domestic system of human rights protection. One 
Justice observed: ‘we face quite an interesting issue in the UK that there are elements of the 
media that portray human rights as a foreign-imposed legal system’.82 They continued: ‘...we 
need to address the narrative that human rights are a foreign imposition because, in the longer 
term that could, at least at the margin, discredit the rule of law’.83 Thus, there was a clear 
awareness on the part of the Justices that the extent to which they are perceived to apply 
Strasbourg judgments, as opposed to common law principles, has implications for the acceptance 
of the system of legal human rights protection amongst domestic audiences.  
5. Mitigating Tensions through Formal Dialogue 
As the preceding sections have shown, the various tensions said to characterise the relationship 
between these institutions – between the UK courts as national courts and the ECtHR as a 
supranational human rights court, and in the duality of the common law and civil law traditions 
within the Council of Europe – have manifested in concerns with the formal and substantive 
quality of the reasoning in the Strasbourg jurisprudence, as applied in the domestic judicial 
context, and in issues of domestic judicial identity. There was thus a shared view amongst both 
the Justices and the Strasbourg judges that the courts sometimes need to ‘modify or finesse’,84 to 
quote Lord Neuberger, or further develop the jurisprudence before it can be effectuated at the 
domestic level. The purpose of formal dialogue can thus be regarded as the mitigation of tensions 
arising from the overlapping, multi-layered systems for the judicial protection of human rights in 
Europe. In using the term, ‘mitigation’, it is useful to recall that the Justices and Strasbourg 
judges described the tensions which exist within the relationship between their courts as 
something ‘inevitable’ – a persisting feature of the relationship, incapable of being definitively 
addressed or resolved. ‘Mitigation’, by definition the ‘action of reducing the severity, 
seriousness, or painfulness of something’85 captures the decision-based means used by the judges 
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as an ongoing response to those inevitable tensions. The following sections explore how it is that 
formal dialogue was understood by the judges to achieve this mitigation.  
 First, disagreements between the courts were deemed to perform a ‘check’ function on the 
decision-making of each. This was seen to provide procedural flexibility to the Convention 
system. Second, formal dialogue was deemed to benefit the clarity and coherence of the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence, either by the UK courts drawing the attention of the Strasbourg court 
to areas where clarity and coherence appear to be lacking or by offering solutions to the areas of 
difficulty through their decisions. Third, it was seen to enhance the substantive quality of the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence by ensuring that that UK law, and particularly the UK’s common law 
system, is fully understood and taken into account in Strasbourg, thereby enabling the Justices to 
fulfil their role as representatives of the common law tradition on the international plane. Finally, 
the judgments which the Justices understood as dialogue appear to contribute to a strengthening 
judicial identity for the UK courts and particularly the UK Supreme Court.   
5.1 A Mutual Check on Decision-Making 
This first function relates to conflictual interactions whereby the courts disagree with one 
another. These interactions were considered to provide each court with ‘a small, sensible check’86 
on the decision-making of the other. One interviewed Justice described the process by way of an 
analogy with dissenting judgments: 
There’s a sense in which a judgment given by one final court, in an area where there 
is another final court with its own jurisdiction, serves a similar purpose. When the 
one is disagreeing with the other it is, among other things, an invitation to the other 
court to reconsider, and that’s no bad thing.87 
It was felt that a disagreement, like a dissenting judgment, ‘provides a launch pad on which 
another court looking at the matter in some time to come may take a different view’.88  
 For a number of the Justices, this check guards against domestic judicial complacency. 
One Justice observed the judicial complacency that existed prior the HRA:  
I don’t want to be too generalist about it but there was a big tendency to say “Oh, our 
law complies with Strasbourg anyway” without subjecting it to the intense analysis 
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that we now do … and then to be perhaps slightly surprised when Strasbourg says, 
“No, you’re wrong.”89 
Since the passing of the HRA, however, the ECtHR judgments were said to serve as a valuable 
‘mirror’90 for critical reflection on domestic practice and preventing such complacency: 
There’s a great danger that if you’re used to a legal system and you’re used to the 
rules and you think they’re broadly fair, you don’t analyse them critically … I think 
once it’s pointed out to you that [the traditional approach] might be unacceptable … 
then I think it’s quite easy to see, well, perhaps what we were doing was unfair, so 
it’s quite useful to have a mirror shone on your practices and the common law will 
be, I suspect, as prone to that as many other legal systems. There'll be things that we 
take for granted, we assume are fair, but if you see it through another person’s eyes, 
you might look at it differently.
91
 
In this regard, Lady Justice Arden has cited the disagreement between the courts concerning 
police stop and search powers. In Gillan,
92
 the House of Lords unanimously found that a power
93
 
of police to stop and search individuals in the absence of reasonable suspicion was compatible 
with Arts. 5, 8, 10 and 11 ECHR. When the case went to Strasbourg,
94
 the ECtHR held, and 
contrary to the view of the Law Lords, that the stop and search process involved a ‘clear 
interference’95 with the right to private life. Further, it found a violation of Art.8 on the basis that 
the various safeguards in place had not been shown ‘to constitute a real curb on the wide powers 
afforded’,96 given the statistical evidence of their extensive use in practice, with the consequence 
that the legislative regime failed to meet the requisite legality for the interference under Art.8(2). 
While the House of Lords had largely focused on the provisions themselves in Gillan, the ECtHR 
attached considerable weight to the available evidence of their use in practice in finding the 
breach of Art.8. Thus, when the Supreme Court subsequently considered Gillan in Beghal v 
DPP,
97
 this time concerning a different set of stop and search powers,
98
 though the majority of 
the court was able to distinguish the powers in issue from those in Gillan and thus reject the 
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Arts.5 and 8 challenges, it accepted the need for a more holistic assessment of their legality. It 
acknowledged the need to ‘look not only at the provisions of the statute or other relevant 
instrument ... but also at how that system actually works in practice’.99 Lady Justice Arden has 
observed of the exchange: ‘...The benefit of decisions of the Strasbourg Court is that they 
encourage domestic courts vigorously to enforce fundamental rights, and correct our decisions if 
we forget the importance of those rights’.100 
 The check provided by UK judgments which disagree with decisions of the ECtHR, on 
the other hand, was perceived to directly mitigate the tensions within the relationship between the 
courts by providing an additional source of procedural flexibility to the ECHR system. Where 
there are serious concerns with the Strasbourg jurisprudence, the ability to disagree was thought 
to serve as a necessary ‘safety valve’.101 This was valued by both the Justices and the ECtHR 
judges in light of what was perceived as the procedural limitations for the resolution of problems 
within the Strasbourg case law, described earlier.  Dialogue by disagreement, in this respect, was 
seen as an alternative means with which to query the decisions of the ECtHR and ensure that the 
system has flexibility.  
This procedural flexibility was said to be crucial to the relationship of subsidiarity 
between the courts and to the legitimacy of the Convention system. According to the 
‘fundamental principle’102 of subsidiarity,103 the ‘primary responsibility’104 for the protection of 
Convention rights is with the national authorities while ‘the Convention system is subsidiary to 
the safeguarding of human rights at national level’.105 To this extent, the Convention rights are 
considered the ‘shared responsibility’106 of the ECtHR and national courts. One Strasbourg judge 
remarked that ‘‘[i]f the ECtHR is to collaborate with the national courts so as to achieve the 
famous notion of “shared responsibility”, there must be some discussion as to how the sharing is 
to be done’.107 For this judge, such a discussion of responsibility-sharing is only possible where 
the domestic courts have the flexibility with which to challenge the ECtHR where they have 
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genuine concerns over particular judgments. It was thus felt ‘to ensure proper balance’,108 
particularly in the light of what was considered to be an absence of the kind of inter-institutional 
balance provided to domestic courts by national legislatures, and allow ‘both sides ... to come to 
the civilised sharing of responsibility’.109 
With regard to the legitimacy of the Convention system, one Justice suggested that the 
procedural flexibility provided by the ability of domestic courts to depart from problematic 
Strasbourg decisions was integral:   
The fact that you’re given a bit of wriggle room, not merely through the margin of 
appreciation, but actually downright ability to refuse to follow decisions of the 
Strasbourg court, means that the system is not too rigid, and if the system isn’t too 
rigid, it’s less likely to break if you act within the bounds of what’s permitted and act 
reasonably … it gives it flexibility, and with flexibility comes greater likelihood of 
acceptability.
110
 
The implication here was that, in the absence of the ability of UK courts to challenge what they 
perceive to be problematic Strasbourg case law, the tensions within the relationship between the 
UK courts and the ECtHR could become more acute, leading to a greater strain on their 
relationship and posing the risk of a gradual erosion in acceptance of the Convention system and 
its court among domestic audiences. In facilitating that flexibility, however, dialogue by 
disagreement was felt to prevent those developments and thus help to preserve the legitimacy of 
the ECtHR and the Convention system.   
 5.2 Enhancing the Formal Quality of Strasbourg Jurisprudence 
Moving from the procedural advantages of the check function attributed to dialogue to the 
implications for the quality of the Strasbourg jurisprudence, both conflictual and consensual 
interactions were said to assist in resolving formal problems of clarity and coherence. As 
explained earlier, the large number of decisions which the ECtHR delivers via different Sections, 
combined with what was felt to be the somewhat formalistic style of reasoning within certain 
decisions, were felt by the Justices to create occasional problems of clarity and coherence within 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence which render its application difficult. Through their judgments, the 
Justices felt that they are able to take steps to alleviate this issue.  
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As explored earlier, problems of this kind within the Strasbourg jurisprudence were said 
to have come to the fore in Kennedy on the question of the compatibility of statutory exemptions 
to freedom of information with the right ‘to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority’ under Art.10(1) ECHR. Here, one Justice described how the 
Supreme Court, confronted with conflicting Strasbourg authorities on the matter, had felt obliged 
to ‘deal with [the Strasbourg case law] at some length and to explain why we didn't think it 
provided an answer’.111 In support of the Supreme Court’s conclusion in the earlier case of BBC 
v Sugar,
112
 the Court in Kennedy reasoned that Art.10 did not confer a positive right to access 
information or an obligation on states to disclose information. As Lord Mance put it, Art.10 did 
not provide a ‘European-wide Freedom of Information law’.113 In reaching this conclusion the 
court relied on the earlier judgments of the ECtHR to this effect,
114
 including Grand Chamber 
judgments, and not the more recent Chamber decisions which appeared to support the existence 
of a right of access to information held by public authorities.
115
   
Several Justices in interview pointed out that there is a benefit in being able to use 
judgments in this way to indicate difficulties to the ECtHR and thereby encourage the Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR to address the source of difficulty at the next opportunity.
116
 Indeed, Lord 
Mance was explicit to this end in Kennedy, declaring it ‘unfortunate that the relevant sections did 
not prefer to release the matter before them to a Grand Chamber’.117 Since the interviews were 
conducted, however, the judges’ prayers have been answered, though perhaps not in the manner 
desired. Declaring that ‘the time has come to clarify the classic principles’,118 the Grand 
Chamber in MHB v Hungary
119
 held, and contrary to the conclusion of the Supreme Court in 
Kennedy, that Art.10(1) does confer a right to access information under certain circumstances. 
The Court rejected that its later cases were inconsistent with the earlier authorities, reasoning 
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instead that they simply demonstrated the circumstances where the court had been prepared to 
accept the existence of a right to access information under certain conditions.
120
 The influence of 
the Supreme Court judgment in persuading the ECtHR to address the issue at Grand Chamber 
level has been noted by several commentators.
121
 
 UK judgments offering novel contributions to the interpretation of Convention rights 
were also considered to mitigate such tensions through their attempts to establish clear and 
coherent principles that might otherwise be lacking in areas of the Strasbourg jurisprudence and, 
in effect, offering a suggestion to the ECtHR as to how it might resolve the difficulties at the 
European level. It was described earlier how problems of coherence were said to have manifested 
in the case of Sturnham on the issue of assessments for damages in respect of violations of the 
right to a speedy review of a detention under Art.5(4) ECHR. There, the Supreme Court was 
invited to consider around seventy-five different Strasbourg cases which were deemed by the 
court to lack clear, general principles for application. Drawing from the large volume of 
decisions, however, the court devised a number of its own general principles to the assessment of 
damages for breaches of Art.5(4).
122
 It was pointed out that such cases also provide the UK 
courts with the opportunity to address problems in the formal quality of the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence by allowing them to ‘introduce a degree of rationalisation’123 where it might 
otherwise be lacking and thereby ‘help [Strasbourg] to develop the law’.124 
 5.3 Enhancing the Substantive Quality of Strasbourg Jurisprudence 
The third way in which the judges seek to mitigate tensions is through the enhancement 
of the substantive quality of the Strasbourg jurisprudence. This function appears to be at the core 
of formal dialogue. It was discussed earlier how the tension arising from the different legal 
traditions comprising the Council of Europe was deemed to manifest in the potential for 
misunderstanding the UK’s legal system. Domestic judgments were felt to mitigate this 
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possibility in two ways. On the one hand, it was noted that consensual interactions, whereby the 
UK courts further develop the Convention principles in the absence of a clear decision on an 
issue from the ECtHR, can serve to mitigate tensions by encouraging the formulation of human 
rights norms by the ECtHR which are appropriate to the common law as well as civil law 
systems. One Justice explained: 
... if a court in the United Kingdom is presented for the first time with a particular 
species of Convention right and pronounces upon it, then obviously that matter 
comes before Strasbourg, there is the opportunity for the national court’s decision to 
be considered by Strasbourg and therefore there is some opportunity for influence.
125
 
It was opined that the UK courts, in this way, ‘may bring about a result which is more suitable to 
the domestic setting than might otherwise be the case at Strasbourg considering the matter before 
it had gone through the filter of judicial interpretation here’.126 Lady Justice Arden makes a 
similar point: ‘...it is at that stage that the ill-fitting edges of a supranational court’s decision and 
domestic law can be made to work together’.127  
On the other hand, the check function provided by conflictual interactions between the 
courts was felt to help the UK courts ensure that the ECtHR judges have a sound understanding 
of UK law. It was pointed out that the UK courts will challenge the ECtHR where there are ‘heel-
digging points’128 at issue: the circumstances described by Lord Neuberger MR in Pinnock129 in 
which the ECtHR case law ‘appear[s] to overlook or misunderstand some argument or point of 
principle’ or has an effect which is ‘inconsistent with some fundamental substantive or 
procedural aspect of [UK] law’.130 By raising concerns with or diverging from decisions which 
reveal misunderstanding of domestic law, the Justices felt that they are able to give the 
Strasbourg judges, at the very least, ‘an informed basis for reconsidering’131 and the opportunity 
‘to decide whether they have misunderstood’.132  There were three ways in which the judges 
described using their judgments to improve the substantive quality of the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence: by rectifying misunderstandings of domestic law, by safeguarding domestic 
fundamentals and by working to ensure the compatibility of the Strasbourg jurisprudence with 
the UK’s tradition of constitutionalism. 
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i. Rectifying misunderstanding 
First, the judges described using their judgments to challenge flawed interpretations of 
domestic law by the ECtHR. This reflects dialogue as it was originally conceived in the UK case 
law.
133
 Cited by one Justice as the ‘classic example’134 of a misunderstanding in this regard was a 
set of decisions concerning the compatibility of striking out negligence claims against the police 
with the right to access a court under Art.6 ECHR. In Osman v UK,
135
 the ECtHR concluded that 
a strike-out rule
136
 for negligence claims against the police breached the right to access a court 
under Art.6, based on an understanding that the domestic courts had discretion in each case as to 
whether or not to apply it.
137
 When the House of Lords subsequently came to consider the 
implications of this decision in Barrett v Enfield,
138
 Lord Browne-Wilkinson found the reasoning 
‘extremely difficult to understand’.139 He drew attention to the ‘many and various’140 flaws in the 
ECtHR’s thinking, in particular its apparent ignorance of the fact that the existence of liability in 
negligence under English law was not imposed as a matter of discretion in each case.
141
 The 
major concern was that Osman appeared to stipulate that Art.6 required access to court even 
where there is no substantive legal basis for a claim. When the matter subsequently came before 
the Grand Chamber in Z v UK,
142
 the Court observed that the jurisprudence in Osman had to be 
‘reviewed in the light of the clarifications subsequently made by the domestic courts and notably 
by the House of Lords’143 and this time found no violation of Art.6.  In doing so, it openly 
conceded that the insistence on a right of access to court in the absence of a substantive legal 
basis for a claim ‘would have been an expensive and time-consuming process which would not 
have provided the applicants with any remedy at its conclusion’.144  
The UK courts, however, have not always enjoyed success in this regard. Mentioned in 
Chapter 3 were the repeated disagreements between the courts as to whether a person’s right to 
respect for their home under Art.8 ECHR could be invoked to challenge the proportionality of an 
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eviction from social housing. In Doherty,
145
 the final of three instances in which a majority of the 
House of Lords refused to accept the ECtHR’s view that Art.8 did make this requirement,146 
strong criticisms were levelled at the ECtHR’s understanding of domestic legal procedures. Lord 
Hope was of the view that the Strasbourg court had not ‘fully appreciated the very real problems 
that are likely to be caused’147  for local authorities and county courts by its insistence on such a 
defence. Likewise, Lord Scott felt ‘unable to place any weight’148 on the Strasbourg view 
because it was ‘based on a mistaken understanding of the procedure in this country’149 and ‘of 
the various factors that would have been taken into account by the domestic court’.150 These 
criticisms, however, were met with silence by the ECtHR in Kay,
151
 as it reiterated the need for a 
proportionality defence under Art.8. A common explanation for this is that the ECtHR was 
simply not mistaken in its view of UK law.
152
 When the issue subsequently came before the 
Supreme Court in Pinnock, the nine-judge panel abandoned the criticisms in Doherty: ‘...there is 
no question of the jurisprudence of the European court failing to take into account some principle 
or cutting across our domestic substantive or procedural law in some fundamental way’.153 
Nonetheless, it was suggested by the Justices that querying the ECtHR through their 
judgments in this way helps to ‘ensure that the decisions that they make about the application of 
the Convention to questions of English law are made with a proper appreciation of what English 
law is’.154 The explicit rationale here was that it will ‘strengthen the quality of the European 
norm if its formulation is better informed’.155 
ii. Safeguarding domestic fundamentals   
 Second, a number of the Justices described using dialogue to safeguard fundamental 
aspects of the domestic legal system. Lord Neuberger here has said that ‘we judges should ensure 
that, in applying or adopting any principles from the Strasbourg court, we do not undermine the 
essential characteristics of our constitutional system, based on the common law and 
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parliamentary sovereignty’.156 During the interviews, it was suggested that the ability to disagree 
with the ECtHR ensures that the common law itself is preserved in the very unlikely event that a 
Strasbourg norm encroached upon it in some fundamental way. One Justice explained:  
I certainly don’t think there’s any sort of conspiracy to stop the common law but I 
think there is a danger that, rather than being enriched and developed by the 
influence of civilian laws through Strasbourg, which is what’s happened so far, it 
could actually be destroyed. I think we have to watch out for that and that’s one of 
our duties, and therefore it certainly impinges on the dialogue quite strongly.
157
 
A specific example cited here was the Chamber judgment of the ECtHR in Taxquet v Belgium
158
 
which found the use of jury trial in Belgian criminal procedure to be in violation of the right to a 
fair trial under Art.6(1) ECHR. One Justice in interview indicated that this case might have 
become the source for concern had the decision been framed as a general indictment of jury 
process. However, as has been pointed out elsewhere,
159
  when the case went to the Grand 
Chamber the Strasbourg Court took care to allay the fears of the intervening UK government, 
highlighting the particular features of the Belgian model in issue and stressing the ‘considerable 
freedom [of Contracting States] in the choice of the means calculated to ensure that their judicial 
systems are in compliance with the requirements of Article 6’.160  Nonetheless, the possibility of 
providing a check on the ECtHR decisions through their judgments was felt to safeguard against 
the tension which such decisions pose to the UK common law system. 
 iii. Highlighting overlooked arguments 
 Third, the Justices described using their judgments to draw the attention of the ECtHR to 
considerations which may be absent from its jurisprudence. Perhaps the strongest example of this 
in practice concerned the question of whether the UK’s ban on political advertising161 could be 
deemed ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for the purposes of Art.10(2) ECHR. In Animal 
Defenders International (ADI),
162
 the question for the House of Lords was whether the 
application of the UK’s ban on televised political advertising to a group of animal rights activists 
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violated the group’s right to freedom of expression under Art.10. In a similar case against 
Switzerland,
163
 the ECtHR had found a violation. However, the House nonetheless concluded 
that there had been no violation of Art.10. Its contention was that the ‘full strength’164  of the 
democratic arguments underpinning the ban had not been fully explored in Strasbourg.
165
  It 
might be said, however, that a further overlooked argument which the judges were implicitly 
drawing the ECtHR’s attention to was the UK’s tradition of political constitutionalism. In 
reaching their conclusion, the judges attached much weight to the fact that the relevant legislation 
had been passed after the ECtHR’s judgment in the case against Switzerland, and that Parliament 
had ‘paid close attention to the important decision’166 before proceeding to enact the ban. Lord 
Bingham noted that ‘democratically-elected politicians will be peculiarly sensitive to the 
measures necessary to safeguard the integrity of our democracy’167 and, therefore, ‘[t]he 
judgment of Parliament on such an issue should not be lightly overridden.’168 Baroness Hale 
echoed the significance of this consideration: ‘The solution chosen has all-party support. 
Parliamentarians of all political persuasions take the view that the ban is necessary in this 
democratic society. Any court would be slow indeed to take a different view on a question such 
as this’.169 Lord Scott acknowledged the prospect of the Strasbourg Court adopting a different 
view, albeit ‘no more than the possibility of a divergence’.170 The possibility subsequently 
intensified as the Strasbourg Court found further violations of Art.10 on similar facts.
171
 
However, when ADI reached the Grand Chamber,
172
 a (9:8) majority was persuaded by the 
reasoning of the House of Lords and no violation of Art.10 was found.  
 Thus, in these various ways, the Justices felt that they are able to enhance the quality of 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence, and thereby mitigate tensions arising from the relationship between 
the UK courts and the ECtHR. As seen in Chapter 3, the Strasbourg judges, for their part, place 
great import on the insights of the UK courts. The former ECtHR President, Sir Nicolas Bratza, 
has been explicit to this effect: ‘Even if it is not bound to accept the view of the national courts ... 
it is of untold benefit for the Strasbourg Court that we should have those views’.173 
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5.4 Strengthening Domestic Judicial Identity  
A final function which was implicit in the Justices’ accounts of dialogue is the 
strengthening of domestic judicial identity. It was explored earlier how the passing of the HRA 
was perceived by a number of the Justices to have been followed with a period of excessive 
deference to, and reliance upon, the Strasbourg jurisprudence in domestic human rights 
adjudication. This appeared to be linked to issues of judicial identity as the judges conceived of 
their decisions as having been too closely defined by the views and activities of the ECtHR. 
Whether through disagreement with judgments of the ECtHR, or by offering distinct 
contributions to the development of the jurisprudence where the ECtHR has not pronounced on 
an issue, formal dialogue was valued by the Justices for bolstering the identity of the Supreme 
Court through the display of a more distinct and confident approach to the Convention rights.  
A strong sense of judicial integrity pervaded their accounts of dialogue with ECtHR. 
With regard to disagreement, one Justice made the observation that the UK courts are ‘start[ing] 
to get more confident and more prepared to stand up for what we think is right, rather than 
necessarily following what we think is Strasbourg’s approach always’.174 Likewise, as shown in 
Chapter 3, another Justice noted how ‘[t]he possibility exists that you may get courts taking 
different views. I sense that among our courts there is a greater readiness to recognise that that 
may happen from time to time’.175 A number of the Justices stressed a sense of duty when 
engaging with the ECtHR case law ‘to do what we think is right’,176 ‘to stand at a certain point 
for principles which [we] absolutely believe in’177 and, where appropriate, to make it clear to the 
Strasbourg Court that is ‘not merely there to tell us what to do’.178  On the one hand, as shown in 
the last chapter, this desire for greater assertiveness on the part of the UK courts was felt to be 
constrained by the demands of the international rule of law and European uniformity in the 
minimum standards of human rights protection. On the other hand, it was stressed that the need 
for common standards should not prevent the UK courts from disagreeing with views which they 
consider to be flawed: ‘If the court really thinks that the Strasbourg approach is wrong, then I 
think it’s important it articulates that rather than knuckles under and says “Well, for the sake of 
legal certainty, we’ll go along with it”’.179 Likewise, another Justice explained: ‘if, having given 
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due consideration to the Strasbourg court’s view, our courts believe it to be wrong, it is their 
constitutional duty to say so’.180  
At the same time, it appeared that the UK cases which make distinct contributions to the 
development of ECHR norms were also valued by the Justices for bolstering domestic judicial 
identity. In Part 2 of this chapter it was shown that a key motivation for the Justices in their 
interactions with the ECtHR was the desire to have a role in the development of the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence. Cases addressing issues which have yet to be considered by the ECtHR, it was 
noted, were said to present ‘opportunities for influence’181 and thus appeared to play a role in 
fulfilling this aspect of their judicial identity: ‘if you don’t take opportunities to influence people, 
then your voice is lost’.182  
It was seen in Chapter 3 that underlying the judgment-based interactions which were cited 
by the Justices as reflecting dialogue was their ability to make a distinct contribution to the 
development of the ECHR through the expression of their own views, as opposed to simply 
applying existing ECtHR case law. Indeed, indications of the link between this assertiveness in 
respect of the Strasbourg case law and the Justices’ sense of judicial identity were evident in the 
language which some of the Justices used to describe those judgments. They were seen as the UK 
courts ‘getting a mind of our own’,183 ‘going more independent’,184 ‘branching out on our 
own’185 and having ‘our own output’.186 In this way, it appeared that the dialogue judgments 
were conceived by a number of the Justices to reflect a more distinct sense of ownership of 
decision-making on human rights, affirming an identity for the UK courts which is more 
‘independent’ from the ECtHR. The ability of the UK courts to take their own view as to the 
interpretation of Convention rights has been a recurring theme of a number of extra-judicial 
lectures by senior UK judges, where the Latinised words
187
 of Lord Rodger which have come to 
symbolise undue deference to the ECtHR have been subject to proposed reformulations. Lady 
Hale, for example, has suggested, ‘Argentoratum locutum: iudicium non finitum’:188 Strasbourg 
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has spoken, the case is not closed; Lord Kerr, even more robustly, Argentoratum locutum, nunc 
est nobis loquendum’ – Strasbourg has spoken, now it is our time to speak’.189  
6. The Mitigating Role of the ‘Resurging’ Common Law 
Placing these insights into the wider context of domestic judicial developments in the UK, it 
would appear that the practices of dialogue identified by the Justices and the utilities which they 
attached to them are perhaps reflective of a broader trend. In view of the interview data, it would 
seem that this trend also encompasses the ‘resurgence’190 of the common law in UK human rights 
adjudication. As seen in Chapter 1, this refers to the series of Supreme Court decisions which ‘re-
emphasise the utility of the common law, and the rights inherent in it, as tools of constitutional 
adjudication’.191 These developments appear to be functionally related to the extent that both 
appear to be motivated by the desire to mitigate some of the tensions within the relationship 
between the UK courts and the ECtHR, explored above.  
6.1 The Resurgence 
As discussed in the introductory chapter, the Supreme Court has over a series of judgments 
repeatedly stressed that in matters of fundamental rights, ‘the starting point ... [is] our own legal 
principles rather than the judgments of the international court’.192 As Masterman and Wheatle 
observe, ‘...after a period of relative dormancy, the common law is being reasserted as an 
important source of rights protection’.193 During the interviews, one Justice observed how these 
developments had already prompted a shift in culture on the part of legal counsel: 
There is already a noticeable change. In this court I’ve seen it. There’ve been recent 
cases where counsel has said “I’m conscious we need to start by looking at the 
common law and this is how I lay out my argument and I’m going to put the 
Strasbourg argument second”.194 
As described earlier, however, the Justices appeared to express varying degrees of support for the 
resurgence. While none voiced any opposition to the notion of a resurgent common law, different 
levels of enthusiasm were certainly evident. One Justice, for example, expressed ‘profound 
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hope’195 that the resurgence continues, whereas another Justice passively observed that a 
‘reemphasis’196 of the common law as a source of human rights was taking place. Another Justice 
felt that there was simply ‘a debate to be had’197 about the accuracy of claims to a ‘resurgence’. 
As discussed earlier, one Justice observed this varying enthusiasm throughout the UK judiciary, 
noting some judges being content to apply the Convention rights under the HRA and others 
preferring to ‘hark back’198 to the common law. One Justice stressed that the desire for greater 
use of the common law stemmed not from an ‘anti-Strasbourg’199 sentiment within the UK 
judiciary but a desire to rectify the ‘imbalance’200 caused by overreliance on Strasbourg case law.  
 The Strasbourg judges, for their part, were sympathetic to this development. On the one 
hand, one judge noted that direct and explicit application of the ECtHR case law – ‘looking of 
the fact complained of through Convention spectacles’201 – was, from the perspective of the 
ECtHR, the most reliable means of ensuring compliance with the ECHR, just as incorporation of 
the ECHR into domestic law has been said by the Strasbourg court to be ‘a particularly faithful 
reflection’202 of the commitment to securing Convention rights at the national level. On the other 
hand, it was accepted that the common law, as ‘authentic national law … is something which 
cannot simply be put aside’.203 Thus, the common law resurgence was seen not as ‘a unique 
British phenomenon’204 but as part of the judicial process by which many national courts 
‘discover’205 and ‘rediscover’206 new potential in national law over time. While welcoming the 
process, however, it was stressed that the ‘contents’207 must still be subject to scrutiny for 
compliance with ECHR rights.  
6.2 The Tension-Mitigating Role of the Resurgence 
Earlier in this chapter it was shown how both disagreement and the proactive 
development of the Convention rights by the UK courts were considered to have the potential to 
benefit the formal and substantive quality of the Strasbourg jurisprudence and strengthen the 
Justices’ sense of judicial identity, thereby helping to mitigate the tensions within the relationship 
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between the courts. On the basis of the interview insights provided by the Justices and Strasbourg 
judges, it appears that a resurgent common law can also play a role in these respects.  
With regard to the formal quality of the Strasbourg jurisprudence, it was explained by the 
Justices that the resurgence has taken place partly because the common law authorities can, in 
some areas, provide a more coherent body of general principles than the Strasbourg case law 
with which to address issues falling within the ambit of Convention rights. Here, a number of 
Justices referred to the Kennedy case. It was seen earlier how this was cited by the Justices as an 
example of their use of judgments to draw the attention of the ECtHR to inconsistencies in its 
jurisprudence. However, the judgment itself also gives recognition to the tension-mitigating 
capacity of the common law:  
Greater focus in domestic litigation on the domestic legal position might also have 
the incidental benefit that less time was taken in domestic courts seeking to interpret 
and reconcile different judgments (often only given by individual sections of the 
European Court of Human Rights) in a way which that Court itself, not being bound 
by any doctrine of precedent, would not itself undertake.
208
 
Also cited in this regard was Guardian Newspapers v Westminster Magistrates Court.
209
 The 
question there was whether the principle of open justice empowered the courts to allow 
journalistic and public access to court documents. In concluding that it did, the Court of Appeal 
was ‘fortified by the common theme of the judgments in other common law countries ... 
Collectively they are strong persuasive authority’.210 In contrast, ‘[t]he Strasbourg jurisprudence 
may be seen as leading in the same direction, but it is not entirely clear cut’.211 The court was 
therefore clear that the outcome was based on ‘the common law and not on article 10’.212  
 With regard to the substantive quality of the Strasbourg jurisprudence, it was said that 
there was much within the common law ‘which is highly relevant to human rights law’,213 
developed over centuries of tradition, thus offering a rich source of law with which to resolve 
human rights claims.
214
 Thus, it was suggested by a number of the Justices interviewed that a 
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greater use of the common law to address problems raised by Convention claims could, in turn, 
‘have an influence on decisions in Strasbourg’215 and thus enrich the contribution of the UK 
courts to the development of the jurisprudence.  
Most importantly, however, it was clear from the Justices’ accounts that the common law 
resurgence shared with the practices of formal judicial dialogue the potential to bolster the 
identity of the UK courts. As explored earlier, the common law for a number of the Justices was 
a proud but too often neglected source of constitutional heritage since the passing of the HRA. 
The excessive reliance which several consider to have been placed on Strasbourg judgments as 
the guiding source of domestic decision-making on human rights was also felt to be contributing 
to a perception of human rights as part of a foreign-imposed legal system. The reassertion of the 
common law as a source of human rights was thus felt to be a welcome return by the UK courts 
to the practice of drawing upon and developing their constitutional heritage. Lord Reed has 
argued here that a greater reliance on the common law allows the UK courts to ‘actively engage 
with the judgments of the highest courts in other common law jurisdictions’216 and thereby 
bolster ‘the reputation of the common law’,217 and ensure the ‘influence of the judgments of our 
highest courts, in particular the Supreme Court, in other common law jurisdictions around the 
world’.218 
  Further, by stressing domestic judicial ownership of human rights via the common law, 
several Justices suggested that they are able to counter the perception that those rights are a 
European imposition. As one Justice noted, ‘by recognising and explaining common law 
principles we actually, firstly, give concepts a domestic root, and I think that is probably 
something that's quite useful and is understood in Strasbourg’.219 On this point, another Justice 
was even more explicit on the potential of the common law. Referring to the Supreme Court’s 
approach in Osborne, they remarked: 
[T]hat is one way of creating a narrative which says these human rights aren’t a 
foreign imposition, they are part of our long-term tradition which, of course, they are 
because the human rights convention, when initially formulated, drew on many 
British traditions and … had a huge British input.220 
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In common with the Justices, several of the Strasbourg judges noted the problematic perception 
that human rights are an alien imposition in the UK. This view was felt to be part of a wider trend 
whereby ‘people want more power for themselves at local level, rather than being ruled by what 
they consider to be an elite miles away’.221 Where this has ‘repercussions for the protection of 
human rights’,222 however, it was felt to be understandable for domestic judges to seek ‘means of 
minimising’223 those repercussions. A greater use of the common law in human rights 
adjudication was thus seen as one way of achieving this, taking ‘the route of national law rather 
than the route of international law’224 and replacing ‘the foreign with the home-grown’.225 For the 
ECtHR judges, what was important at the national level was not the source of law with which 
rights are protected but the existence of the protections themselves. As one judge explained, 
‘what this Convention is concerned about is results, ensuring that in practice what the 
Convention guarantees by way of rights, that is the level of protection as embodied in the 
Convention Article concerned, is actually enjoyed as far as possible [emphasis added]’.226 As 
with formal dialogue, the position of the Strasbourg judges was thus one of accommodation, 
recognising the benefits of the mitigation strategies adopted by the UK courts for the viability of 
the European system of human rights protection. 
7. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the functions of formal judicial dialogue between the UK courts and 
the ECtHR. Its conclusion is that the principal judicial intention behind this process, by which 
the courts exchange views and seek to influence one another through their judgments, is to 
mitigate the tensions arising from the overlapping and multi-layered systems for the judicial 
protection of human rights of which these courts are a part.  
 The chapter began by observing three judicial motivations at work in this dialogue: for 
the ECtHR judges, the desire to make the Convention rights effective at the national level; for the 
Justices, the eagerness to have a voice in the development of the Strasbourg jurisprudence; and, 
for both sets of judges, the desire for mutually compatible standards of human rights protection. 
Formal dialogue – broadly defined in Chapter 3 as the process by which the courts exchange 
views and seek to influence one another through their judgments – works to achieve these in a 
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number of ways. A sufficient influence of the ECtHR upon domestic judicial decision-making – 
the form of dialogue emphasised by the ECtHR judges – achieves the first of these. On the basis 
of the interview insights, however, formal dialogue is directed principally at the second and third 
motivations due to the presence of multiple tensions within the relationship between the courts 
which are felt to render the application of the ECtHR case law at the domestic level problematic. 
These tensions are rooted in the differences of institutional perspective, as a national and 
supranational human rights court, respectively, and from the diverging legal traditions of their 
respective judges. The differences are brought to the fore by the jurisdictional pluralism which 
defines the relationship between these courts. They manifest in difficulties concerning the clarity 
and coherence of ECtHR judgments, their substantive grasp of the UK domestic law, in 
particular the operation of its common law system, and raise questions for domestic judicial 
identity. Through their exchange of views and efforts to influence one another through their 
respective judgments, however, the judges feel that they are able to take mitigate these issues.  
 First, the ability of the courts to disagree was felt to provide a mutual check on decision-
making. The ability of the ECtHR to check domestic judgments is valued by a number of UK 
judges for its role in challenging judicial complacency regarding the protection of rights in 
domestic law. Further, the ability of the UK courts to criticise and disagree with ECtHR 
judgments was deemed to provide an additional source of procedural flexibility to the ECHR 
system akin to a ‘safety valve’. This was considered by a number of the judges to accord with the 
primary role of the domestic courts in the protection of Convention rights under the subsidiarity 
principle. Additionally, the ability of the UK courts to check judgments of the ECtHR is thought 
to prevent areas of particularly problematic jurisprudence from causing excessive strain on the 
relationship between the courts, thereby averting the risk of erosion in the legitimacy of the 
ECtHR among domestic audiences.  
 Second, the views expressed in the domestic judgments were considered to carry the 
potential of improving the formal quality of the Strasbourg jurisprudence. The raising of 
concerns or disagreements, on the one hand, was felt to draw the attention of the ECtHR to 
problem areas, while their contributions in areas of unclear jurisprudence, on the other hand, in 
addition to providing resolution at the domestic level, are felt to offer potential insights for the 
ECtHR for addressing those areas when it next considers the same issue.  
 Third, with regard to the substantive quality of the Strasbourg jurisprudence, the 
contributions of the UK courts, through their critiques and through their analysis in areas where 
the ECtHR has yet to make a direct ruling, were again felt to alert the latter to misunderstandings 
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of domestic law and offer useful insights with which the ECtHR can formulate European norms 
which are workable within the UK context.  
 Fourth, the chapter has observed that the judgments which the Justices associate with 
dialogue play a mitigating role in the issues of judicial identity arising from the tensions within 
the relationship between the courts. The increasingly assertive role with which the Justices 
associate their dialogue, manifesting in a willingness to both challenge the ECtHR where they 
disagree with its judgments and offer their own conclusions where the ECtHR has not yet 
spoken, appear to contribute a more distinct identity for the UK courts.  
 Finally, the chapter has observed a functional connection between the emergence of 
dialogue and the resurgence of the common law in domestic judicial thinking on human rights 
adjudication. On the basis of the judges’ insights, it appears that the resurgent common law plays 
a complimentary role to dialogue, performing the same tension-mitigating functions. It is 
considered to offer a comprehensive source of law in certain areas where the requirements of the 
ECtHR jurisprudence are unclear, and have much to contribute to the substantive development of 
European human rights law. Further, it appears to provide certain Justices with a more distinct 
sense of ownership over their adjudication on human rights. There is a further, strategic element 
underpinning both developments: the desire to challenge perceptions that human rights are a 
foreign imposition in the UK.  
The observations of a functional link between the emergence of dialogue and the 
resurgence of the common law support the analysis of Masterman and Wheatle, who argue that 
‘[t]he [Supreme] [C]ourt’s reassertion of domestic law in rights protection speaks not only to a 
domestic audience wary of Strasbourg overreach, but also a second audience: the European Court 
of Human Rights itself’.227 The common law resurgence, they note, follows on from the ‘pivotal 
moment in the interaction between Strasbourg and domestic courts’228 during the Horncastle / Al-
Khawaja exchange, which demonstrated ‘the fallibility of Strasbourg and the potential for 
assertiveness on the part of national courts’229 and that ‘[t]he armour of Strasbourg has been 
pierced’.230 What is more, ‘the reiteration of the common law’s vitality in the face of the 
Convention rights amounts to a partial rejoinder to calls for a UK Bill of Rights’.231 Along with 
those developed in Chapter 3, these observations are instructive to the legitimising role of 
judicial dialogue between these courts. Before turning to that part of the discussion, however, it 
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is necessary to explore the third – and largely unexplored – dimension of the dialogue between 
the courts: informal dialogue in the form of face-to-face meetings.  
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Chapter 5  
‘Informal’ Judicial Dialogue  
I think that developing relations with the Strasbourg Court and actually meeting 
them and seeing the judges is very, very important. Partly because of the present 
political stance, we are generally seen as being antagonistic as a country to Europe 
for reasons which, although I don’t happen to agree with, I understand.1 
- Justice of the UK Supreme Court 
1. Introduction  
The thesis has so far established from the interview data the nature and functions of judgment-
based or ‘formal’ dialogue between the UK courts and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). Chapter 3 developed a definition of this type of interaction as a process by which the 
courts, subject to practical and normative constraints, exchange views and seek to influence each 
other through their respective judgments. In Chapter 4, it was shown how this process appears to 
have the overarching aim of mitigating the tensions within the relationship between the UK 
courts and the ECtHR inherent in their overlapping jurisdictions, institutional differences of 
perspective and diversity in legal tradition. It was argued that ‘dialogue’, to this extent, connects 
with another significant development in the UK courts, the common law resurgence, as part of a 
broader trend in domestic judicial thinking aimed at increasing the distinctness of their role and 
identity in human rights adjudication.  
The focus of this particular chapter, the last exploring how the judges understand the 
dialogue between their courts, is on the face-to-face or informal dialogue which takes place in the 
form of periodic meetings. In Chapters 1 and 2, it was noted that there has been little sustained 
analysis of the role of this particular form of interaction between these courts. At the same time, a 
number of senior UK and ECtHR judges have spoken of its importance. This chapter therefore 
aims to provide an account of informal dialogue between these courts based upon the insights 
from the interviews and extra-judicial materials. In doing so, it seeks to answer the third research 
question posed in Chapter 1: what is the role of informal dialogue between the UK courts and the 
European Court of Human Rights? The chapter consists of five parts. In Part 2, informal judicial 
dialogue is situated within the context of the European and domestic rules which appear to have 
both encouraged and facilitated its development. Next, in Part 3, the chapter considers the nature 
of informal dialogue: the frequency of the meetings, the participants and the format and tone of 
the discussions. The third and central part of this chapter explores the procedural, substantive and 
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diplomatic functions of informal dialogue which supplement the tension-mitigating functions of 
formal judicial dialogue. While each of these functions has its own intrinsic value, it will be 
shown how they are also aimed at enhancing subsidiarity between the courts. Part 4 considers the 
implications of these functions by reference to the varied relations which exist between the 
ECtHR and the respective national judiciaries across the ECHR Member States, followed by the 
conclusion in Part 5.  
2. The Diplomatic Roles of the UK and Strasbourg Judiciaries 
There is no legislation which specifically regulates face-to-face meetings between the UK and 
Strasbourg judges. Nonetheless, informal dialogue has been made possible by rules and policies 
at the domestic and European levels which have permitted and encouraged diplomatic relations 
between their institutions. The following sections address these facilitators from the Strasbourg 
and UK judicial perspectives.  
 2.1 The Strasbourg Judiciary 
In Chapter 1, it was seen that the building and maintenance of relations with national 
authorities, including national judiciaries, has long been part of the Strasbourg Court’s activities. 
The Court’s President from 1985-1998, Rolv Ryssdal, championed a policy of hosting 
delegations from the highest national courts ‘for informal exchanges on the Convention case-law 
and procedure’,2 viewing a constructive relationship between the national courts across the 
Council of Europe and the ECtHR as a necessity to the success of the Convention system.
3
 The 
Annual Reports of the ECtHR demonstrate that this policy has retained its place in the Court’s 
activities. The first such report, published in 2002, details meetings with a wide range of national 
constitutional and supreme courts.
4
  
There are a number of provisions in place in the ECHR and the ECtHR’s Rules of Court 
which facilitate these activities. First, under the Rules of Court, the President of the ECtHR holds 
a responsibility for relations with national judiciaries.
5
 Second, under Art.51 ECHR,
6
 all judges 
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of the ECtHR are afforded the same ‘privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities’7 
which are conferred upon diplomats under international law. They are thus ‘immune from legal 
process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official 
capacity and within the limit of their authority’.8 Third, the Council of Europe’s 2012 Brighton 
Declaration ‘[w]elcomes and encourages open dialogues’9 between the ECtHR and the highest 
courts of the State Parties.
10
 The former UK judge at the ECtHR, Paul Mahoney, and the Court’s 
former President, Dean Spielmann, take the view that this Declaration represents a blessing by 
those governments at the Brighton Conference of the continuation of direct relations between the 
judges of the national judiciaries within the Council of Europe and the judges of the ECtHR.
11
 
 2.2 The UK Judiciary 
In contrast to the ECtHR judges, the ability of the UK judges to engage in diplomatic 
relations with the ECtHR was historically hampered by two facts. First, as seen in the 
introductory chapter, the UK courts played little role in the interpretation of ECHR rights.
12
 
Second, the UK judiciary previously lacked the institutional autonomy to conduct international 
relations with its counterparts abroad. The two key pieces of legislation which dramatically 
altered this situation, paving the way for diplomatic relations between the ECtHR and the UK 
courts, are the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 and, perhaps more importantly, the Constitutional 
Reform Act (CRA) 2005.  
2.2.1 The Human Rights Act 1998  
Prior to 2000, there was arguably little reason for the UK judges to engage in face-to-face 
relations with the ECtHR judges. Under the UK’s dualist legal system, ECHR rights could not be 
enforced at the domestic level and thus the UK courts played little role in their interpretation. As 
was noted in Chapter 1, however, the passing into UK law of the list of rights, drawn directly 
from the ECHR, within Schedule 1 of the HRA 1998, and the constitutional bestowing of powers 
on the UK courts to adjudicate upon them, fundamentally changed their relationship with the 
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ECtHR. It did so by placing upon the UK judges the task of interpreting an identical set of rights 
to the Strasbourg judges. While the Act left open whether and how the judges should conduct any 
relations with the ECtHR judges, it could be argued that this provided an incentive for informal 
dialogue between them by establishing a common point of reference for discussions. What is 
more significant in this respect, however, is s.2 of the Act, requiring the UK courts to ‘take into 
account’ judgments and decisions of the ECtHR when adjudicating on Convention rights. It 
would be reasonable to assume that this duty further incentivised informal dialogue between the 
UK and Strasbourg judges to the extent that both were engaged in interpreting and applying not 
only an identical set of rights but also the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.  
 2.2.2 The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 
Despite these developments, a cursory glance through the records of visits to and from the 
ECtHR reveals the conspicuous absence of any bilateral exchanges with UK judges during the 
HRA’s infancy.13 In fact, the first such meeting did not take place until 2006.14 In this respect, as 
one Strasbourg judge remarked, ‘the UK was later than other countries’.15 The explanation for 
the apparent absence of exchanges between the UK and Strasbourg judiciaries during the first 
five years of the HRA appears to reside in the passing of the CRA 2005. As is well known, this 
‘constitutional instrument’16 drastically increased the independence of the UK judiciary from the 
legislative and executive branches of government, replacing the judicial committee of the House 
of Lords with a Supreme Court
17
 and transferring the powers of the Lord Chancellor as head of 
the judiciary to the Lord Chief Justice.
18
 Most significantly for present purposes, however, the 
Act did not specify how the powers transferred to the Lord Chief Justice were to be used. As the 
Lord Chief Justice, Lord Thomas, has explained: 
The Constitutional Reform Act by and large vested in the Lord Chief Justice most of 
the old powers that had been exercised by the Lord Chancellor as head of the 
judiciary in relation to England and Wales and most of the new powers to be 
conferred on the judiciary in relation to the delivery of justice in England and Wales. 
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The Act was essentially silent on the exercise of these powers by the Lord Chief 
Justice and on the governance of the judiciary. This has enabled the judiciary to 
develop its own leadership and governance.
19
 
A by-product of this judicial self-governance was an expansion in what could be called the 
diplomatic autonomy of the UK judiciary in its relations with foreign counterparts. Utilising this 
autonomy, it has since the Act’s passing set itself a number of objectives for its international 
judicial relations.
20
 They include building links with judiciaries within the EU and Council of 
Europe, ‘facilitating co-operation and understanding on matters of mutual interest’,21 holding 
bilateral meetings with counterparts ‘with whom the UK judiciary has or wishes to have close 
links’22 and participation in ‘projects for the promotion of English law’.23  
 This growth in diplomatic autonomy has also prompted a number of other developments 
within the UK judiciary. The Justices of the UK Supreme Court, according to the court’s 
statement of professional values, have an explicit role as ‘ambassadors for the court’24 and, as 
Paterson notes, a strategic objective to develop relations with the ECtHR.
25
 This helps to explain 
why, as seen in Chapter 4, a number of the Justices interviewed conceived of themselves as 
having a role as representatives of the common law tradition on the international plane. Most 
interestingly, however, the diplomatic autonomy brought about by the CRA 2005 necessitated a 
leading strategist to monitor its exercise. Lady Justice Arden has explained that the 2005 Act in 
this way prompted the creation of her current role as ‘Head of International Judicial Relations’:26  
As a separate institution, the judiciary had to conduct its own foreign policy and I 
became, so to speak, its foreign secretary. My responsibility was, where appropriate, 
to facilitate relations with other judiciaries and to receive visits from them in 
London.
27
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As the UK’s foremost judicial diplomat, Lady Justice Arden carries a responsibility to ‘take stock 
of the work already being done and to identify the work that needs to be done’.28 The latter point 
is particularly interesting. It indicates that this judicial-diplomatic role is partly conducted on a 
needs basis, where relations with certain counterparts are not what they should be. In this 
capacity, it was Lady Justice Arden who, in 2006, brokered the very first bilateral meeting 
between UK and ECtHR judges and has since played the leading role in maintaining judicial 
relations between their institutions.
29
   
 2.2.3 Judges as diplomats  
Through these various frameworks at the domestic and European levels, it is apparent that 
the UK and Strasbourg judges have come to possess certain diplomatic roles. In performing these 
roles, it is important to bear in mind the nature of the bodies which the respective judges 
represent. As Hutching and Suri note, ‘[o]ne cannot understand the role played by diplomats 
without reference to their larger organizational context. Diplomats represent the characteristics of 
their government, as well as its official positions’.30 The UK judges in their relations with their 
counterparts, however, do not represent the characteristics and positions of the government but 
those of the UK judiciary. Equally, the President of the ECtHR is tasked not with representing 
the Council of Europe but the ECtHR.  
The characteristics and positions of these judicial bodies differ in major respects, as the 
interviewed judges were quick to point out. The UK judges represent a senior appellate court 
operating within the common law tradition of the UK, a role which, as seen in Chapter 4, for a 
number of the Justices carries particular import. Their official positions are those established in 
the domestic case law on the interpretation of fundamental rights. The ECtHR judges, in turn, 
represent a supranational body responsible for supervising the protection of human rights across 
forty-seven countries. Its official positions, in turn, are those established within its jurisprudence 
in respect of those countries. The last chapter made clear that the judges rely on the exchanges of 
view and cross-influence through their judgments as a means of mitigating the tensions arising 
from their relationship. What will become clear by the end of this chapter is that informal judicial 
dialogue performs a similar role, only through direct, face-to-face means.  
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3. The Nature of Bilateral Meetings 
Having thus set out the frameworks which have prompted and facilitated diplomatic relations 
between the UK and ECtHR judges, the chapter turns now to the nature of the bilateral meetings 
at the centre of those relations. This section examines the frequency of the meetings, the 
participants and the format and the tone of the discussions.  
3.1 Frequency 
Bilateral meetings between ECtHR and UK judges have been taking place on a fairly 
regular basis since they began. As a rough estimate from the available details, eight bilateral 
meetings took place between 2006 and 2015, providing the judges with a regular, if slightly 
staggered, channel of communication. The first took place in 2006. Then, in October 2007,
31
 the 
ECtHR President, Jean-Paul Costa, along with ‘Section Presidents and members of the 
Registry’32 made a two-day visit to the UK where they met with Lord Phillips, the Lord Chief 
Justice, and participated in ‘workshops on the case-law of the Court’.33 A third meeting took 
place in June 2010.
34
 The Lord Chief Justice, then Lord Judge, and Lord Phillips, the President of 
the Supreme Court, led ‘a high level delegation of United Kingdom judges’35 to the ECtHR ‘for a 
working meeting with Judges and members of the Registry’36 as ‘part of the continuing dialogue 
between senior national courts and Strasbourg’.37 In February 2012, a further meeting took place 
in London where the ECtHR President, Sir Nicolas Bratza, ‘accompanied by [ECtHR] Judges 
and members of the Registry’,38 was received by Lord Judge and Lord Phillips, again in their 
respective capacities as Lord Chief Justice and Supreme Court President. Additionally, senior 
members of the Scottish judiciary, including the Lord President and Lord Justice General of 
Scotland, Lord Hamilton, and the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, Sir Declan Morgan, 
were also present.
39
 Later, in March 2014, the ECtHR President, Dean Spielmann, accompanied 
by the Court’s Vice-Presidents, Josep Casadevall and Guido Raimondi (the Court’s current 
President, at the time of writing), and the Deputy Registrar, Michael O’Boyle, visited the UK 
where they had two meetings with UK judges.
40
 First, they met with the Lord Chief Justice, Lord 
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Thomas, the President of the Queen’s Bench Division, Sir Brian Leveson, and the Head of 
International Judicial Relations, Lady Justice Arden.
41
 They later met with the President of the 
Supreme Court, Lord Neuberger, and eight Justices of the Supreme Court.
42
 Later that year, in 
July, the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Thomas, led another group of UK judges, including two 
Justices of the Supreme Court,
43
 to the ECtHR where they ‘took part in a day-long programme of 
discussions with Judges of the Court and members of the Registry.’44 In October 2015, a further 
meeting took place between ‘senior judges of the different jurisdictions of the United Kingdom’45 
and ‘representatives of the [Strasbourg] Court’.46 
The relative frequency of the meetings appears to be aimed deliberately at reducing the 
effects of regular changes in judicial office-holders. According to the former ECtHR President, 
Dean Spielmann, regular meetings between ECtHR and national judges are particularly 
important given the ‘single-mandate’47 rule of non-renewable nine year tenures for the 
Strasbourg judges.
48
 One Strasbourg judge in interview stated the issue here in even blunter 
terms: ‘This court is like a hotel – people check in and they check out’.49 The frequency of the 
changes at both the ECtHR and within the UK judiciary is apparent from the visits outlined 
above. Since the first exchange with UK judges took place in 2006, the ECtHR Presidency has 
changed four times.
50
 The House of Lords has been replaced by the Supreme Court as the highest 
appellate court in the UK, and the offices of the Lord Chief Justice and the Presidency of the 
Supreme Court has changed hands twice if the change in Senior Law Lord at the judicial House 
of Lords is also considered.
51
  
Thus, it appears that the perceived value of informal dialogue is contingent upon its 
regularity. Lady Justice Arden has referred to this as the need for ‘constant renewal’52 of the 
relationship between the UK and Strasbourg courts. The more regular the informal dialogue, it 
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seems, the greater the value of the interactions. The less regular the informal dialogue, in 
contrast, particularly when there has been changes in key judicial office-holders, the weaker the 
value of the interactions. The implication here is that those tensions between the courts which 
were explored through the interview data in the last chapter, between the UK courts as national 
courts and the ECtHR as a supranational human rights court, and between the common and civil 
law traditions of the Council of Europe, and the issues which these were perceived by the 
interviewed judges to generate – difficulties in the application of ECtHR case law for the 
domestic courts and misunderstandings of the UK common law system – have the potential to 
increase should their meetings become too infrequent. This point will be returned to later in the 
chapter. 
3.2 Participants 
It will be clear from the last section that there have been a range of participants to the 
meetings from both the ECtHR and the UK judiciary, with the participants also varying slightly 
with each meeting. From the UK, the meetings have included a ‘pick-and-mix’ of the Lord Chief 
Justice, the President of the Supreme Court, the Head of International Judicial Relations and 
senior judges from the High Court and the Scottish and Northern Irish legal jurisdictions. 
Generally, however, they have consistently tended to include the Lord Chief Justice, the 
President of the UK Supreme Court and, on the basis of Lady Justice Arden’s insights on the 
topic, the Head of International Judicial Relations. Thus, if it is the case that the UK judiciary 
has, since the CRA 2005, increased its diplomatic autonomy, it would appear that this is 
exercised only at the most senior levels. From the ECtHR, the President has been the constant 
representative, consistently with their role under the ECtHR’s Rules of Court,53 along with the 
national judge for the country concerned
54
 and senior members of the Registry. The frequent 
presence of these various high judicial office holders, however, appears to provide not only 
consistency but symbolic and strategic value. 
Symbolically, the presence of the Lord Chief Justice, the President of the Supreme Court 
and the ECtHR President are perhaps the most significant. As Head of the Judiciary in the UK, 
the Lord Chief Justice speaks on behalf and with the full weight of UK judges. Similarly, the 
President of the Supreme Court speaks on behalf of the most senior court in the UK and the most 
authoritative on the interpretation of Convention rights in the domestic context. The ECtHR 
President’s role is also symbolically significant, showing the ECtHR to be taking seriously its 
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relations with the UK judiciary. It is not difficult to imagine that exchanges which never included 
the President could be interpreted unfavourably by the UK judges. What is more, by including 
these senior representatives from both courts, the meetings, to those who are aware of them, 
serve to convey an impression of equality between the participants. They suggest a relationship 
of genuine ‘dialogue’ rather than ‘dictation’.55 
Strategically, the regular participation of the judges identified above has practical 
advantages. The frequent participation of the Lord Chief Justice would appear to provide a direct 
feedback link between the meetings with the ECtHR judges and the Judicial Executive Board, 
responsible for the governance of the judiciary, and the Judges’ Council, the body which 
represents all levels of the UK judiciary.
56
 Thus, the Lord Chief Justice is able to communicate 
issues or concerns which have arisen at any level of the UK judiciary as a result of ECtHR 
jurisprudence to the Strasbourg judges and deliver any guidance or conclusions which are 
reached during the ensuing discussions. Equally, the participation of either the President or 
Justices of the Supreme Court provides a feedback link between the ECtHR judges and the UK 
court which makes the most authoritative pronouncements on the interpretation of Convention 
rights at the domestic level. Indeed, the interview insights supporting this point are considered 
below. 
From the perspective of the ECtHR, the central role of the President is also strategically 
valuable. As with the Lord Chief Justice in the UK, it provides a feedback link to other ECtHR 
judges. The central place of the President in the court’s operations allows any lessons learned 
during the discussions with UK judges to be communicated where appropriate through plenary 
meetings, Grand Chamber meetings and panel meetings for Grand Chamber referral requests.
57
 
The participation of the national judge for the UK at the ECtHR in the meetings is perhaps even 
more important in this respect. They can provide the feedback link from the discussions with the 
UK judges to the ECtHR judges at the Section of the court who routinely deal with UK cases. 
Additionally, the presence of senior members of the Registry also seems crucial, given its wide-
ranging functions in respect of the ECtHR’s work. It is responsible for ‘preparing files and 
analytical notes for the judge rapporteurs’,58 ‘drafting decisions and judgments’59 and 
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‘responding to inquiries and investigating issues of national or international law relevant to the 
Court’s work’.60 They thus play a crucial role in informing the ECtHR judges in their decision-
making. Thus, if any of the discussions relate to issues of UK law, it seems that the senior 
members of the Registry will be better informed in those tasks.  
For all of the strategic value offered through the consistent participation of these office-
holders, however, the regular changes in personnel cannot be overlooked. In this regard, it would 
seem that the presence of the Head of International Judicial Relations since the first meeting took 
place in 2006 has provided valuable continuity. Dean Spielmann has described Lady Justice 
Arden as the ‘moving force behind the strong relations that exist’61 between the UK courts and 
the ECtHR. This is unsurprising and yet all the more interesting given her role as the UK’s Head 
of International Judicial Relations. It is an indicator of the prominence which this role has 
quickly gained in the management of the relations between the UK and Strasbourg judges.  
3.3 Format and Tone 
Turning to the format of the meetings, there are a number of features worth drawing 
attention to. First, it is important to first note their frequently bilateral nature: they often involve 
representatives from the UK judiciary and the ECtHR alone. Second, it was described by the 
Strasbourg judges in interview that the meetings typically have a written agenda. Third, it was 
also said in those interviews that while the meetings will usually have an agenda, the judges are 
generally free to articulate their questions, thoughts, concerns or ideas. In this respect, the 
meetings were said by one Justice to be characterised by ‘give and take and open discussion’.62 
Fourth, it is clear that the meetings consist of more than just brief exchanges. The visits generally 
take place over the period of one to two days and are made up of what are variably described as 
‘workshops on the [ECtHR] case law’,63 ‘working meeting[s]’,64 ‘working sessions’65 and ‘day-
long programme[s] of discussions’.66 Finally, and perhaps most significantly, no minutes are 
recorded at the meetings in order to preserve judicial discretion.
67
 
These features appear to have a number of implications. While the written agenda will 
obviously play some role in steering the discussions, the open flow of the verbal exchanges 
described by the judges indicates a discursive flexibility which they simply do not have in their 
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judgments i.e. the domain of ‘formal’ dialogue. As Lady Justice Arden describes it, there is ‘a 
more free-flowing debate’.68 The judges are not constrained by the facts or legal issues of 
particular cases or the duties of decision-making but are free to discuss whatever issues they 
have. Additionally, unlike the communication through judgments, the meetings involve direct 
communication, reducing the likelihood of the concerns and insights voiced by the national 
judges being missed – something which was deemed to be an occasional problem, as seen in 
Chapter 3. The bilateral structure of the meetings also appears to be particularly important. It 
would appear to focus the discussions on issues which have particular relevance to the UK judges 
and even allow the UK judges to steer the direction of those discussions. 
The length of the meetings, evident in the descriptions of working sessions and 
programmes of discussions, would appear to complement the openness of the discussions, 
enabling substantive debate rather than polite judicial chitchat. Relatedly, the fact that no minutes 
are recorded appears to encourage a directness of tone on the part of the judges which is not 
feasible in their judgments. The common distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ dialogue, 
evident in the interviews and in extra-judicial writings, itself points to a marked difference in the 
way that the two are conducted. Indeed, it was seen in Chapter 3 that a sense of judicial 
diplomacy constrains and informs the language employed by the judges towards one another in 
their respective judgments. This is not to suggest that during the meetings, the judges, hidden 
from public view, seize upon the opportunity to hurl abuse at one another. However, throughout 
the interviews the point was repeatedly made that the face-to-face discussions are distinctly ‘full 
and frank’69 rather than ‘a polite series of formalities’.70 On this point, the former UK judge at 
the ECtHR, Paul Mahoney, has been explicit that these meetings do not consist of a ‘purely 
diplomatic exchange of niceties’.71 As one Strasbourg judge recounts, ‘there is no press in 
attendance, the meeting is behind closed doors, the atmosphere is friendly, but the exchange of 
views is frank - so the participants do not pull their punches’.72 The privacy of the meetings in 
this respect was widely valued by the interviewed judges. It was felt to facilitate a space where 
the judges are not subject to the reservation required when delivering judgments and public 
lectures. Importantly, however, the meetings were still deemed to carry the formality of official 
meetings between judges. A Strasbourg judge, for example, distinguished the meetings from the 
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informal socialising which can take place after such meetings. In these respects, the meetings 
appear to provide a relative informality as compared to the communication through judgments. 
3.4 The Constraints of Judicial Independence 
 Finally, before progressing to consider the functions of informal dialogue, it is necessary 
to consider the constraints which are imposed by the duty of independence and impartiality to 
which all of the judges are subject. It was shown in Part 2 of this chapter how the ECtHR and 
UK judges are tasked with distinctly diplomatic responsibilities. The ECtHR President, on the 
one hand, has a responsibility to ‘represent’73 the Court to national judiciaries, while the UK 
judges, on the other hand, are to act as ‘ambassadors’74 for the UK judiciary. Both sets of judges, 
nonetheless, remain subject to their duty of independence as judges. Under Art.21(3) ECHR,
75
 
the ECtHR judges are prohibited from acts which would compromise their independence. 
Additionally, Rule 4(1) of the Rules of Court explicitly prohibits their engagement ‘in any 
political or administrative activity or any professional activity which is incompatible with their 
independence or impartiality’.76 Likewise, the independence of the UK judges is enshrined in 
both the common law and the CRA 2005,
77
 and is set out in detail in their Guide to Judicial 
Conduct.
78
 
 It can be argued that this presents a slight tension. Both sets of judges are charged with 
representing their respective courts, each with distinct interests, traditions and working methods, 
and yet both must, at the same time, remain impartial. At this intersection between different 
judicial interests, it seems that the independence of judges representing those interests has the 
potential to come under strain. It seems that the judges must traverse the line between acting as 
representatives of their courts and their legal traditions while avoiding active lobbying of the 
other. For the Supreme Court Justices interviewed, however, there was a bright line between the 
two. One Justice stated: 
If judges of one court were to set about lobbying behind closed doors to persuade the 
other court to take a different view that would be quite obviously inappropriate, and 
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I’ve no awareness that any such a thing has ever happened and I don’t believe that it 
would.
79
  
Likewise, another Justice indicated that ‘frequent cabals between judges who were cooking up 
arrangements between themselves’80 is a ‘farfetched idea’:81 ‘We don’t sit down and try to 
persuade them to change Hirst
82
 to something different, it’s not the way it works’.83 On this 
point, one Justice provided a particularly interesting insight into their professional approach to 
the face-to-face meetings:  
I always used to think as a barrister, if I was concerned as to whether some particular 
piece of conduct would be professionally embarrassing, a very good test would be to 
ask oneself: “Would I feel embarrassed and have something to defend if my 
opponent or somebody other else knew what I was doing?” And I think if one asks 
oneself that question, you normally have an intuitive sense of what are the proper 
boundaries.
84
 
It would appear, therefore, that while the format of the meetings encourages open, substantive 
and frank discussion in a relatively informal setting, judicial independence and professional 
integrity combine to constrain the judges from openly pressuring one another for change. Instead, 
as the Justices recounted in interview, their role is confined to ‘exploring’,85 ‘discussing’86 and 
‘explaining’87 issues with the ECtHR judges.  
4. The Functions of Informal Judicial Dialogue 
Thus far it has been shown that informal judicial dialogue between the UK and Strasbourg judges 
has been both facilitated and prompted by rules at the domestic and European levels which have 
given the judges distinctly diplomatic roles. The central question here, however, is the value of 
this informal dialogue.  
 The answer appears to reside in the procedural, substantive and diplomatic functions 
which it performs. The first two terms embody, respectively, the ways that the bilateral meetings 
facilitate certain processes and achieve certain outcomes which are considered valuable to the 
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relationship between the UK courts and the ECtHR. Procedurally, informal dialogue facilitates 
the participation of the national courts in the development of ECHR principles and provides an 
accountability mechanism where its decisions have caused concerns. Substantively, it promotes 
mutual understanding between the courts. These processes and outcomes appear to have their 
own intrinsic value. However, throughout the following section it will be shown that each 
contributes to the realisation of the ‘fundamental principle’88 of subsidiarity,89 according to 
which the ‘primary responsibility’90 for the protection of Convention rights is with the national 
authorities while ‘the Convention system is subsidiary to the safeguarding of human rights at 
national level’.91 Diplomatically, the meetings are valued for smoothing relations between the 
courts and rectifying damaging perceptions that may arise between them, either as a result of 
hostile domestic politics or critical judgments. In these various ways, informal judicial dialogue 
between the courts appears to both complement and buffer the formal dialogue taking place 
through judgments. 
4.1 Procedural Functions 
4.1.1 Participation 
 The first procedural function of informal dialogue is the participation of national judges 
in the construction of norms. According to Lady Justice Arden, the meetings ‘give the national 
judges an input into the process of developing jurisprudence at the supranational level’.92 In 
particular, the national judges can assist the ECtHR judges in determining whether a particular 
course of action would tip the balance ‘between [their] international obligation to interpret the 
Convention and national sovereignty’93 too far in favour of the former. In this way, Lady Justice 
Arden remarks that ‘a conversation between judges can head off steps which might prove ill-
advised’.94  
Additionally, Lady Justice Arden explains that the meetings provide a key opportunity for 
the national judges to ‘explain where the shoe pinches most and how the new jurisprudence can 
best be absorbed into their own system’.95  To this extent, it seems that they also enable the UK 
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judges to perform their diplomatic role as ‘ambassadors’ for the UK common law tradition. As 
shown in Chapter 4, during the interviews the participation of UK judges in the development of 
European norms was deemed particularly important by some of the Justices due to a shared 
perception that the common law tradition is a minority legal tradition within Europe.  Lord 
Neuberger has offered a colourful account of this view:  
…the ant is the common lawyer, collecting and using forms of action, seeing what 
works and what doesn’t, developing the law on an incremental, case by case, basis. 
The spider is the civil lawyer, propagating intricate, principle-based codes, which 
can be logically and rigidly applied to all disputes and circumstances. In Europe, the 
common law ants are heavily outnumbered by the civilian law spiders.
96
 
Through their participation in informal dialogue with the ECtHR judges, it appears that the UK 
judges are able to fulfil their ambassadorial roles and articulate any specific common law 
concerns, ensuring that the voices of the few ‘ants’ are not muffled or overlooked amongst the 
many ‘spiders’. Indeed, as the previous chapter demonstrated, several of the interviewed Justices 
saw it as their duty to make sure that the UK’s common law system is properly comprehended 
and taken into consideration by the ECtHR judges in their decision-making. As seen in Chapter 
3, it was said to be important for the UK judges to see that the ECtHR judges are ‘listening to us, 
taking into account our concerns and interests’.97 To this extent, informal dialogue also appears 
to enhance the realisation of the principle of subsidiarity by giving the UK judges the opportunity 
to participate, as representatives of their common law tradition, in the construction of norms 
which, according to the subsidiarity principle, it is their primary responsibility to uphold. 
4.1.2 Accountability  
The second procedural function of informal dialogue is accountability. It was described 
earlier how the bilateral meetings are said to be characterised by open, frank discussion, whereby 
the national judges are free to articulate their questions and concerns to the ECtHR judges. This 
appears to provide the national judges with a means of holding the ECtHR to account where its 
decisions have caused consternation among the domestic judiciary. In this way, informal 
dialogue mirrors the check function of judgment-based dialogue. Indeed, Lady Justice Arden 
suggests that informal dialogue provides an important check and balance on the power of the 
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ECtHR within the European legal order.
98
 As discussed in Chapter 4, she likens the relationship 
between domestic and European courts to ‘an ill-fitting jigsaw’99 where there are ‘pieces jostling 
to occupy the same space from different directions’.100 Within this space, domestic courts are 
instrumental to the protection of ‘the constitutional identity of the domestic system in the 
supranational sphere’.101 In her view, however, the protection of this identity is also incumbent 
on the ECtHR.
102
 The meetings can therefore function as an accountability mechanism that 
enables the domestic courts to communicate their concerns to the ECtHR where they feel it is in 
tension with the constitutional identity of the domestic system.  
 It would appear that this also carries the potential to promote subsidiarity between the 
courts. Several Justices interviewed echoed the general concern amongst UK judges that the 
Strasbourg Court had at times been prone to contradicting the findings of fact made by domestic 
courts and thus not adhering to the subsidiary nature of its role. Concerns of this kind, in 
particular over the related doctrine of the margin of appreciation by which the ECtHR delineates 
whether a matter falls within the exclusive decision-making competence of the national 
authorities, have been voiced publicly by UK judges on a number of occasions. In 2011, for 
example, Lady Hale argued at the official opening of the judicial year at the ECtHR that ‘it 
would be idle to pretend that we have not sometimes been deeply troubled by an apparent 
narrowing of the margin’.103 Interestingly, it was pointed out during the interviews with the 
Justices that a concern that the ECtHR had not always not sufficiently respected the principle of 
subsidiarity was shared by judges of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany and that, to 
this extent, their horizontal relations with national counterparts in Europe were of strategic value 
in their relationship with the ECtHR. One Justice explained: ‘If they’re getting the same message 
from the German supreme court and the supreme court here, I think that helps. It isn’t ganging up 
exactly, I would call it coordinating’.104 A number of the Justices felt that coordinating their 
concerns over the subsidiarity principle with the judges of the German court may have played a 
role in two, related ways. It was felt that it may have contributed, alongside the Brighton 
Declaration, to the reemphasis of the principle of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation in 
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the Strasbourg case-law in recent years.
105
 Relatedly, it was suggested that it may have prompted 
the Strasbourg court to show greater deference to the findings of fact made by national courts.  
Thus, by giving the UK judges a forum through which to voice their concerns, it appears 
that informal dialogue is valued for providing a useful check upon the ECtHR, ensuring that it is 
accountable for any decisions which appear to show a lack of regard for the constitutional 
identity of the UK or for the principle of subsidiarity. In these ways, it is evident that informal 
dialogue broadly mirrors the formal judicial dialogue. As was shown in Chapter 4, participation 
in the development of the European human rights norms and holding the ECtHR to account 
where its decisions cause concerns were central to many of the judges’ understandings of how 
the dialogue between their courts functions.  
4.2 Substantive Functions 
The value attributed to informal dialogue has been explored thus far by reference to the 
participation and accountability which it appears to facilitate. It has been shown that these 
procedural functions possess their own intrinsic value and also contribute to observance of the 
subsidiarity principle. Additionally, however, participation and accountability also appear to 
perform a substantive function: enhancing mutual understanding between the courts. Lord Kerr 
here has argued that through informal dialogue ‘[a] greater appreciation of the problems that we 
create for each other might be, if not eliminated, at least better understood’.106 This arguably 
represents the central aim of informal dialogue and that which is most crucial to subsidiarity. It is 
noteworthy that the Brighton Declaration, which affirmed subsidiarity as a fundamental principle 
within the Convention system, also called for further interactions between the national courts and 
the ECtHR ‘as a means of developing an enhanced understanding of their respective roles in 
carrying out their shared responsibility for applying the Convention’.107 According to the former 
ECtHR President, Dean Spielmann, informal dialogues ‘make for a sounder grasp of the other’s 
perspective’.108 There are a number of levels on which the participatory and accountability 
functions of informal dialogue appear to assist the judges in enhancing their understanding of not 
only those perspectives but also their own: in respect of Convention law and its practical 
application, the UK’s legal system, appropriate methods of judgment-writing and shared legal 
resource needs. Each of these is considered below. 
                                                          
105
 Helen Fenwick, ‘Enhanced Subsidiarity and a Dialogic Approach – Or Appeasement in Recent Cases on Criminal 
Justice, Public Order and Counter-Terrorism at Strasbourg Against the UK?’ in Ziegler, Wicks and Hodson (eds) (n 
11) 193 
106
 Lord Kerr, ‘Dialogue or Dictation?’ (n 55) 12 
107
 Brighton Declaration (n 9) [12](c) 
108
 Spielmann (n 11) 
154 
 
4.2.1 ECHR principles and their application 
 First, the meetings appear to facilitate mutual understanding between the judges through 
discussion of ECHR principles and their practical application. As described by the Supreme 
Court Justices, they allow the judges to share and explain to one another their ‘perceptions of 
how one should deal with particular points’109 and to explore ‘some of the principles which have 
been thrown up by previous cases’,110 a process which can help to inform their respective 
practices. Here, the judges of both courts appear to carry crucial feedback roles.  
The UK judges explain how they have, in one Strasbourg judge’s words, ‘tried to 
translate the implications [of ECtHR judgments] into domestic law through their judicial 
activity’.111 The ECtHR judges, in turn, are able to provide feedback on that activity, which was 
said to be typically very positive. Numerous Justices described how the Strasbourg judges in the 
informal discussions have shown particular appreciation for the detail and rigour with which the 
UK courts engage with Strasbourg case law: 
[T]he judges of the Strasbourg court regularly say that they find the jurisprudence of 
the British courts to be very useful in their examination of Convention rights, even 
when they’re not considering British cases.112  
Additionally, informal dialogue allows the judges to address any perceived problems of 
clarity and coherence arising from the Strasbourg jurisprudence. In this way, the accountability 
function of informal dialogue described earlier also serves to improve the Strasbourg judges’ 
understanding of any problems which their case law has created at the domestic level. In terms of 
clarity, the meetings provide an opportunity for the ECtHR judges to explain principles 
expounded in judgments where their meaning is unclear to the national judges. One Strasbourg 
judge explained that ‘saying it in other words’113 can help to clarify the ‘basic idea’114 
underpinning particular judgments. This suggestion was qualified, however, by the observation 
that this function is perhaps less useful for UK judges because the ECtHR judgments are issued 
in English. Unlike their counterparts whose first language is not English or French, the two 
official languages of the ECtHR, the UK judges do not face a language barrier in discerning the 
meaning of ECtHR judgments.  
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 In terms of coherence, it was suggested by the Supreme Court Justices that informal 
dialogue has enabled them to communicate the problem presented by voluminous bodies of 
Strasbourg cases lacking statements of legal principle. The concern is neatly summarised in a 
lecture by Lord Reed: ‘...the discussion of the law in Strasbourg judgments is in most cases 
comparatively short, with a tendency to repeat well-worn formulae, and it is unusual to find 
authoritative statements of general principle other than in judgments of the Grand Chamber’.115 
As explored in Chapter 4, such cases were felt to present particular difficulties for common law 
judges accustomed to reconciling decisions under a system of precedent. Communicating these 
difficulties directly to the ECtHR judges during the meetings was therefore valued for the 
insights which the ECtHR judges can offer in reply. One Justice explained: ‘the conversations 
that we have informally with Strasbourg judges are quite valuable on this, because they can give 
us a bit of assistance as to how they think we should be approaching it’.116 The particular 
guidance issued by the Strasbourg judges on this issue was for the UK courts to focus primarily 
on the Grand Chamber decisions: 
One got the impression that, as far as Strasbourg is concerned, a single Chamber 
decision does not reflect a clear and constant Strasbourg line, and it’s only when you 
get to the Grand Chamber that you can say that Strasbourg has taken a particular, 
strong position, and that we possibly shouldn’t worry as much as we do about the 
Chamber decisions.
117
 
These insights perhaps give context to other developments in UK case law. In December 2014, 
sometime after this advice had been imparted, the Supreme Court handed down its judgment in 
Haney,
118
 where it has been observed that a directly relevant ECtHR Chamber decision against 
the UK was ‘almost casually swatted aside’.119 In James v UK,120 the ECtHR had reasoned, and 
contrary to the conclusion of the House of Lords,
121
 that in the context of Art.5(1) ECHR an 
opportunity for rehabilitation was a necessary part of the justification required for an 
indeterminate prison sentence for the purpose of public protection.
122
 Accordingly, it found a 
violation of Art.5(1) on the basis that the continued detention of individuals beyond the expiry of 
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their tariff was, in the absence of the provision of rehabilitative assistance and an opportunity to 
demonstrate rehabilitation, arbitrary and thus unlawful.
123
 The Supreme Court in Haney, 
however, declined to give full effect to the decision. Citing concerns with the distinctions implied 
in James between lawful and unlawful deprivations of liberty on the basis of when rehabilitative 
assistance is provided,
124
 as well as concern that the ECtHR view appeared to necessitate the 
release of individuals whose safety was not established,
125
 it accepted an implicit duty on the 
state to provide rehabilitative assistance and opportunities to demonstrate rehabilitation, but 
opted to address the issue not through Art.5(1) but via an ‘an ancillary duty - a duty not affecting 
the lawfulness of the detention, but sounding in damages if breached ... implied as part of the 
overall scheme of article 5, read as a whole’.126 
 It would not be unreasonable to suggest that the advice given informally by the ECtHR 
judges in respect of its case law may have played a role in shaping the confidence with which the 
Supreme Court was able to approach the Strasbourg jurisprudence in this instance. Indeed, at a 
wider level of informal interactions, there are other indications that extra-judicial assurances by 
ECtHR judges have been influential on domestic judicial thinking. The public assurance made in 
2011 by the former ECtHR President, Sir Nicolas Bratza, for example, that the judgments of the 
ECtHR need not always indicate the final word
127
 appears to have struck a chord.  Lady Hale’s 
response, for example, was that ‘I am intrigued and encouraged indeed to know that 
Argentoratum locutum, iudicium finitum
128
 is not in fact how the President and his fellow judges 
view the respective roles of our two courts. ...We may look forward to an even more lively 
dialogue with Strasbourg in future’.129 In the same vein, Lord Mance remarked that the former 
ECtHR President’s assurance ‘sets a sound basis for cooperation, which is likely in future to 
prove very influential in domestic courts’.130   
 This aspect of informal dialogue again appears to be aimed at further a relationship of 
subsidiarity. By facilitating the assistance of the UK judges in their understanding of how to 
apply the ECtHR case law, it appears to assist the domestic judges in their fulfilment of their 
‘primary responsibility’ of safeguarding Convention rights at the domestic level. 
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 4.2.2 The UK’s common law system 
 Aside from ECHR principles, it seems that informal dialogue is also used to enhance the 
ECtHR judges’ understanding of the UK’s legal system, further mitigating the sources of tension 
identified in Chapter 4. The point has been made here and in that chapter that the UK judges 
perform a certain diplomatic function as ambassadors of the common law tradition both within 
and outside of the context of their decision-making. In their participation in bilateral meetings, 
this particular function appears to entail explanation of what one Justice described as ‘the mental 
processes of the common law’131 to the Strasbourg judges. It was felt that informal dialogue 
provides the opportunity to ‘clear away’132 any misunderstandings and thereby reduce the 
potential for them to manifest in the ECtHR’s judgments and cause conflict. As with formal 
dialogue, the ECtHR judges also considered this informative role to be valuable in informal 
dialogue. One Strasbourg judge explained that it is 
... the role of the British judges at these meetings, and sometimes the Irish, 
Cypriot and Maltese judges on the ECtHR, who are often invited to attend, … to 
explain to the others why it is that most legal systems in Europe, when regulating 
some issue in law, do it in one way, whereas the common law does it in some 
wholly peculiar other way.
133
   
 To the extent that informal dialogue thus improves the understanding of the Strasbourg 
judges of the UK common law system and its traditions, it seems that subsidiarity is again 
strengthened as the performance of the domestic courts in their primary responsibility for 
protecting human rights is less likely to be challenged by the ECtHR in its supervisory capacity 
on the basis of a misunderstanding of domestic law. 
 4.2.3 Judgment-writing 
 A third way that informal dialogue appears to enhance mutual understanding relates to the 
way that judgments are written. During one interview, it was described how the meetings enable 
the judges to discuss ways of writing judgments which are mutually intelligible. This was 
deemed particularly important given the resurgence of the common law on human rights 
issues.
134
 It was suggested that if the UK courts were to decide human rights cases using only the 
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common law and some of the cases were to then be challenged at Strasbourg, ‘the Strasbourg 
court might find itself puzzled about how we see our common law linking in with Convention 
law’.135 With this in mind, it was suggested that the meetings would enable the Strasbourg 
judges, if necessary, to explain that concern to the UK judges and to request them to provide 
some explanation in their judgments of how that common law analysis fits in with the 
Convention. Likewise, it was suggested that it would be reasonable for the UK judges to use the 
meetings to request the Strasbourg judges to offer some explanation when deciding cases 
involving the UK as to how their analysis of Convention principles fits in with the common law. 
It was felt that this would enable the courts to avoid disagreements resulting from ‘a lack of 
expression of one court’s reasoning in terms that are enlightening to the other court’.136 This 
would appear to further enhance subsidiarity as the judges have a greater awareness of what they 
should include in their respective judgments to assist the other court in the performance of its 
tasks.  
 4.2.4 Legal resource needs 
 Finally, informal dialogue appears to enhance mutual understanding between the courts 
by allowing them to explore and identify any shared legal resource needs. Dean Spielmann has 
described how one particular meeting at Strasbourg with the President of the French Cour de 
Cassation led to plans being put into place for the development of a ‘network for sharing case-
law’137 between their courts, ‘which in the long term could cover all Supreme Courts’.138 This 
plan was subsequently developed to facilitate not only the sharing of case law but other legal 
resources between the ECtHR and domestic courts.
139
 These plans have now materialised with 
the ‘Superior Courts Network’140 having been launched on a trial basis on 5 October 2015.141 
Such developments enhance subsidiarity by equipping both courts with the resources to 
better understand the work which they respectively perform in the protection of Convention 
rights. With increased access to domestic legal resources, the ECtHR is better able to grasp how 
those rights are being protected at the national level. Likewise, with better access to ECHR 
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materials, domestic courts are better able to understand the particular requirements of the 
Convention and thus better placed to fulfil their primary responsibility of securing the rights at 
the national level. As the former ECtHR Vice-President, François Tulkens has argued, ‘if the 
national courts are to play the role assigned to them by the Convention system, in other words, to 
apply the Convention directly in the light of the Court’s case-law, then they must have access to 
that case-law’.142 
 4.3 Diplomatic Functions 
 The next function which the meetings appear to perform is, by comparison, of a more 
diplomatic nature: the enhancement of mutual receptivity between the judges and thereby the 
scope for mutual influence. Here, the analysis turns to the more interpersonal aspect of the 
relationship between the judges of these courts.  This section considers how informal dialogue is 
able to improve this dimension of their relationship and why the resulting enhancement in the 
potential for mutual influence is perceived by the judges to be significant.  
 4.3.1 Maintaining mutual respect 
 In Chapters 3 and 4, it was seen how the judges actively seek to influence one another 
through their judgments, whether for the effectuation of the Strasbourg jurisprudence, or the 
improvement of the formal and substantive quality of the applicable principles. The ability of 
each court to influence the other appears to depend, however, on a certain level of mutual respect 
between the judges. On this point, Lord Carnwath has specifically praised informal dialogue 
between the UK and Strasbourg for maintaining a ‘high degree of respect from both sides’.143 It 
is reasonable to assume that the extent to which the UK courts and ECtHR mutually understand 
one another will have some impact on the level of mutual respect between their judges. Flagrant 
misunderstandings between the institutions are unlikely to foster mutual respect. It appears, 
however, that it is not simply the educational value of the meetings which harnesses mutual 
respect but also their implicit psychological value in alleviating tensions and rectifying negative 
perceptions. 
As to the former, the frank discussions between the judges were described by one of the 
Justices as a way of managing the ‘inevitable and healthy tension’144 arising from the different 
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institutional perspectives of the UK courts and the ECtHR, explored in Chapter 4. The ability to 
raise concerns over subsidiarity, explored earlier, is one example of this. Further, it would appear 
that these meetings can help to diffuse any tensions arising from conflictual dialogues between 
the courts. Recounting the prolonged disagreement between the courts over the role of Art.8 
ECHR in possession order cases, discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, Lord Walker confessed in his 
Thomas More lecture that he found it ‘painful to dwell on this episode. ... I am reluctant 
“infandum ... renovare dolorem”’ 145 (to renew an unspeakable grief). In this vein, some of the 
Justices described how the meetings can play a role in defusing tensions when concerns over the 
relationship between the courts have been voiced in extra-judicial lectures. One Justice expressed 
the view that the increased regularity of meetings during 2014 was partly prompted by a string of 
lectures delivered respectively by Lord Justice Laws, Lord Judge and Lord Sumption in late 2013 
which had criticised either the Strasbourg Court or deference to it by the UK courts.
146
 Here, 
however, the general feeling among the interviewed judges of both courts was that there are no 
personal tensions to dispel. Indeed, several stressed the difference between the reality of the 
relationship between their courts and the way that is depicted in the popular press. One Justice 
stated: ‘I think there’s a lot of nonsense talked in the press about tensions but there are very few 
tensions between this court and those who actually operate the court in Strasbourg’.147 
Nonetheless, by engaging in face-to-face discussions and thereby building mutual understanding, 
it was said that informal dialogue facilitates a sense of cooperation between the judges. As one 
Justice neatly put it, it ‘makes it less of an “us and them” situation’.148 
Informal dialogue was also valued by interviewed judges of both courts for allowing them 
to challenge any negative perceptions which might exist between them. As one Justice explained: 
Particularly at a time when one group of judges may have perceptions about the sort 
of people deciding cases, and the way in which they decide them, which may be 
entirely inaccurate, meetings which just improve one judge’s understanding of what 
makes another judge tick are, I think, perfectly innocuous.
149
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Likewise, one Strasbourg judge stressed the value of allowing national judges ‘to see the faces 
behind the name of the institution’.150 The former ECtHR President, Jean-Paul Costa, in this 
regard has similarly suggested that while dialogues through judgments can be productive ‘... 
there is no substitute for human contact’.151 
 More specifically, it appears that informal dialogue benefits the UK judges by enabling 
them to distance themselves from political or populist currents in the UK which might otherwise 
have a damaging impact on their relations with the ECtHR. One Justice suggested that the UK 
might presently suffer from a view that it is ‘antagonistic’152 as a country due to the ‘present 
political stance’.153  This appears to be an accurate view of the situation in the light of remarks 
made by the former ECtHR President, Sir Nicolas Bratza, writing in 2011: 
The vitriolic--and I am afraid to say, xenophobic--fury directed against the judges of 
my Court is unprecedented in my experience, as someone who has been involved 
with the Convention system for over 40 years. ... [T]he scale and tone of the current 
hostility directed towards the Court, and the Convention system as a whole, by the 
press, by members of the Westminster Parliament and by senior members of the 
Government has created understandable dismay and resentment among the judges in 
Strasbourg.
154
 
Clearly, there was a perception amongst the Justices that the ‘dismay and resentment’ among the 
Strasbourg judges had the potential to spill over into similar feelings toward the UK judiciary. It 
was therefore indicated that by meeting the Strasbourg judges, the Justices are able to rectify that 
perception and make clear that the UK courts are ‘friendly, trying to – as we ought to as judges – 
ensure that the law is clear and coherent’.155 The implication here was that by allowing the UK 
judges to present themselves as both cooperative and non-political, motivated by a desire for 
clarity and coherence, informal dialogue can secure the necessary respect on the part of the 
ECtHR judges. Thus, as Slaughter observed, it would appear that ‘regular relations and 
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knowledge of one another provides assurance that conflict will not escalate or rupture the 
underlying relationship’.156 
4.3.2 Ensuring mutual receptivity 
 It is clear from the judges’ accounts quoted in the previous section that the level of 
respect between the UK and ECtHR judges is deemed to have real significance for the overall 
relationship between their courts. This is because mutual respect is deemed by the judges to 
facilitate mutual receptivity between the courts to the views that each expresses, ensuring a 
greater potential for each to influence the other. Informal dialogue was thus valued as a means of 
cultivating through judicial diplomacy an atmosphere between the judges in which future 
dialogues, both informally through meetings and formally through judgments, can thrive. 
 For the Supreme Court Justices, it was said that receptivity on the part of the ECtHR 
judges is important to ensure that they give weight to the ideas and concerns of the UK judiciary. 
One Justice explained: ‘I think that if they see that we are basically friendly … hopefully they’ll 
listen more to us’.157 This was particularly valued by some of the Justices given their desire to 
represent the common law tradition in a European human rights system which they consider to be 
dominated by civil law traditions. There have been clear indications from ECtHR judges that 
informal dialogue is indeed conductive to receptivity on the part of the ECtHR. The former 
ECtHR judge, Paul Mahoney, has written that ‘As far as the United Kingdom judiciary is 
concerned, it is knocking on an open door to suggest that the more regular the informal meetings 
between Strasbourg judges and senior national judges, the more productive actual judicial 
cooperation through judgments delivered is likely to be’.158 
 For the Strasbourg judges, however, the meetings play an even more important role. 
Securing receptivity on the part of UK judges through informal dialogue is partly intended as a 
legitimation strategy for the ECtHR amongst the UK courts. The introductory chapter drew 
attention to the basic distinction between normative and descriptive legitimacy, which concern, 
respectively, the justification and acceptance of authority.
159
 During the interviews, there were a 
number of indications that informal dialogue can enhance the acceptance of the ECtHR and its 
decisions by the UK judiciary. One Strasbourg judge explained: ‘It’s always easier to accept and 
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understand [a judgment] if you know the person who has written it. You feel more at ease with 
it’.160 In particular, there was a perception amongst the judges interviewed of a clear link between 
the procedural functions of participation and accountability, earlier explored, and the wider 
acceptance of the ECtHR and its decisions by the UK judiciary. As one Strasbourg judge 
explained: 
It always helps understanding and acceptance when you can really see who the 
people are behind these judgments and you can really share your opinions and your 
worries and put your questions.
161
 
According to one Justice, this process could legitimise the ECtHR not only in the eyes of the UK 
judiciary but other key groups at the domestic level: 
It’s essential that there is the dialogue because if the judges here don’t have 
confidence in and respect for the Strasbourg court, then nobody else is going to. If 
we do feel that they are doing their best, listening to us, taking into account our 
concerns and interests and developing the law in a sensible way, then that will 
probably affect lawyers, it’ll affect politicians and generally people are more likely 
to accept that which is obviously good for the rule of law.
162
 
Thus, for a number of the Justices and Strasbourg judges there was a link between the procedural 
functions of informal dialogue, the level of respect between the judges at a personal level and the 
extent to which the ECtHR and its judgments are accepted by UK courts and other domestic 
audiences.  
 What is particularly notable is the degree of strategic thinking evident here. Earlier in this 
chapter, attention was drawn to the diplomatic roles of the UK and ECtHR judges in representing 
their respective bodies. The importance which was attached to building respect and receptivity 
and thereby a greater scope for influence points to the remarkable extent of the judges’ 
diplomatic functioning. Consistently with the remit conferred upon them by the CRA 2005, the 
UK judges are not only acting as representatives of the UK judiciary and its legal tradition but 
engaging in international relations with the ECtHR which are institutionally distinct from those 
of the UK government. The Justice quoted in the heading to this chapter and in the previous 
section spoke of the potential problem for relations between the UK and ECtHR judges presented 
by the hostility of the UK government and politicians towards the ECtHR, along with a 
                                                          
160
 Interview with Judge of the European Court of Human Rights (Strasbourg, France, 29 May 2015) 
161
 Interview with Judge of the European Court of Human Rights (Strasbourg, France, 29 May 2015) 
162
 Interview with Justice of the UK Supreme Court (London, United Kingdom, 8 July 2014) 
164 
 
consequent need to create distance between those attitudes and those of the UK judiciary in order 
to maintain the respect and receptivity amongst the Strasbourg judges to UK judicial influence. 
The ECtHR judges, for their part, also displayed a degree of strategic thinking, perceiving 
informal dialogue as a means of enhancing acceptance of the ECtHR and its decisions amongst 
domestic judiciaries which, as one of the Justices noted, can play a role in promoting the 
acceptance of the ECtHR amongst other domestic audiences.  
5. The Asymmetry of Judicial Relations  
Finally, it is worth noting the importance of the UK judiciary within the ECHR system. Between 
the ECtHR and the many national judiciaries across the Council of Europe, there is a variation in 
the frequency of informal dialogues taking place. Dean Spielmann has referred to this as the 
‘variable geometry’163 which exists in the relations between the ECtHR and particular national 
judiciaries. Speaking in 2015, the former ECtHR President noted that those with the strongest 
links to the ECtHR are the UK judiciary, the senior French courts ‘(the Cour de Cassation, the 
Conseil d’Etat and also the Conseil Constitutionnel)’,164 and the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany.
165
 A review of the most recent ECtHR Annual Reports at the time of writing, from 
2013 to 2015, appears to support this. During this period, the UK, French and German judiciaries 
enjoyed the most frequent exchanges with the ECtHR, with between three and five bilateral 
exchanges each.
166
 This makes for an interesting contrast with some of the other national 
judiciaries within the Council of Europe. During one Strasbourg interview, it was described 
anecdotally how Georg Ress, the former judge at the ECtHR, had informally referred to the 
Slovenian constitutional court as ‘der vergessene Gericht’:167 ‘the forgotten court’.168 Again, the 
most recent ECtHR Annual Reports paint a similar picture, with the Slovenian Constitutional 
Court listed as a participant in just one, multilateral visit to the ECtHR with various other 
presidents of national superior courts in 2013.
169
 One reason for the variable geometry, according 
to Spielmann, is resource limits. The ECtHR, he suggests, ‘would be stretched rather thin if we 
were to engage with such intensity with the judiciary in every one of the 47 States in the 
system’.170 This appears to work both ways, with resource constraints upon the domestic 
judiciaries also having some influence on the intensity of informal dialogues with the ECtHR. 
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Additionally, Spielmann suggests that national judiciaries vary in their receptivity to conducting 
relations with the ECtHR.
171
  
The considerations of resources and receptivity go some way to explaining the position of 
the UK judiciary as currently among those with the strongest relations with the ECtHR. 
Notwithstanding a limited budget,
172
 the UK judges have clearly had the financial capacity to 
conduct numerous exchanges with ECtHR judges in recent years. Likewise, as described earlier, 
the meetings have been applauded and further meetings welcomed both by the participants and 
the UK government. There is thus no question of the receptivity on the part of the UK judiciary 
to informal dialogue with the ECtHR judges.  
The asymmetry which is apparent in the relationships between the ECtHR and the various 
national courts within the Council of Europe is not insignificant. Mak observes that ‘Under the 
effects of globalisation, the authority of highest national courts concerns not only their formal 
legal status as the final interpreter of a specific set of rules, but also the prestige accorded to these 
courts by other courts and society at large’.173 As such regular meetings between particular courts 
can cause ‘a shift in the position of authority and autonomy’174 which they enjoy. On this basis, 
the strong relations between the UK judiciary and the ECtHR judges have the potential to 
increase the former’s authority on the domestic and international plane. This raises a number of 
questions regarding the nature of the influences, power and judicial politics at work on this level. 
Such questions are beyond the scope of this thesis. For present purposes, however, the fact that 
the engagement between these courts is among the strongest at work arguably underlines the 
seriousness with which the ECtHR approaches this particular audience of judges. It is perhaps no 
coincidence that the UK, along with France and Germany, is regarded as one of the most 
important Member States in the ECHR system.
175
 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined in detail the third research question posed at the outset of this thesis 
concerning the ‘informal’ or ‘personal’ dialogue’ in the form of bilateral, face-to-face meetings 
taking place between the UK courts and the ECtHR. It has produced three sets of conclusions. 
First, the chapter has observed the rules and policies at the domestic and European levels which 
have enabled the informal dialogue between these courts to develop. While rules have long been 
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in place for the ECtHR to build relations with national judiciaries, such relations have only been 
able to fully develop with the UK judiciary with the combined effects of the enactment of the 
Human Rights Act and the Constitutional Reform Act. Together, these have placed the UK 
judges in the joint task of interpreting and applying the ECHR rights and surrounding 
jurisprudence with the ECtHR, and conferred upon the UK judiciary the autonomy to conduct its 
own international judicial relations.  
 Second, the chapter has explored the nature of the informal dialogue which is taking place 
between these courts its frequency, the participants, and the format and tone of the discussions – 
and the significance of those features. It has shown that bilateral exchanges between the UK 
courts and the ECtHR have been taking place frequently since the first in 2006, and that this 
regularity is considered crucial by the participating judges to maximising the value of the 
interactions, particularly in the light of the regular personnel changes in judicial office at the 
senior levels of both the UK and ECtHR judiciaries. In terms of the participants to this form of 
dialogue, the chapter has observed that the judges which frequently take part in the meetings – 
the ECtHR President, the UK judge at the ECtHR, members of the ECtHR Registry, the Lord 
Chief Justice, the President of the Supreme Court and the Head of International Judicial 
Relations – each occupy a position within the respective judicial institutions which are of 
strategic and symbolic value. Strategically, they facilitate the passing of the information 
exchanged between the judges during the meetings to and from the levels of the respective 
domestic and Strasbourg judiciaries where it will be influential. Symbolically, they demonstrate 
the seriousness with which the courts engage with one another. Additionally, the chapter has 
discussed how the particular formatting of the meetings encourages open, frank and substantive 
exchanges between the judges, whereby the judges are free of the practical constraints of formal 
dialogue, on the one hand, but nonetheless constrained by the requirements of judicial 
independence, veering them away from judicial lobbying.  
Third, the chapter has concluded that the value of informal dialogue stems from the 
procedural, substantive and diplomatic functions which it performs, each of which can contribute 
to the realisation of the now fundamental principle of subsidiarity. Procedurally, it allows the UK 
judges to participate in the discussion of jurisprudence which, under the subsidiarity principle, 
they have the principal responsibility of applying, and to hold the ECtHR judges to account 
where they feel it is not respecting the boundaries of its subsidiary role. In terms of the 
substantive functions of informal dialogue, the chapter has drawn attention to the capacity of 
bilateral meetings for building mutual understanding as to the content of Convention law and its 
practical application, the UK legal system, methods of judgment-writing which make decisions 
167 
 
mutually intelligible and shared legal resource needs, each of which can contribute to the judges’ 
respective understandings of their role in the shared responsibility for upholding the Convention 
rights. In terms of the diplomatic functions, informal dialogue is used to maintain respect 
between the judges, relieving tensions and challenging damaging perceptions resulting from 
domestic politics or conflictual judgment-based interactions. Such respect is particularly valued 
for fostering mutual receptivity between their courts, thereby cultivating the conditions for 
productive informal dialogues in future meetings and formal dialogues through decision-making, 
whereby the ECtHR is alive to the concerns and ideas of the UK courts, on the one hand, and the 
UK courts, on the other hand, are accepting of the judgments of the ECtHR.  
It is submitted that these three sets of conclusions shed light on why it is that several 
senior UK and ECtHR judges of past and present have attributed such value to the informal 
dialogue between their courts and repeatedly called for its continuation. The deeper value of 
these dialogic interactions, however, along with those taking place through judgments, resides in 
their legitimising potential. It is that potential to which the thesis now turns. 
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Chapter 6 
The Legitimising Role of Judicial Dialogue 
... [T]he sole source of a court’s legitimacy stems from the reasoning of its 
decisions. To explain rationally the reasoning followed is an instrument of 
dialogue. Reasoning is indispensable for mutual trust.
1
 
- Jean-Paul Jacqué 
1. Introduction 
Over the course of the previous three chapters, the nature and functions of both judgment-based 
(‘formal’) and face-to-face (‘informal’) judicial dialogue between the UK courts and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have been examined in depth using the insights of 
the interviewed judges, case law and extra-judicial literature. In Chapter 3, it was observed that 
judgment-based dialogue is understood as a process by which the courts, subject to practical and 
normative constraints, exchange views and seek to influence one another through their respective 
judgments. In Chapter 4, the thesis concluded that the principal function of this process is the 
mitigation of tensions arising from the overlapping, multi-layered systems for the protection of 
human rights of which the courts are a part. Informal dialogue, explored in Chapter 5, taking 
place in the form of bilateral meetings between the judges, was shown to supplement this process 
of tension-mitigation by performing procedural, substantive and diplomatic functions in the 
relationship between the courts.   
 With this understanding of the central forms of dialogue between these courts established, 
the thesis turns to the fourth and central question posed at the outset of the thesis: what is the role 
of judicial ‘dialogue’ between the UK courts and the ECtHR in legitimising their respective 
judgments? More specifically, how are the judges using these processes as a means of 
legitimising their particular courts and their decision-making? This chapter proceeds in nine 
parts. Part 2 recaps the concept of legitimacy explained in the introductory chapter and sets out 
its significance in the context of jurisdictional pluralism in which the processes of dialogue 
studied here unfold. From here, the two subsequent parts of the chapter detail the recent 
legitimacy challenges confronting the ECtHR and the UK courts. In Part 3, it is observed that the 
Strasbourg Court faces the task of maintaining the consent of national authorities, the 
concomitant need to demonstrate respect towards their autonomy and legal traditions, and at the 
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same time avoid the charge of appearing to act on discretion rather than law. In Part 4 it is noted 
that the UK courts, on the other hand, have been confronted by the related contentions of their 
undue deference to the ECtHR and the perceived lack of ‘ownership’ of human rights in the UK 
resulting from the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 and its connection with the ECtHR 
jurisprudence.  
 From here, the chapter in Part 5 goes on to outline the central thesis: that the courts 
respond to these various challenges through judicial dialogue by utilising the reasoning of their 
judgments and their face-to-face discussions to employ three features of discourse: mutual 
participation, mutual accountability and the ongoing revision and refinement of arguments. The 
legitimising roles of each of these discursive features are then elaborated in Parts 6-8. Having 
then explored the legitimising roles of judicial dialogue, the chapter situates them in Part 9 within 
the context of what are arguably the wider, parallel legitimacy strategies currently pursued by the 
ECtHR and UK courts based respectively on enhancing subsidiarity within the Convention 
system and strengthening domestic judicial autonomy and identity in human rights adjudication. 
Part 10 offers the concluding remarks.  
2. Legitimacy and the Challenges of Pluralism 
2.1 Legitimacy Recapped 
As outlined in Chapter 1, ‘legitimacy’ concerns the ‘validation of power’2 or the 
justification and acceptance of authority
3
 (‘authority’ being a relational claim of obedience by 
one actor upon another).
4
 The former, normative dimension concerns the reasons which justify an 
institution’s ‘worthiness to be recognised’,5 while the latter, descriptive dimension is typically 
concerned with the extent to which a particular institution commands popular acceptance as 
legitimate. Descriptive legitimacy is traditionally measured in actual compliance with authority – 
Bentham’s ‘disposition to obey’6 – and, following Weber, whether there is belief in the 
legitimacy of governing institutions on the part of the governed.
7
 This chapter is concerned with 
elements of both the normative and descriptive dimensions of legitimacy: specifically, the way 
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that the judges appear to be using judicial dialogue between their courts to normatively justify the 
exercise of their power in terms of the beliefs of their audiences.
8
 
The potential audiences from whom judges seek legitimacy are many and various. Courts 
make their decisions under the ‘critical gaze of a robust legal public sphere’,9 seeking acceptance 
from ‘their own community of the legally informed’.10 Thus, it has been observed that in order to 
be considered legitimate ‘[a] judicial decision should aim to convince as many potential members 
of the audience: the State officials, legal professionals in general’.11 Both national courts and 
international courts seek acceptance of their judgments from the elected arms of government(s) 
and from the general public ‘out there in the streets’12 from whom they and the elected officials 
draw power.
13
 What is more, it is worth recalling from Chapter 3 that both sets of courts seek 
acceptance of their views from one another, each considering the other among the key audiences 
to their judgments. Clearly, the quality of legitimacy does not require agreement among these 
various audiences with the substantive content of every decision by the courts. The ability of the 
ECtHR to find against the UK, for example, and thereby contradict the views of the UK courts, is 
intrinsic to its institutional function in providing external review. Dzehtsiarou thus argues that the 
‘legitimacy of the judgments cannot be evaluated on the basis of whether they achieved the result 
preferred by the addressee of the ruling’.14 Tremblay makes the same point: ‘judges do not have 
to justify their decisions on the basis of reasons that legislatures would necessarily accept’.15 
Nonetheless, as seen in Chapter 1, it has been observed that ‘legitimacy considerations’16 
are among the key factors which influence judicial decision-making. On the one hand, judges 
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will take opportunities to ‘strengthen[...] ... the position, authority, and legitimacy of the court as 
an institution’.17 On the other hand, their actions can be tempered by opposing legitimacy 
considerations, particularly the ‘fear of a backlash’.18 Thus, judges can be strategic in the way 
that they go about the business of legal interpretation; ‘their calculations can be judicious as well 
as judicial’.19  
 2.2 No ‘Ultimate’ Judicial Authority 
 In making their legitimacy calculations, judges have to respond to a range of possible 
challenges. One challenge common to both the UK courts and the ECtHR is the fact that neither 
enjoys complete authority over the other. Theirs cannot be described neatly as a relationship 
between the governing and the governed or ultimate authority and its subjects. As seen in 
Chapter 4, it was described during the interviews as having an ‘inevitable ... and healthy 
tension’20 with both the UKSC and the ECtHR occupying the position of a ‘final court with its 
own jurisdiction in an area where there is another final court with its own jurisdiction’.21 Such 
remarks reflect the plurality of authority between these courts which, according to Somek, is the 
‘consequence of mutual recognition of final authority’.22 The UK courts, on the one hand, accept 
that the ECtHR has final authority on the interpretation of the ECHR,
23
 while the ECtHR accepts 
the authority of national courts in their interpretation of domestic law.
24
 Their relationship can 
thus be considered ‘interactive rather than hierarchical’.25 As Stone Sweet observes, ‘[t]he 
system is pluralistic: neither a national court nor the Strasbourg Court has formal powers to 
impose its interpretation of rights on the other’.26  
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 A further challenge arising from this pluralism is the risk of conflict. As seen in previous 
chapters, the authority of the courts overlap as a result of the UK being signatory to the ECHR 
and, since the HRA was enacted, the courts adjudicating on the meaning of identical sets of 
rights. The way that the UK courts interpret Convention rights under the HRA can contradict the 
interpretations of the ECtHR and vice versa, and the ECtHR can interpret the Convention rights 
in a way which potentially conflicts with the constitutional and legal traditions of the UK legal 
system and the role of the UK courts in maintaining it. The concern generated by jurisdictional 
pluralism in this regard is that it ‘generates unpredictability, unevenness, incoherence, and 
inconsistency, which leaves subjects unable to plan as autonomous and rational agents should be 
entitled to do’,27 rendering compliance difficult. MacCormick observed that such a situation is 
not ‘logically embarrassing’28 but ‘practically embarrassing to the extent that the same human 
beings ... are said to have and not have a certain right. ...To which system are they to give their 
fidelity in action?’.29 The same concern was raised in respect of the s.2 HRA duty on UK courts 
to simply ‘take into account’ ECtHR rulings. As Gearty notes, it was felt that such flexibility 
‘gave rise to a real risk of conflict between the two legal regimes, the courts here saying one 
thing, Strasbourg another with the government embarrassed by having to enforce both’.30 It is 
worth recalling from Chapter 3 how the Justices described international rule of law 
considerations in this way acting as a constraint on the UK courts in their interactions with the 
ECtHR jurisprudence, steering them away from either regular or outright disagreements with 
final judgments of the Strasbourg Court. The concern was that regular divergences from the 
ECtHR would create a situation where ‘nobody knows where they are’31  and thus undermine the 
coherence and legitimacy of the Convention system.  
 Thus, pluralism presents two challenges for the courts. In the absence of either court 
holding ‘ultimate decision-making capacity’,32 it can be argued that they must seek to find ways 
of enhancing the legitimacy of their decisions in order to secure the compliance of the other. 
Additionally, given the risk of conflict, the courts need to find ways of accommodating one 
another in order to ensure a degree of coherence between their positions so that both might enjoy 
the disposition to obedience from their overlapping audiences. 
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3. Legitimacy Challenges for the ECtHR 
Aside from the challenges posed by jurisdictional pluralism, each of the courts faces their 
own, distinct legitimacy challenges. For the ECtHR, three challenges are the need to maintain the 
consent of the national authorities across the Council of Europe, the related need to accord 
respect to the decision-making of those institutions and, at the same time, demonstrate that its 
decisions are reached on the basis of law and not discretion.   
3.1 The Need for Consent 
The ECtHR faces a ‘structural handicap’:33 it operates within a system which lacks the 
coercive power to ensure compliance with its judgments. In this regard, Bodansky notes that ‘an 
institution’s lack of coercive power means that it must rely more on perceived legitimacy as a 
basis of influence’.34 Indeed, Harlow observes that ‘[i]n its initial phases, the ECtHR relied to a 
great extent on consensus and the consent of the member states of the Council of Europe to 
establish its legitimacy – as indeed it still to a certain extent does’.35 In the same vein, 
Dzhetsiarou observes that the consent established at the signing of the ECHR ‘does not suggest 
that the Contracting Parties initially subscribed to any ruling produced by the court ... [or] extend 
to the interpretive methods deployed by the court’.36 What is more, the fact that the ECtHR is an 
international court is said to aggravate the concern with the ‘counter-majoritarian difficulty’ that 
judges should not readily interfere with the decisions of the directly elected branches of 
government.
37
 To this extent, it has been argued that the ECHR is ‘inevitably trapped in a 
permanent “crisis of political legitimacy” between its purpose of extending human rights 
protection and the raw reality that its effectiveness and ultimate survival depends on the consent 
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of states’.38 The observation that courts act strategically in order to increase their legitimacy is 
thus particularly relevant to international courts such as the ECtHR.
39
 
Maintaining the consent of national authorities presents a significant challenge for the 
ECtHR in what is a politically hostile climate in the UK towards European institutions. Elliott 
has described the political debates surrounding the HRA and the role of the ECtHR as:  
....a particular manifestation of a specific, and influential, strand within politico-
legal discourse in the United Kingdom. It is characterised by a deep antipathy 
towards legal control of political—including, and especially, legislative—
authority in general, and external—“European”—legal control in particular: 
mindsets which, in turn, arguably betray attitudes of entrenched isolationism and 
a deep-seated commitment to the notion of the political constitution.
40
 
Within this climate, the UK courts are an essential ally – a point recognised by a number of the 
judges in interview – as national courts can play a key role in legitimising international law. In 
another context, Maduro argues that ‘co-operation and discourse with national courts’41 was key 
for ‘securing the legitimacy and authority of both the European Court of Justice and EC law’.42 
Their application of the case law served to equip them with the ‘same authority of national court 
decisions’,43 providing the ‘added values of both neutrality and of legitimacy’.44 In the same way, 
it can be argued that the UK courts help to anchor the legitimacy of the ECtHR, particularly in 
light of the view that they have cited the Convention rights and the Strasbourg case law ‘with a 
frequency and diligence hardly matched anywhere else in Europe’.45 The UK courts are seen to 
be giving recognition to the normative force of the ECtHR’s conclusions, encouraging other 
actors subject to its rulings to do the same.  
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3.2 Respecting Domestic Legal Traditions and Autonomy 
In order to maintain the consent of national authorities, it is often observed that 
supranational courts should accord respect to the former’s constitutional traditions and the 
autonomy of their decision-making. With regard to traditions, Maduro argues that ‘[t]he bottom 
up construction and legitimacy of EU law requires the Court to pay due respect to the common 
national legal traditions and not simply to search for its preferred legal solution among a variety 
of national legal regimes’.46 Likewise, Ostrovsky argues that in the face of legal and cultural 
diversity, human rights courts ‘ignore the different institutional contexts in which interpretation 
takes place, the different cultural contexts, and the different power relations in these jurisdictions 
at their peril’.47 It was seen in Chapter 4 that these views were shared by the Justices interviewed, 
who placed much emphasis on the need for the ECtHR judges to understand the nature of the 
common law system, its tradition of constitutionalism, and the implications of their judgments on 
their operation. 
Equally, with regard to the need for supranational courts to respect the decision-making 
of national authorities, Helfer and Slaughter warn that ‘[b]old demonstrations of judicial 
autonomy by judgments against state interests ... must be tempered by incrementalism and 
awareness of political boundaries’.48 This point is sharply underlined in Çali, Koch and Bruch’s 
empirical study of how the legitimacy of the ECtHR is understood by elite judicial, legal and 
political actors across Europe.
49
 They conclude that the legitimacy accorded to the ECtHR 
fluctuates on the logic of ‘a fair compromise between the purposes and the performance of 
human rights courts and the purposes and performance of domestic institutions’.50 Of particular 
note here is that ‘the legitimacy of the human rights court is a matter of comparative judgment’51 
between its purpose and performance ‘with those of domestic institutions’.52 Crucially, they 
found that ‘[t]he more actors perceive competition rather than cooperation between domestic 
and international institutions, the more onerous it becomes to maintain the legitimacy of 
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international institutions in domestic contexts’.53 The ECtHR thus relies on ‘a presumption of 
complementarity with domestic institutions’.54  
On the one hand, it has been observed that the ECtHR enjoys legitimacy among senior 
UK judges. In an analysis of a range of extra-judicial speeches, Bates has observed that ‘taken 
overall, the views were supportive, if not very supportive of the [Strasbourg] Court, with 
references being made to its recent practices and interaction with UK courts’.55 Such support, 
however, as made clear during the interviews, is not unconditional. Indeed, in the breakdown of 
legitimacy constructions by profession, Çali, Koch and Bruch’s study observed that the UK 
judges attributed legitimacy to the ECtHR subject to its non-intrusion in domestic processes and 
flexibility in areas of reasonable disagreement.
56
 Again, this was echoed by a number of the 
interviewed Justices, who were concerned that the ECtHR in the past had not always abided by 
the subsidiarity nature of its role, particularly in the determination of facts, in breach of its 
‘fourth instance’57 doctrine, and valued the freedom to occasionally disagree with the Court’s 
rulings.  
The ECtHR has been responsive to these challenges. It has recognised the need to observe 
the various legal traditions of the ECHR signatories, stating over the years that it should not 
‘strike at the very roots of the State’s legal system’,58 ‘ignore entirely the specificities of the 
particular legal system’59 or overlook ‘a well-entrenched and necessary part of legal tradition’.60 
What is more, it has developed a number of ‘restraining principles’61 to assist it in navigating 
these legitimacy challenges, notably the margin of appreciation accorded to states in areas where 
a clear ‘European consensus’ is lacking, and the principle of subsidiarity which emphasises the 
subsidiarity or complementary role of the ECtHR to domestic decision-makers as the primary 
guarantors of Convention rights. Nonetheless, the challenges remain. It has been observed that an 
acute difficulty faced by supranational courts is that they ‘have larger audiences than national 
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courts, hearing cases from multiple, often very different countries’,62 manifesting ‘sharply 
divided preferences with respect to the interpretation and promulgation of international law’.63 
Indeed, as others have noted, the jurisdiction of the ECtHR spans from ‘Ireland in the west to 
Vladivostok in the east’64 and from ‘Iceland to Istanbul’,65 covering over 800 million people. 
Thus, developing its jurisprudence in a way which is consistent with the diverse legal traditions 
and respectful of the autonomy of decision-makers across this vast space remains a persistent 
challenge, as the former ECtHR President, Dean Spielmann has recognised.
66
 It is in light of 
these difficulties that Çali, Koch and Bruch advise that the ECtHR ‘must be sensitive to—at 
times strongly conflicting—demands of those it asks to abide by its decisions’.67  
3.3 Law not Discretion  
A third legitimacy challenge facing the ECtHR is that, to the extent possible, it has to 
avoid the charge that its decisions are informed by discretion rather than law. MacCormick notes 
that ‘the opinion that power is being exercised under law is a notable inducement to accept as 
legitimately in authority those who do in fact exercise effective political power’.68 Faced with the 
ongoing need to maintain the consent of national authorities, however, Helfer and Slaughter 
observe the risk that judges on international courts such as the ECtHR ‘may feel that their 
authority and legitimacy depends on not antagonizing those governments on which their power 
ultimately depends, and on proceeding diplomatically’.69 Here, ‘neutrality can come to mean 
"avoiding political confrontation," a euphemism for choosing not to remind governments of their 
legal obligations’.70 They ‘must be willing to brave political displeasure, searching always for 
generalizable principles, even as they search for formulations ... to render the principles more 
palatable to the states concerned’.71 In the same vein, Alter argues that such courts should avoid 
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‘transparently political decision[s]’72 if they are to avert the risk of ‘los[ing] their legitimacy as 
legal actors’.73 Here, the legitimacy study discussed above offers further insights. Among the 
factors which emerged as affecting the legitimacy of the ECtHR among judicial, political and 
legal actors was ‘[o]bjectivity ... the respondents’ judgments about whether the Court achieves a 
balance between law and politics when deciding on the facts of cases before it’.74 Çali et al 
observed that the perception of objectivity depletes ‘when the Court is perceived as displacing or 
overriding a decision of domestic authorities based on political considerations’.75 Further, they 
note that ‘the lack of objectivity or concern for double standards was more a legitimacy concern 
in Turkey and Bulgaria than the other three states [the UK, Ireland and Germany]’76. They thus 
caution that ‘by aiming to increase its legitimacy in states with good human rights records, the 
Court may lose it in states with bad records’.77  
4. Legitimacy Challenges for the UK Courts 
The UK courts face their own, albeit less severe, legitimacy challenges. They enjoy the benefits 
of having been ‘traditionally legitimated’78 and having domestic enforcement mechanisms at 
their disposal. Indeed, O’Cinneide notes that ‘far from being dependant on state approval, they 
constitute part of the integral framework of the state, both as a matter of law and popular 
perception’.79 Unlike the ECtHR, they enjoy enforceable review powers over the executive for 
their compliance with Convention rights and ‘weak review’ powers over primary legislation. 
However, they face the same challenge, articulated by Elliott: the ‘deep antipathy towards legal 
control of political—including, and especially, legislative—authority in general, and external—
“European”—legal control in particular’.80Situated, as they are, within the framework of the 
domestic constitutional setting, however, they are perhaps better placed than the ECtHR in 
confronting this issue. They are not existentially threatened in the way that the ECtHR has been. 
However, as Kumm notes, ‘[i]nstitutionally, national courts–including constitutional courts–are 
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far too weak to withstand persistent majoritarian pressures for long’.81 While their institutional 
legitimacy is less disputed, the legitimacy of their current powers and place within the 
constitutional order of the UK under the HRA – an arrangement of which many senior judges are 
openly supportive – is less secure. 
4.1 The ‘Modest Underworker of Strasbourg’82 
The introduction of the HRA presented new legitimacy challenges for the UK courts. As 
Krisch notes, ‘they had been turned into a quasi-constitutional court with broad review powers 
over executive and legislative action, and this was in strong tension with previous assumptions 
about the role of courts under the British constitution’.83 Indeed, O’Cinneide points out that the 
UK’s traditionally political constitution had been characterised by ‘judicial deference to the 
decisions of elected decision-makers and the prerogative-wielding executive’.84 Against this 
background of tradition, Krisch notes that deviations from the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
‘might have appeared too openly “creative”: as a legislative rather than judicial function and 
therefore subject to greater challenge’.85 The close adherence to the ECtHR case law thus helped 
to ‘maintain a more clearly judicial role, one of ‘applying’ the law’.86 In this regard, ‘tying its 
hand and limiting (or denying) its discretion by reference to Strasbourg might have seemed to the 
House of Lords the safest option in the new – tempting but slightly uncomfortable – position in 
which the HRA placed it’.87  
As seen in the introductory chapter, however, this approach brought its own legitimacy 
challenges. A widespread view developed that the UK courts had become excessively deferential 
to the ECtHR by allowing the ‘permissive language of section 2 to harden into an unavoidable 
obligation’.88 The case which infamously came to typify this was AF (No 3).89 There, the House 
of Lords accepted, contrary to their previous conclusion,
90
 that the right to a fair trial would be 
violated where a person suspected of terrorist offences was subject to control orders on the ‘sole 
or decisive’ basis of evidence obtained through closed material procedures. This was despite the 
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fact that the Lords expressed serious concerns over the ‘sole or decisive’ test. Lord Hoffmann 
criticised it as the imposition by the ECtHR of a ‘rigid rule’91 in a context where the demands of 
a fair procedure simply ‘cannot ... be stated in rigid rules’.92 Nonetheless, the Law Lords 
considered themselves ‘obliged’93 by the applicable ECtHR judgment,94 having ‘no option but to 
accept and apply it’.95 This was best encapsulated in the now-famous words of Lord Rodger’s 
single-paragraph contribution to the judgment: ‘Even though we are dealing with rights under a 
United Kingdom statute, in reality, we have no choice: Argentoratum locutum, iudicium finitum – 
Strasbourg has spoken, the case is closed’.96  
As discussed in Chapter 1, in the view of one of the primary architects of the HRA, this 
posed a threat to the legitimacy of the UK courts and human rights law itself at the domestic and 
international levels. In a plea to the judges to take a less deferential approach, the former Lord 
Chancellor, Lord Irvine, argued that it was imperative that the UK courts counter the perception 
that they are ‘merely agents or delegates of the ECHR and CoE ... regard[ing] it as their primary 
duty to give effect to the policy preferences of the Strasbourg Court’.97 Undue deference was 
‘damaging for our courts' own legitimacy and credibility’98 and ‘would gravely undermine, not 
enhance, respect for domestic and international human rights principles in the United 
Kingdom’.99 Likewise, the Court of Appeal judge, Lord Justice Laws, has written of the threat of 
such deference to the common law’s virtues of ‘catholicity’100 – its ‘capacity to draw inspiration 
from many different sources’101 and its ‘restraint’.102 Any principle of foreign ancestry, he 
suggests, ‘like any other principle of the common law, can only truly take their place and play 
their part if the law’s users, its practitioners and its commentators, believe in their benign 
effects’.103 In this way, ‘law’s authority rests upon public belief’.104 Where, however, ‘the law is 
or seems to be driven by decisions of the Strasbourg court ... the resulting fears and resentments 
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may undermine the confidence which thinking people ought to have in the common law’s 
catholicity’.105 In the same vein, Amos has written of the ‘ongoing legitimacy problem flowing 
from the link between UK courts and the ECtHR’.106 Where the UK courts ‘simply accept and 
apply the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, this may contradict shared national values leading to HRA 
judgments and the HRA itself losing legitimacy’.107  
4.2 The Lack of Rights ‘Ownership’ 
Related to the concern that the UK courts had accorded to the ECtHR too much influence 
is the alleged lack of national ‘ownership’ of the rights contained under the HRA. A majority on 
the Commission on a UK Bill of Rights, set up by the former coalition government to consider 
how the HRA might be replaced, concluded that ‘many people feel alienated from a system that 
they regard as ‘European’ rather than British’,108 with the consequence of a lack of ‘widespread 
public acceptance of the legitimacy of our current human rights structures, including of the roles 
of the Convention and the European Court of Human Rights’.109 This is echoed by Amos, who 
notes that ‘[t]he human rights protected and the procedures adopted are perceived as European 
and not sufficiently British’,110 with ‘a distrust of international and European institutions by 
contrast to the trust placed in national courts and other institutions’.111 Thus, for a majority of the 
Commission, this provided one of the strongest reasons for a ‘new constitutional instrument’112 
to replace the HRA, there being ‘a strong case at least in principle for drafting it in language 
reflecting our own heritage and tradition’.113 It should be noted that the contentions on 
‘ownership’ have been roundly rejected by Klug and Williams.114 Nonetheless, as seen in 
Chapter 4, the judges are conscious of a problem: ‘we need to address the narrative that human 
rights are a foreign imposition because, in the longer term that could, at least at the margin, 
discredit the rule of law’.115 
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In these respects, it can be said that the UK courts and the ECtHR face interwoven 
legitimacy challenges. Both face the challenges of pluralism to achieving effective compliance 
with their judgments, and both face the task of navigating a political climate hostile to European 
institutions and legal interventions on human rights grounds. The difficulties presented for the 
ECtHR are perhaps more acute and, as will become clear throughout this chapter, it is thus the 
ECtHR which stands to benefit the most from the legitimising role of judicial dialogue with the 
UK courts. 
5. Judicial Dialogue: Drawing Lessons from Discourse  
Having considered the interwoven legitimacy challenges facing the UK courts and the ECtHR in 
their decision-making on Convention rights, the question to which the chapter now turns is how 
the judges appear to use the processes of judicial dialogue as a way of navigating these 
challenges. How might the courts be using their dialogue to legitimise their decisions to each 
other, to their ‘own community of the legally-informed’116 or the ‘legal public sphere’?117 The 
principal tool which the courts have in this regard is the reasoning of their judgments.
118
 Jacqué, 
quoted in the heading to this chapter, argues that ‘the sole source of a court’s legitimacy stems 
from the reasoning of its decisions. To explain rationally the reasoning followed is an instrument 
of dialogue. Reasoning is indispensable for mutual trust’.119 Likewise, Weiler argues that ‘the 
legitimacy and persuasiveness of ... decisions resides both in their quality and communicative 
power’.120 Judicial reasoning, as seen in Chapters 3 and 4, is the medium of ‘formal’ dialogue 
between the courts through which they mutually engage with one another and seek to explain 
their conclusions. However, as seen from Chapter 5, informal dialogue complements this 
engagement by providing an additional opportunity for both sides to further explain their views 
and positions to one another. To that extent, their judgments are not the sole source of their 
legitimacy.  
Drawing upon the insights of Chapters 3-5, it can be argued that both the reasoning of 
their judgments and their face-to-face meetings enable the courts to seek legitimacy for their 
decision-making by drawing upon three particular features of discourse, as understood in 
political theory: participation, accountability and ongoing revision and refinement of arguments. 
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These provide the courts with the means to enhance the ‘procedural quality of the jurisgenerative 
process’121 through which they develop their interpretations of Convention rights. The following 
sections explain how these discursive features are reflected in judicial dialogue, before the 
chapter turns to examine how each feature performs distinct legitimising roles. 
 5.1 Discourse and Judicial Dialogue Compared 
 Following the example of other authors exploring the legitimising role of judicial 
dialogue,
122
 a useful starting point here is the proceduralist understanding of law and democracy 
developed by Habermas. According to Habermas’ discourse principle, ‘[j]ust those action norms 
are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational 
discourses’.123 For Habermas, these rational discourses ‘...include any attempt to reach an 
understanding over problematic validity claims’,124 conducted ‘under conditions of 
communication that enable the free processing of topics and contributions, information and 
reasons in the public space constituted by illocutionary obligations’.125 Here, ‘...the only thing 
that counts is the compelling force of the better argument based on the relevant information’.126  
 Neither formal nor informal dialogue between the UK courts and the ECtHR neatly match 
these ideal conditions.  In formal dialogue between the courts, as seen in Chapter 3, the free 
processing of topics and contributions is subject to certain practical constraints. It is as an 
indirect, case-dependent process taking place on an ad hoc basis, with the judges confined to 
addressing the issues raised by the particular cases as and when they come before them.
127
 
Similarly, informal dialogue, though taking place directly on a face-to-face basis, was shown to 
occur somewhat sporadically. Various normative constraints are also present. Respect for 
parliamentary sovereignty and the international rule of law in particular were identified by the 
judges as constraining and influencing the interactions between their courts, both conflictual and 
consensual, from different directions, as does the duty of judicial independence during the course 
of their informal discussions. What is more, it is clear that dialogue between the courts is not 
simply an effort to reach mutual understanding as to the stronger argument. It does not take place 
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between freely associating individuals engaged in communication but individuals performing 
distinct, institutionalised roles in the form of the judicial functions of their particular courts, each 
with their own traditions, working methods and judicial philosophies in play. Chapter 3 saw how 
the judges’ understandings of the very notion of ‘dialogue’ appeared to be conditioned in part by 
the particular interests of their respective courts.  
Despite these deviations from ideal discourse, the following sections will show that the 
reasoning of their judgments and the communicative flexibility of the face-to-face situation 
enable the courts to employ numerous features of discourse along with their legitimising 
potential.    
5.2 Participation  
 First, judicial dialogue harnesses the participation of both courts in the development of 
the jurisprudence on Convention rights at both the domestic and European levels. The 
participant, as Waldron notes, takes ‘a part or share in the activity in question’128 and ‘demands 
that [their] voice be heard and that it count in public decision-making’.129 Direct participation in 
discourse, according to Habermas, depends on ‘communicative freedom’:130 ‘the possibility – 
mutually presupposed by participants engaged in the effort to reach an understanding – of 
responding to the utterances of one’s counterpart and to the concomitantly raised validity 
claims’.131  
 Through both formal and informal dialogue, the courts take part in the development of 
Convention rights and exercise communicative freedom in respect of one another. In Chapter 3, 
it was established that formal dialogue is considered a process by which each court listens to the 
views of the other and seeks to explain their own position in turn if and when the opportunities 
arise. The UK courts, as is required under s.2 HRA, take into account the judgments of the 
ECtHR – ‘engage with Strasbourg on Strasbourg’s terms’132 – and explain their own conclusions 
– ‘fashion our response’133 – in reply, thereby contributing to the development of the 
jurisprudence on Convention rights. The ECtHR, for its part, takes into account the arguments 
advanced by the UK courts – ‘listen[s] to what the partner says’134 – and ‘assesses, and, as the 
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case may be, rectifies or validates the analysis’.135 Through informal dialogue, the judges 
participate directly in open, ‘give and take’136 discussion, exploring whatever issues, concerns, 
feedback and ideas either set of judges might have concerning the Convention rights or their 
practical application. In this way, both sides take a part in the activity and have ‘a voice and a 
role in norm creation’.137 Further, through their reasoning and through their face-to-face 
meetings, both sides enjoy ‘the opportunity ... of responding to the utterances of [their] 
counterpart’ 138and thus exercise a degree of communicative freedom as participants.  
 5.3 Accountability  
Second, formal and informal judicial dialogue involve mutual accountability, one of the 
central ‘illocutionary obligations’139 which underpin discourse. According to Habermas, 
‘…interacting participants must consider themselves mutually accountable’.140 Each statement 
made by participants in discourse ‘...involves the raising of criticizable validity claims141 and ‘the 
speaker, by raising a validity claim, concomitantly takes on a sufficiently credible guarantee to 
vindicate the claim with the right kind of reasons, should this be necessary’.142 A similar 
stipulation of accountability is visible in Tremblay’s model of deliberative dialogue, according to 
which ‘...each participant must be willing to expose their views to the critical analysis of the 
others’.143 
This accountability is evident in the way the UK courts and ECtHR interact. With regard 
to the ECtHR, it was seen in Chapter 3 how the dominant category of formal dialogue which 
emerged from the interviews with the judges was the domestic judgments which signal concerns 
or disagree with an aspect of the Strasbourg jurisprudence. These concerns, as seen in Chapter 4, 
have primarily concerned the clarity and coherence of the Strasbourg jurisprudence and its 
substantive appreciation of UK domestic law. As will be explored below, when confronted with 
such criticism, the ECtHR has often shown its willingness to engage through both judgments and 
meetings. What is more, the ECtHR holds itself accountable with reasons for any divergence 
with the views of national judgments. As Amos points out, in light of the margin of appreciation 
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doctrine the ECtHR has declared that when considering a case which has already been the subject 
of domestic adjudication it requires ‘strong reasons to substitute its view for that of the final 
decision of the [domestic court]’.144 
 With regard to the UK courts, their accountability to the ECtHR, as courts of an ECHR 
member state, is intrinsic to the Convention system of human rights protection.
145
 In line with 
their s.2 HRA duty to ‘take into account’ ECtHR rulings and their interpretive presumption at 
common law that Parliament intends to act in accordance with the UK’s international obligations, 
the UK courts will follow a ‘clear and constant’146 view of the ECtHR which does not contravene 
‘some fundamental substantive or procedural aspect of [UK] law, and whose reasoning does not 
appear to overlook or misunderstand some argument or point of principle’.147 This presumption 
helps to ensure a degree of coherence between the domestic and Strasbourg case law, thereby 
easing the potential rule of law difficulties arising from disparate approaches. For this reason, the 
UK courts hold themselves accountable to the ECtHR for any conscientious divergence between 
their own judgments and those of the ECtHR. The Supreme Court has stated that while it is ‘open 
to this court to decline to follow [a] Strasbourg decision’,148 if choosing to do so it must ‘giv[e] 
reasons for adopting this course’.149 As one Justice in interview put it, such reasons provide the 
ECtHR with ‘an informed basis for reconsidering’.150 Further, as seen in the previous chapters, 
the UK courts have revisited their previous decisions on numerous occasions where those 
decisions, based on predicative assessments of how the ECtHR would interpret the Convention 
rights, transpired to be at odds with the subsequent conclusions of the ECtHR. However, while 
the UK courts consider the judgments of the ECtHR partly ‘because they have been directed by 
Parliament to do so’,151  it should be recalled from Chapters 3 and 4 that a number of the 
interviewed judges considered ECtHR judgments which disagree with UK judgments to be an 
important form of dialogue. Despite Lord Wilson’s remark in Moohan152 that ‘the notion that the 
ECtHR has power to “correct” a decision of this court is a constitutional aberration’,153 it was 
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clear from the interviews that a number of the Justices considered the ability of the ECtHR to 
challenge their decisions to be valuable. It was considered to be ‘an invitation ... to reconsider, 
and that’s no bad thing’154 and a means of challenging judicial complacency about domestic 
human rights standards. 
Thus, through their interactions the courts are felt to act as an important ‘check’ on their 
respective decision-making, challenging their respective reasoning and the assumptions 
underlying them. Likewise, informal dialogue was shown in Chapter 5 to serve the same purpose, 
providing a forum for the judges to raise concerns with one another, though this was thought to 
be valuable primarily from the perspective of the national judges, raising concerns with the 
ECtHR. In these numerous respects, as in discourse, both sets of courts demonstrate 
accountability in reason to one another. 
 5.4 Revision 
 The third discursive feature of judicial dialogue, both formal and informal, which appears 
to be aimed at legitimising decision-making is the ongoing revision and refinement of judicial 
opinions in light of the new arguments which each court advances. For participants engaged in 
discourse, Habermas suggests that the respective views held by each are only ‘provisionally 
justified’155 because there is ‘no criterion independent of the argumentative process’.156 This 
warrants from each participant ‘an openness to the possibility that ... views might have to be 
revised in the light of new information and arguments’.157 Similarly, Rawls observes that ‘[w]hen 
citizens deliberate, they ... suppose that their political opinions may be revised by discussion ... 
and therefore these opinions are not simply a fixed outcome of their existing private or 
nonpolitical interests’.158  
Ongoing revision is, of course, intrinsic to legal development. It is ‘an ever changing 
process ... [that] morphs, adapts and develops in response to previously unencountered arguments 
and unanticipated circumstances’.159 Understood discursively, Habermas suggests that judicial 
decisions reflect ‘...a caesura in an ongoing discussion; ...the interim result of a discursive 
opinion-forming process’160 and one which ‘is in principle resumable’.161 This ‘resumability’ is 
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plain in the decision-making by the UK courts and the ECtHR, both of which enjoy the capacity 
to explicitly revise their views over time.
162
 For the UK courts, revision is central to the case-by-
case development of the common law, with its ‘power of continuous self-correction’163 and 
‘catholicity’:164 its ‘...capacity to draw inspiration from many different sources’.165 In relation to 
the ECtHR, this self-correcting capacity is enhanced by the s.3 HRA power to interpret 
legislation ‘so far as it is possible’ in a manner which is compatible with Convention rights. This 
provision, as Dickson notes, is an instrument of ‘adaptability’166 which allows the UK courts to 
revise their positions as the case law of the ECtHR develops. For both the ECtHR and UK courts, 
the Convention is interpreted as ‘a living instrument which … must be interpreted in the light of 
present day conditions’,167 allowing the judges to ‘breathe life into the words of the instrument so 
as to make it relevant to contemporary European society’.168 What is more, the ECtHR has 
shown its willingness to revise its jurisprudence ‘in the light of the clarifications subsequently 
made by the domestic courts’.169 It has ‘plasticity’170 in this regard.  
 Formal and informal judicial dialogue harness these capacities as each court is 
encouraged to review and potentially revise their positions in light of the views presented by the 
other through judgments and meetings. The understanding of formal dialogue developed in 
Chapters 3 and 4 is that of a process by which each court considers the views of the other, 
explains its own position and expects that explanation, in turn, to be considered by the other 
court. The capacities of each court for revision are utilised in a process of tension-mitigation 
through which the courts, primarily the UK courts, employ their judgments as a means of 
signalling concerns or disagreement to the ECtHR and also offering contributions to areas 
lacking Strasbourg case law with the aim of influencing the ECtHR in a way that minimises 
either existing or potential difficulties arising from their differing institutional perspectives, 
modes of operating and the prevailing legal traditions of their judges. Further, formal dialogue 
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was predicated, albeit with somewhat less enthusiasm from some of the Justices, on the UK 
courts modifying their own views in the wake of new judgments of the ECtHR which appear to 
warrant a review of the domestic judicial position. Thus, the tension-mitigating function rests on 
the capacity of both courts to revise their previous conclusions. Informal dialogue is also 
predicated on the possibility of views and approaches being revised through the face-to-face 
discussions which take place between the judges. It was seen in Chapter 5 how UK judges feel 
that they can use these encounters to give their views to the Strasbourg judges on developments 
which might prove ‘ill-advised’171 and seek guidance as to how they could revise their approach 
to the application of ECtHR case law domestically.  
6. The Legitimising Role of Participation  
The discussion turns now to how each of the discursive features of judicial dialogue can 
contribute to the legitimacy of their decision-making. The first feature is the mutual participation 
of the courts in the development of the jurisprudence on Convention rights. This participation 
appears to contribute to the legitimacy of the courts’ decisions both in respect of one another and 
on the part of their other audiences.  Through their mutual participation, they demonstrate 
institutional awareness towards one another; build mutual understanding in order to avoid 
conflict; and attempt to reach jurisprudential outcomes to which both have contributed.  
6.1 Institutional Awareness 
For a start, with each court according weight to the views of the other court before 
pronouncing their own, they show mutual recognition for their respective authority and roles in 
the ‘shared responsibility’172 for enforcing the Convention rights. Helfer and Slaughter suggest 
that such recognition ‘...dignifies the opposing arguments, signalling the proponents of these 
arguments that they have been heard and recognized as important participants in a debate, 
participants whose arguments must be answered’.173The importance of mutual participation for 
the legitimacy of decision-makers within contexts of jurisdictional pluralism is well-noted.
 
Maduro points out that such conditions generate a need for ‘institutional awareness’:174 ‘[c]ourts 
must increasingly be aware that they don’t have a monopoly over rules and that they often 
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compete with other institutions in their interpretation’.175 Likewise, Kumm argues that when 
national and supranational courts within Europe interpret legal provisions in such contexts, ‘[t]he 
views of the other courts have to be given appropriate weight and their concerns, so far as 
reasonable, accommodated’.176 Even where they disagree, ‘evidence of having listened is an 
important legitimating force’.177 To borrow a phrase from Weiler, the courts thus need ‘to listen, 
not only preach, and to be seen to be listening’.178 A number of the interviewed judges spoke in 
similar terms. As seen in Chapter 3, one Justice explained that ‘it’s very important for them that 
they see that we are taking them seriously’.179 Likewise, a Strasbourg judge remarked that ‘any 
decision is more reliable if you listen to what the person who’s going to be affected by your 
decision has to say’.180 To this extent, the judges display to one another a kind of judicial civility 
– ‘a willingness to listen to others and a fairmindedness in deciding when accommodations to 
their views should reasonably be made’.181 This could be particularly crucial for the ECtHR 
which, as discussed earlier, depends for its legitimacy on the continued consent of the national 
authorities.  If it is the case that the legitimacy of the ECtHR becomes more vulnerable the more 
the domestic actors perceive ‘competition rather than cooperation’,182 by showing recognition of 
the views of the UK judges in its judgments, the ECtHR reduces the risk of damaging its 
legitimacy in this regard.  
6.2 Conflict Avoidance 
Next, their mutual participation can contribute to the legitimacy of the courts’ decision-
making by enabling them to minimise the risk of conflict. Under the kind of pluralist conditions 
which define their relationship, Somek observes that ‘there is no final legal resolution to 
jurisdictional conflicts ... No meta-law governs their interaction’.183 However, it was seen earlier 
how the courts arguably require a degree of coherence between their conclusions if both are to 
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enjoy the disposition to obedience on the part of their shared audiences, who would otherwise 
have to grapple with conflicting rulings.
184
 Thus, MacCormick argues that such a situation 
necessitates ‘careful management at all levels to avoid deadlock or damaging conflict among 
rival authorities’.185  
With each court taking into consideration the views of the other through formal and 
informal exchanges of argument, however, exercising communicative freedom in turn, their 
participation in dialogue can improve understanding. Pérez notes that it ‘brings to the fore 
information about the views and concerns of the participants’,186 which in turn ‘promotes 
knowledge and sustains better understanding of competing interests and values at the different 
levels of governance’.187 This enables them to reach ‘common understanding of the scope and 
limits’188 of their respective authority and to ensure a degree of coherence between their 
approaches.
189
 Constantinides notes here that while ‘judge-made rules face legitimacy 
concerns’,190 ‘[c]oherence through dialogue can provide such legitimacy’.191 As seen in previous 
chapters, through their dialogue the courts seek through cross-influence to prevent as well as 
rectify disagreements. Their participation in dialogue involves ‘each learning from the other and 
trying to ensure that, on the whole, we’re singing from the same hymn-sheet’192 and ‘both sides 
trying to come to the civilised sharing of responsibility’.193 
What is more, their mutual participation helps to avoid conflicts where possible between 
the UK generally and ECtHR by ensuring that the Strasbourg judges benefit from the insights of 
the UK judges. National judges, as the ECtHR acknowledges with its margin of appreciation 
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doctrine, [b]y reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their 
countries, ... are in principle in a better position than the international judge’194 to determine the 
proportionality of interferences with Convention in their particular countries. Lupu notes that 
‘international courts have less information than national courts about their audience’s 
preferences’,195 the latter ‘having more experience with their home country and more direct 
access to information about public opinion’.196 The ECtHR’s vast audience means that ‘it is often 
difficult ... to discern the preferences of the public and of the political actors in the applicable 
states’.197 In the same vein, Bellamy notes that ‘the ‘outsider’s’ view may overlook how the 
specification of a particular right within a given legal system forms part of a more general 
approach to rights, that balances different rights considerations and which taken overall is 
reasonable and reflects local circumstances and concerns’.198 Thus, judicial dialogue allows UK 
judges to nudge the ECtHR judges away from potential approaches which would cause 
unnecessary difficulties at the domestic level.  
6.3 Shared Interpretive Outcomes 
Third, the mutual participation of the courts in judicial dialogue allows the European 
human rights jurisprudence to be ‘constructed as much bottom up as it is constructed top 
down’,199 thereby reflecting a ‘shared result’200 of input from the ECtHR and UK courts. This 
offers a legitimising potential for the judgments of the ECtHR which can be explained by 
democratic insights on public participation. In liberal democracies, the participation of the 
governed in the governance of their society, as free and equal individuals, is considered a staple 
requirement for the legitimacy of authoritative decision-makers. As discussed earlier, Habermas’ 
discourse principle stipulates that a norm’s validity depends on whether all those possibly 
affected by it could agree to it as participants in discourse.  Applying this understanding to law 
and democracy, he proposes that the legitimacy of legal norms requires that those subject to them 
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‘understand themselves, taken as a whole, as the rational authors of those norms’.201 In a similar 
vein, Young writes that ‘...a democratic decision is normatively legitimate only if all those 
affected by it are included in the process of discussion and decision-making’. 202 Participation in 
this way can enhance legitimacy by ‘giving stakeholders a sense of ownership in the process’203 
while ‘restricted participation can provoke dissatisfaction on the part of those excluded’. 204 
These democratic arguments  are resonant in the thinking of the judges in their dialogue. 
As seen in Chapter 3, the Justices stressed the importance of the ECtHR ‘listening to us, taking 
into account our concerns and interests’205 and valued the opportunities through both their 
judgments and meetings to have ‘an input into the way in which Strasbourg thinks’.206 In 
Chapters 4 and 5, their participation was deemed to be particularly important by a number of the 
Justices who conceived of themselves as both representatives and guardians of the UK’s common 
law tradition within a European human rights system consisting largely of civil law traditions. 
Two opposing examples from the case law further demonstrate the importance which is attached 
to their participation. In Chapter 3, it was seen how the failure of the ECtHR to acknowledge the 
divided views of the Law Lords in Qazi
207
 on the question of whether Art.8 ECHR required a 
court making a possession order to determine its proportionality had not only given rise to 
consternation in the UK’s highest court208 but had arguably prolonged domestic judicial 
difficulties in that area as the judges were left decipher whether the majority or minority view 
had been implicitly endorsed. A contrasting example, also seen in Chapter 3, concerned the 
question of whether any of the Convention rights affords a ‘right to die’. The conclusions of the 
House of Lords on this question in Pretty
209
 were cited extensively in Strasbourg,
210
 with the 
Court citing forty paragraphs from Lord Bingham’s judgment alone. This particular interaction 
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has been hailed by the former Supreme Court Justice, Lord Walker, ‘an example of a real 
dialogue between our final appeal tribunal and the Strasbourg Court’.211  
The difference between the two exchanges is plain: the UK judges appreciated having 
their contributions heard by the ECtHR, particularly where it resulted in influence; they were less 
keen on being ignored, particularly having faced stark interpretive disagreements at the domestic 
level. It seems clear that they thus value the opportunity to ‘voice their claims and see if their 
arguments are answered in convincing terms’.212 On this basis, as Pérez argues elsewhere, ‘the 
participatory nature of the process of interpretation ... may well enhance compliance’.213 Through 
their direct involvement in interpreting Convention rights, the UK courts ‘might be inclined to 
support the interpretive results as fair’.214 As with democratic participation, the participation of 
the judges appears to give them a sense of ownership in the process, offering the potential to 
legitimise the ECtHR judgments, whereas a lack of regard for their views promotes 
dissatisfaction. Again, this is particularly important given that the ECtHR depends on the consent 
of domestic actors, including domestic courts, for the acceptance of its jurisprudence and for its 
legitimacy. By developing jurisprudence to which the UK judges can feel that they have 
contributed, they are more likely to perceive cooperation rather than competition, viewing 
themselves as co-authors of the jurisprudence. 
7. The Legitimising Role of Accountability  
The second discursive feature of dialogue between the UK courts and the ECtHR identified 
above is the mutual accountability which the courts display to one another. This accountability is 
perhaps an inevitable feature of the jurisdictional pluralism which defines their relationship. 
MacCormick pointed out that under such conditions ‘[t]hose who hold power at particular levels 
or for particular purposes would be likely to find themselves subject to checks and controls on 
their action that emanate from different authorities’.215 Nonetheless, the courts appear to be 
harnessing aspects of this accountability as a means of bolstering the legitimacy of their 
decisions, in numerous ways. First, it seems that they seek to enhance trust both between their 
courts and toward them on the part of other actors by showing a willingness to engage with 
criticism. Second, and relatedly, in holding the ECtHR to account where its jurisprudence gives 
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rise to domestic judicial concerns, the UK courts show themselves to be actively guarding the 
domestic legal order. Third, through its exchanges with the UK courts, the ECtHR demonstrates 
its sensitivity to domestic concerns. 
7.1 Enhancing Trust 
As with the participation of those affected in the decision-making process, accountability 
is often considered central to the legitimacy of institutions with decision-making power, guarding 
against error and abuse and thereby building trust in decision-makers. Trust is linked to 
legitimacy to the extent that the belief that an institution’s authority is justified will often be 
based in part on the view that ‘officials can be trusted to wield their power judiciously’.216 The 
need for trust in judges, in particular, is often summarised with the ancient question, ‘Quis 
custodiet ipsos custodes - who will guard the guards themselves?’.217 For reasons of 
accountability and legitimacy, both the UK courts and the ECtHR publish their decisions and 
provide full reasons.
218
 Reasoning, as seen earlier, is integral to maintaining trust in decision-
makers. Offering reasons for judicial decisions reflects what Le Sueur defines as ‘content 
accountability’: 219 a specific form of judicial accountability for ‘what the law is and what legal 
and constitutional values a court ought to promote in its judgments’.220 It subjects judicial 
decisions to ‘a normative, and not political, scrutiny with regard to the normative preferences 
[courts] attribute to their legal order’.221 Through judicial dialogue, however, the UK courts and 
the ECtHR appear to have extended their respective content accountability, treating themselves 
and one another as accountable in certain respects for the conclusions that they make in their 
judgments.
222
  
This extension of accountability through openness to mutual challenge appears to be 
aimed at generating trust both between their institutions and towards them on the part of other 
actors with whom they have a relationship. In terms of building trust and legitimacy with each 
other, by treating themselves and one another as accountable for their conclusions in a manner 
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similar to participants in discourse, the courts further demonstrate institutional awareness, 
‘reciprocally attributing communicative freedom to each other’223  rather than insisting on 
monopolistic authority in their respective interpretive tasks. Further, as seen in Chapter 5, the 
accountability of the ECtHR to domestic judicial concerns, according to one Justice, helps to 
sustain ‘confidence in and respect for the Strasbourg court’224 on the part of the UK judiciary, 
which in turn was deemed integral to the wider legitimacy of the ECtHR within the UK.
 
Likewise, a Strasbourg judge suggested that a key rationale for informal dialogue with national 
judges is that it ‘helps understanding and acceptance when you can really see who the people are 
behind these judgments and you can really share your opinions and your worries and put your 
questions’.225 Equally, the need for the UK courts to maintain the trust of the ECtHR is apparent 
in their presumption that they should interpret Convention rights consistently with its rulings. 
This was not simply a matter of respecting the UK’s international obligations. The reemphasis by 
the UK courts on the common law as the first source of domestic rights protection was said to 
generate a need to ‘make[...] clear to Strasbourg we’re doing it in a way that is coherent and 
consistent with the human rights convention’,226 to show that  they are not ‘antagonistic’227 but 
‘friendly’,228 ‘interested in the Convention and ... want[ing] it to be successful’.229 
Likewise, the critique which each court offers the other, along with their mutual 
willingness to respond to those critiques, appear to deliberately further the potential to build 
wider trust and legitimacy in these institutions. Habermas describes a judicial decision as a 
‘rationally motivated yet fallible result of a process of argumentation that has been interrupted in 
view of institutional pressures to decide’.230 Judges of both courts recognised the potential 
fallibility of their own decision-making during the interviews. For some of the Justices, this 
fallibility was felt to be manifested in occasional complacency about domestic human rights 
standards. For the ECtHR judges, the institutional pressures resulting from its caseload were felt 
to increase the risk of mistakes and inconsistencies in its decision-making. In view of this 
fallibility, both courts thus appear to embrace through dialogue a willingness to both challenge 
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and be challenged, thereby facilitating the detection of ‘mistakes or misunderstandings about 
factual or normative claims’.231  
There is however a more significant dimension to this accountability. Poole observes that 
‘...the opening-up of public decision-making to a kind of ‘legal audit’ reflects and responds to the 
deep-seated mistrust that characterizes the attitude of (modern) citizens to the government and 
fits the concomitant demand that exercises of power must always be open to challenge and 
justification’.232 To this extent, through their dialogue the judges appear to have embraced the 
view that ‘...in political systems where the legitimacy of public power is increasingly measured 
according to the nature and extent to which a public authority is accountable, courts themselves 
have much to gain from engaging in modern accountability practices’.233 Paterson makes a 
similar point where he observes that the various dialogues involved in the decision-making at the 
Supreme Court, including with the ECtHR, contribute to its accountability: ‘both because of the 
transparency which they bring, but also because of the link which they provide to the 
expectations of the wider legal community’.234 
7.2 Guarding the Domestic Legal Order 
The willingness of the UK courts to take on board the conclusions of the ECtHR 
demonstrates their openness to having, as one Justice put it, ‘a mirror shone on [their] 
practices’.235 It suggests a willingness to have challenged any domestic judicial views which, as 
O’Cinneide puts it, might be ‘stagnant, unresponsive or excessively accommodating of 
entrenched assumptions’.236 It can thus counterbalance what some have considered a ‘tendency to 
support the authorities’237  and a ‘restrained and tentative’238 approach to the protection of rights 
by the UK courts, thereby providing domestic rights adjudication with ‘good conscience, 
ensuring that it remains alive, aware and committed to self-improvement’.239  
While this should play an important role in establishing trust in both the UK courts and 
the ECtHR, the legitimacy of the decision-making by UK courts on human rights issues also 
appears to depend on their safeguarding the domestic legal order from unnecessary disruption. In 
this way, trust in the UK courts can be said to turn on their willingness to challenge decisions of 
                                                          
231
 Pérez (n 4) 113 
232
 Thomas Poole, ‘Legitimacy, Rights and Judicial Review’ (2005) 25(4) OJLS 697, 720 
233
 Le Sueur (n 219) 75 
234
 Alan Paterson, Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court (Hart 2013) 308 
235
 Interview with Justice of the UK Supreme Court (London, United Kingdom, 8 July 2014)  
236
 O’Cinneide (n 38) 20 
237
 Gearty, On Fantasy Island (n 10) 121 
238
 Dickson (n 151)  98 
239
 O’Cinneide (n 38) 43 
198 
 
the ECtHR which fail to appreciate the specifics of the domestic legal system. Indeed, as seen in 
Chapters 3 and 4, a recurrent point from the interviews was the need for the UK courts to 
challenge ECtHR decisions which have ‘not been adequately reasoned’.240 Their freedom to 
disagree with such decisions was itself deemed integral to the legitimacy of the Convention 
system: ‘...it gives it flexibility and with flexibility comes greater likelihood of acceptability’.241 
To this extent, it appears that the UK courts seek legitimacy from the act of holding the ECtHR to 
account as guardians of the domestic legal order.  
As seen in Chapters 4 and 5, the judges do so by raising concerns with the formal and 
substantive quality of the Strasbourg jurisprudence through their judgments and meetings. With 
regard to the formal quality of the jurisprudence, the UK courts have used their judgments to 
raise concerns with regards to a range of issues. In Chapter 4, it was seen how they have done so 
in relation to the application of Art.10 ECHR to freedom of information.
242
 Additionally, 
concerns over the clarity and coherence of the Strasbourg jurisprudence have been raised by the 
UK courts in relation to a number of other areas of the Convention: the rule against self-
incrimination (Art.6),
243
 the rule against hearsay evidence (Art.6),
244
 the temporal application of 
Convention rights (arising in respect of the procedural obligation to investigate killings 
(Art.2),
245
 and the extra-territorial application of Convention rights (Art.1),
246
 and the application 
of the right to a review where a detention has taken place following early release (Art.5).
247
 With 
regard to the substantive quality of the Strasbourg jurisprudence, the UK courts have also voiced 
criticism in number of areas, wherever they have deemed the ECtHR to have misunderstood 
domestic law or underappreciated certain arguments, often in the same cases where the perceived 
lack of clarity or coherence in the case law has caused difficulty. In Chapter 4, it was discussed 
how they have done so in respect of the operation of negligence claims under English law 
(Art.6),
248
 the ability of county courts to undertake proportionality analysis in respect of 
possession orders (Art.8),
249
 and the democratic justifications for a domestic ban on televised 
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political advertising (Art.10).
250
 Again, further examples can be added. The UK courts 
challenged the ECtHR’s understanding of courts martial systems in the armed services,251 the 
domestic fair trial safeguards in place for the use of hearsay evidence (Art.6),
252
 the clarity of the 
domestic law on whole life tariffs (Art.3)
253
 and the procedures in place for imprisonment for 
public protection (Art.5).
254
 What is more, as seen in Chapter 5, it is clear that the Justices have 
used their informal dialogue with ECtHR judges to raise concerns directly over certain areas of 
its jurisprudence.  
It must be recalled that a distinct legitimacy challenge allegedly facing the UK courts was 
the perception of undue deference to the views of the ECtHR, an argument made by senior 
politicians and even the judges themselves. In response, the judges appear to have taken on board 
Lord Irvine’s call for an ‘appropriately critical’255 approach to their interactions with the ECtHR 
in order to ‘enhance our courts' own institutional prestige and credibility domestically, both with 
the man in the street and Parliament’.256 By participating in formal and informal judicial 
dialogue, raising concerns with the ECtHR, the UK courts show themselves to be actively 
guarding the domestic constitutional and legal order. Amos suggests that this can enhance the 
legitimacy of their judgments, particularly where their critiques result in a change of approach by 
the ECtHR.
 257
 
7.3 Allaying Domestic Judicial Concerns 
The ECtHR, on the other hand, appears to seek to enhance its legitimacy through 
dialogue with the UK courts by showing its willingness to account for its jurisprudence in the 
face of those domestic judicial concerns. Taking some of the examples mentioned in the previous 
section, the ECtHR directly responded to the criticisms from the UK judiciary concerning a lack 
of clarity or coherence in respect of the jurisprudence on self-incrimination (Art.6),
258
 hearsay 
evidence (Art.6)
259
 and the extra-territorial (Art.1)
260
 and temporal
261
 application of Convention 
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rights, often to the satisfaction of the UK courts.
262
 Likewise, it has shown its willingness to 
respond to allegations of misconstruing domestic law or underappreciating arguments, in respect 
of English negligence,
263
 court martial systems,
264
 safeguards against unfair admissions of 
hearsay evidence in criminal trials,
265
 the democratic justifications for the UK’s ban on televised 
political advertising
266
 and the possibilities for review and release of prisoners serving whole life 
tariffs,
267
 again to the satisfaction of the UK courts, while sometimes rejecting their criticisms.
268
  
 Once again, recalling that the ECtHR can be said to depend for its legitimacy on the 
consent of the national authorities, displaying such accountability to the national courts is likely 
to be beneficial. What is more, given the need for the ECtHR to accord respect to the legal 
traditions of the courts and for the autonomy of their decision-making, the ECtHR judges are 
clearly seeking to demonstrate their willingness to engage with critical arguments raised by the 
UK courts. It could be argued that this additional accountability is particularly important given 
the lack of a separated powers model within the Convention system. Bellamy argues that 
domestic courts are at least ‘indirectly’269 democratically accountable for their decisions ‘be it 
through the selection process of the judges, the influence of public opinion, which can exert 
rather greater sway in the domestic than in the international arena, or – in some jurisdictions – 
because of democratic procedures, such as referenda or a parliamentary vote, that allow court 
decisions to be overridden’.270 Within the Council of Europe machinery, in contrast, 
Nollkaemper observes within the Convention system a ‘lack of a proper political context ...given 
the rather limited role of the Committee of Ministers’.271 In the same vein, Helgesen observes the 
concern that ‘there is no political body which may correct and control the court’.272 It was seen in 
Chapter 4 how this view was shared by a number of the interviewed judges, who considered the 
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ability of the national courts to challenge ECtHR decisions valuable given the lack of an 
equivalent to a domestic legislature within the Convention system. To this extent, the ECtHR 
appears to use its dialogue with national courts to plug this accountability gap and thereby 
compensate for any perceived legitimacy deficits arising from it.
273
  
8. The Legitimising Role of Revision  
 The third discursive feature of judicial dialogue which appears to be geared towards 
legitimising the respective decision-making of the courts is the ongoing revision and refinement 
of arguments. Revision, of course, would not of itself perform a legitimising role. Rather, it 
appears that the judges seek to enhance legitimacy by harnessing their capacities for revision in 
two ways. First, they strive for mutual accommodation, thereby ensuring legitimacy with one 
another. Second, and relatedly, they attempt to improve the quality of the reasoning in their 
judgments, thereby building greater legitimacy both with one another and with their other 
audiences. 
 8.1 Mutual Accommodation  
 It was seen in Chapter 4 that the tension-mitigating function of judicial dialogue 
elucidated from the interviews and case law rests on the willingness of the courts to mutually 
accommodate their respective concerns. If, as discussed earlier, the participation of the courts in 
dialogue enables them to avoid conflict and the legitimacy challenges that go with it, as they 
reach mutual understanding as to the limits of their respective authority, the revision of judicial 
opinions which takes place through dialogue enables them to rectify conflict where it has 
materialised. Judicial dialogue, as seen in Chapters 4 and 5, is aimed at both preventing and 
rectifying conflicts between the courts. Such accommodation can contribute to the legitimacy of 
their decision-making in numerous respects.  
 First, it does so in conjunction with the other legitimising functions of participation and 
accountability explored so far in this chapter. With regards to participation, where one court 
revises its views in order to accommodate the concerns of the other, it gives recognition to their 
authority and to the value of their contribution. Once again, this demonstrates the kind of 
institutional awareness which, according to Maduro, is required of courts under conditions of 
jurisdictional pluralism.
274
 It could be said that when a court revises its own position in light of 
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the critique of another court, it ‘dignifies the opposing arguments’275 even more so than when it 
simply considers them. The revision of positions in this way can give the other court an enhanced 
sense of participation in the interpretive process, potentially strengthening its tendency to accept 
the authority of the other court as legitimate. Again, this is likely to be useful for both courts but 
particularly the ECtHR which depends on the UK courts to a degree for the application of its 
jurisprudence domestically.  
 In terms of accountability, where a court revises its previous conclusions on an issue in 
the face of the critique or insights of the other court, it shows accountability in reason to the force 
of its argument or the relevance of the information which it presents. Recalling Oliver’s 
definition, accountability is not simply a question of whether those with decision-making power 
provide reasons for their actions but also whether they ‘undertake to put matters right if it should 
appear that errors have been made’.276 In this way, as discussed earlier, the willingness of the UK 
courts and the ECtHR to revise their opinions in light of one another’s conclusions has the 
potential to generate trust both between the courts and towards them among other actors. As 
‘both sides work their way toward a mutually satisfactory position on legal issues of common 
concern and impact’,277 they strengthen their relationship and build legitimacy with one another. 
Taking the exchange over access to court and negligence claims against public authorities as an 
example, it was seen in Chapter 4 how the ECtHR in Z and others
278
 adjusted its previous 
conclusion in Osman
279
 in order to accommodate the concerns voiced by the UK courts in 
Barrett
280
 that it had misunderstood the English law on negligence. However, in Barrett the 
House of Lords also departed from its own previous position by accepting the thrust of the 
ECtHR’s view in Osman, albeit inexplicitly,281 that public bodies should not be able to avoid 
liability in negligence. Recalling that the legitimacy of the ECtHR rests on the consent of 
national authorities, which in turn depends on its demonstration of respect for the decision-
making and legal traditions of the national authorities who have the ‘primary responsibility’ for 
the Convention, its accommodation to domestic concerns can be crucial for its legitimacy. For 
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example, had the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in Al-Khawaja
282
chosen to ignore the trenchant 
criticisms of the Supreme Court in Horncastle,
283
 it has been observed that the Court would have 
effectively ‘precipitate[d] a crisis of authority between itself and the UK Supreme Court’.284 By 
accommodating their concerns, however, it avoided the potentially damaging ‘constitutional 
experiment ... [of] seeing whether the English courts would continue to defy’.285 On the contrary, 
Bjorge suggests that ‘...in the longer run the acceptance, sometimes with alacrity, by the 
European Court of such rulings from the national courts is just what is needed to create a sense of 
solidarity between the European and the national courts’.286 
Finally, by revising and accommodating their respective concerns and approaches, the 
courts work to ensure a degree of coherence between their regimes, enabling them to reduce the 
legitimacy challenges arising from contradictory approaches. Judicial dialogue, as seen in 
previous chapters, involves mutual judicial learning in order that both courts are ‘singing from 
the same hymn-sheet’.287 Like Sunstein’s ‘incompletely theorized agreements’,288 whereby 
judges seek agreement at a low level of abstraction to avoid the inevitable conflict which comes 
with appeal to grander theories, ‘[t]he result is a degree of stability and predictability that are 
important virtues for law’.289 The damaging consequences of the courts failing to accommodate 
and the ensuing instability were clear in the exchange over the role of Art.8 ECHR and 
proportionality in dispossession proceedings for social housing. The reticence of the majorities in 
the House of Lords in Qazi,
290
 Kay
291
 and Doherty
292
 to accept the view of the ECtHR that a 
person facing eviction should be able to challenge its proportionality in court created notable 
difficulties at the domestic level, further exacerbated by the sheer volume and variety of judicial 
opinions which were delivered.
293
 The Equality and Human Rights Commission intervened in 
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one of the Strasbourg cases
294
 to complain of the ambiguity at the domestic level, protesting that 
‘certainty of the law [is] required if justice [is] to be secured’.295 It was only when the Supreme 
Court in Pinnock finally accepted that persons facing eviction from social housing should be able 
to challenge its proportionality that these difficulties began to alleviate, albeit with some 
persisting issues of clarity in this area. Where, however, the courts have readily accommodated 
one another, ensuring a degree of coherence between their approaches, it can be argued that they 
have avoided such difficulties.  
 8.2 Enhancing Judicial Reasoning at the Domestic and European Levels 
The second legitimising role of revision is the enhancement of judicial reasoning.  The 
reasoning of judgments, as discussed earlier, is central to their legitimacy. Fredman notes that the 
‘legitimacy and accountability of court decisions depends on the ability of judges to adduce 
reasons for their conclusions which are thorough and persuasive’.296Both the UK courts and the 
ECtHR enjoy significant flexibility with which to revise their previous conclusions, which they 
harness through their interactions with one another to strengthen the reasoning of their decisions. 
In order to be accepted as legitimate, it is perhaps a given that the reasoning of judicial decisions 
needs to be fully informed of the relevant law and affected interests. For Habermas, a legitimate, 
‘rationally acceptable’297 decision is thus one in which ‘all relevant questions, issues, and 
contributions are brought up and processed ... on the basis of the best available information and 
arguments’.298 It is one ‘taken by a well-informed decision maker, having consulted available 
binding and persuasive sources’.299 In this respect, Krisch observes how the flexibility to revise 
opinions affords ‘a greater capacity for learning’300 as decision-makers ‘are better able to respond 
to changes in both circumstances and knowledge’,301 whereas a lack of flexibility can risk 
rendering past decisions static, ‘obsolete or even positively harmful’.302 
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 As seen in Chapter 2, the potential of interactions between judges to enhance judicial 
reasoning in these respects has been observed by a number of authors. Slaughter suggests that 
‘courts sharing their insights with their counterparts ... will be forced to examine their own legal 
systems in comparative perspective, a perspective that often casts features we take for granted 
into sharp relief’.303 Likewise, Pérez argues that ‘courts contrasting their claims with those of 
other courts enhance self-understanding of their respective interpretations, thus permitting them 
to revise these interpretations with added insights’.304  
 The judges appear to harness this potential in at least three respects. First, the possibility, 
and actual instances, of conflict have at times encouraged the courts to revise and strengthen the 
justifications for their positions. Second, the shared insights offered by each court have often 
provided the other with a source of reasoning and authority with which to enhance its own 
conclusions. Third, the UK courts appear to assist the ECtHR in the development of a rationally 
acceptable jurisprudence which is workable across the various legal traditions of the Convention 
system.  
 8.2.1 Enhancing justification through mutual challenge 
MacCormick once observed that dissenting judgments can point out ‘in a strong form the 
very reasons which need to be countered for the justification of the majority to stand up’.305 
Likewise, Lord Kerr has argued that a judicial opinion, ‘in confronting and disposing of an 
opposite view, if it has been done convincingly, will be all the more commanding of acceptance 
as a result’.306 Several Justices in interview considered disagreements between the UK courts and 
the ECtHR to play an analogous role at the inter-institutional level. Indeed, there are examples 
from the case law to suggest that either disagreement or its potential between the courts has led 
them to strengthen the justifications for their decisions.  
In all of the areas mentioned in which the ECtHR has sought to respond to the criticisms 
of the UK courts, it also revised its jurisprudence in order to achieve greater clarity or 
demonstrate an improved understanding of the specifics of domestic law. The exchange between 
the courts over hearsay evidence, however, provides the best demonstration of dialogue’s role in 
enhancing justification. The critique offered by the Supreme Court in Horncastle showed a 
determination and intensity which has since yet to be surpassed in the UK case law. As seen in 
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Chapter 3, one of the Justices explained that the ‘whole point’307 of the case was to convince the 
ECtHR that the Grand Chamber needed to reconsider Al-Khawaja and that it needed to revise the 
Chamber’s conclusions. As Paterson notes, it is clear that the case was ‘written consciously as a 
form of advocacy’.308 In summary, the court criticised the ECtHR for a lack of clarity and 
consistency in its jurisprudence,
309
 for having misunderstood or overlooked numerous 
historical
310
 and current features of domestic law,
311
 for having insufficiently explained the 
underlying premise of its applicable principles
312
 and for failing to consider their practical 
implications.
313
 In support of these conclusions, the Court provided multiple annexes to its 
judgment, including a history of the development of the Strasbourg principles in dispute,
314
 a 
table of comparisons based on Strasbourg decisions to demonstrate parity of outcome between 
the application of domestic law and the relevant Strasbourg case law
315
 in order to strengthen its 
argument that the latter added nothing to the existing domestic protections, and a wealth of case 
law from commonwealth jurisdictions to support its view that it was the ECtHR, and not the UK, 
which was out of step by insisting on an absolute rule against the ‘decisive’ reliance on hearsay 
evidence in criminal trials.
316
 In response, the ECtHR in Al-Khawaja dedicated thirty-one 
paragraphs of its judgment to setting out and directly responding to the domestic judicial 
criticisms.
317
 It clarified the jurisprudence in dispute, the rationale underpinning it
318
 and sought 
to rebut a number of the Supreme Court’s contentions. What is more, the court used twenty-five 
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paragraphs of its judgment to provide its own review of the use of hearsay evidence in common 
law jurisdictions,
319
 which for one commentator ‘does a more careful job than the Supreme Court 
did in its own survey’.320 It thus seems reasonable to conclude, as Redmayne does, that 
‘Horncastle was provocative, and it produced a judgment that is generally more thorough and 
better reasoned than many ECtHR decisions – even Grand Chamber decisions’.321  
8.2.2 Shared insights  
 It is not simply the mutual challenge, however, which appears to encourage the courts to 
revise and strengthen the justification for their views but the jurisprudential insights which each 
is able to offer the other for its own reasoning. The judges, to varying degrees, appear to rely on 
these insights to both develop the content of their own reasoning and support that development as 
a matter of persuasive authority.  
 With regard to the content of their reasoning, a number of the Justices valued the shift in 
the ‘whole way of thinking’322 brought about by their access to the ‘very rich vein’323 of  ECtHR 
jurisprudence and the complacency which it helps the judges to avoid, as seen in Chapter 4. 
Additionally, it was seen in Chapter 5 how informal dialogue allows the judges to discuss the 
content of Convention principles and their practical application, and how the Justices, conscious 
of their common law tendency to ‘try and reconcile every single Strasbourg authority’,324 have 
used the insights from the ECtHR judges in informal dialogue to revise the way that they 
approach the application of ECtHR case law and simplify the task of analysing the jurisprudence. 
Likewise, it was seen in previous chapters how the ECtHR judges emphatically valued the 
contributions of the UK courts. Specifically, the UK courts assist the ECtHR in the way that it 
interprets the Convention as a ‘living instrument’,325 a particularly controversial aspect of its 
interpretive approach. Masterman notes that ‘decisions of State's national courts form a large part 
of the evidence on which the Strasbourg court gauges the ‘present day conditions’ in the light of 
which the Convention is to be interpreted’.326 In this way, domestic courts can provide it with 
support for its development of Convention rights,
327
 adding ‘one more voice in the choir of 
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political and legal actors that give meaning and spell out the implications of what the project is 
all about’.328 Thus, the UK courts provided the ECtHR with support for its development of its 
jurisprudence on the application of Convention rights to the removal of foreign nationals,
329
 the 
burden of proof for deprivations of liberty on mental health grounds,
330
 and the operational duty 
on mental health authorities, arising from the right to life, to guard against the risk of suicide by 
voluntary patients,
331
 among a range of possible examples.
332
 In this way, the judges recognise 
that they may mutually ‘profit’333 from one another’s views. 
 As a matter of authority, the insights which the courts provide for one another allow them 
to reinforce and legitimise their respective views, performing a classic function of comparative 
practice in judicial decision-making.
334
 In such instances, the judicial authority, both legal and 
epistemic, of both courts is harnessed – ‘two courts have given their views on the issue, not just 
one’.335 Helfer and Slaughter suggest that ‘Evidence that a number of judges could reach the 
same conclusion ...could well enhance persuasive power’.336 It provides ‘a simple demonstration 
that others have trodden a similar path’,337 thereby ‘avoid[ing] the appearance of a checkerboard 
of legal principle across jurisdictions’.338 Dothan makes the point that ‘[n]ational courts can 
increase support for the judgments of an international court by issuing judgments that the 
international court can rely on’.339 Thus, in each of those instances explored in the previous 
section, the judgments of the UK courts provided the ECtHR with an additional means of 
legitimising the development of its jurisprudence, reinforcing it with parallel developments by 
the UK judiciary in their interpretation of Convention rights. Likewise, the judgments of the 
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ECtHR can provide what one Justice termed ‘Strasbourg’s blessing’.340 However, as shall be 
explored later, in the current climate of political animosity towards the ECtHR, it appears that the 
UK courts are moving away from reliance on ECtHR judgments as a source of authority with 
which to legitimise their conclusions towards greater reliance on the common law.  
8.2.3 A rationally acceptable European human rights jurisprudence 
Finally, the shared insights and authority which the courts provide for one another 
connects to the third and broader way in which the judges seek to revise and enhance the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence. As discussed earlier, the legitimising force of discourse, according to 
Habermas, depends on the reaching of outcomes which would be rationally acceptable to those 
affected. Applying this thinking to the fundamental rights jurisprudence of the CJEU, Pérez 
argues that dialogue with the national courts enables that court to ‘fashion an interpretation [of 
fundamental rights] that all could rationally agree upon’.341 
The same applies in this context. The insights of the UK courts can assist the ECtHR in 
developing an approach which is ‘woven into the fabrics of established communities’342 and thus 
commanding of acceptance within the UK. Maduro notes that the ‘[t]he legitimacy of a court 
comes from a particular political community and it is based on the values of that polity’.343 Thus, 
for this reason, Weiler argues that the legitimacy of the ECtHR requires it to be ‘simultaneously 
reflective and constitutive of the European constitutional practices and norms’.344 In this vein, 
Amos notes that ‘[t]he general public and their representatives in governments and legislatures 
are far more likely to consider a judgment of the ECtHR legitimate and acceptable if it is 
reflective of their values. And a judgment of the ECtHR is much more likely to meet this 
criterion if it is the result of dialogue with a national court’.345 This thinking appears to be shared 
by the judges. A key motivation for the Justices in their dialogue with the ECtHR is to ensure 
that the latter’s jurisprudence is formulated with sufficient coherence - ‘trying, as we ought to as 
judges, to ensure that the law is clear and coherent’346 – and a full appreciation of the specifics of 
UK law in order for it to be workable within the common law as well as civil law systems which 
make up the ECHR Member States, thereby ‘strengthen[ing] the quality of the European 
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norm’.347 To this extent, the judges appear to be utilising judicial dialogue as ‘a means to reach 
better-reasoned outcomes for the community as a whole’,348  their interactions providing 
‘opportunities for the development of a richer, more integrative common European 
Constitutional tradition that embraces constitutional diversity’.349 
9. The Wider Legitimacy Strategies 
The chapter has examined the three discursive features of judicial dialogue between the UK 
courts and the ECtHR which appear to be strategically driven towards enhancing the legitimacy 
of their respective decision-making. Viewing their dialogue across a wider canvass, its role 
appears to connect to two general legitimacy strategies currently pursued by the UK courts and 
the ECtHR. These two strategies, running parallel to one another, are the enhancement of 
subsidiarity, adopted by the ECtHR, and the enhancement of domestic judicial autonomy in 
rights adjudication, adopted by the UK courts, both of which can be explained by the legitimacy 
challenges outlined in the early part of this chapter.  
 9.1 The ECtHR and the ‘Fundamental Principle’ of Subsidiarity 
 The emergence of dialogue between the UK courts and the ECtHR has taken place 
against the backdrop of significant reforms at the ECtHR. These have aimed to reduce the 
backlog of cases at the ECtHR and have repeatedly emphasised the strengthening the principle of 
subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation in the Convention system as means of achieving this. 
The ‘fundamental principle’350 of subsidiarity was encountered in Chapter 5 where it was shown 
that its enhancement was a central part of informal dialogue between the ECtHR and national 
courts. The principle states that the ‘primary responsibility’351 for the protection of Convention 
rights is with the national authorities while ‘the Convention system is subsidiary to the 
safeguarding of human rights at national level’.352 This reflects the long-standing view of the 
ECtHR that ‘national authorities are in principle better placed than an international court to 
evaluate local needs and conditions’353 in the determination of Convention rights. The related 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation can be considered a ‘doctrine of judicial deference’354 
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which the ECtHR will apply to the decisions of national authorities in areas lacking a clear 
European consensus as to the requirements or balancing of certain rights. It is used in recognition 
of the view that where ‘it is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Contracting 
States a uniform European conception of morals’,355 the national authorities are better-placed to 
determine the content of those requirements [b]y reason of their direct and continuous contact 
with the vital forces of their countries’.356 In this respect, Elliott observes that ‘the margin of 
appreciation doctrine may predispose Strasbourg to accept a domestic court’s view, particularly 
if the matter is one that is not straightforwardly covered by existing jurisprudence’.357 
 The respective Interlaken and Izmir Conferences of 2010 and 2011, the UK-led Brighton 
Conference 2012 and the Brussels Conference 2016 on the future of the ECHR system repeatedly 
stressed that the role of the ECtHR within the system was subsidiary to national authorities, in 
particular the national courts.
358
 The Brighton Conference in particular [w]elcome[d] the 
development by the Court in its case law of principles such as subsidiarity and the margin of 
appreciation, and encourage[d] the Court to give great prominence to and apply consistently 
these principles in its judgments’.359 The Brighton Conference recommended ‘for reasons of 
transparency and accessibility’360 a formal elevation of subsidiarity and the margin of 
appreciation into the preamble of the ECHR itself. Protocol 15 to the Convention, drafted in the 
follow-up, inserts both concepts into the preamble.
361
 This was considered a means of reducing 
the backlog. Additionally, it was a response to the concerns that the court had intervened too 
readily in domestic decision-making, a key legitimacy challenge discussed at the outset of this 
chapter.   
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 As a wider legitimacy strategy, it has been said that strengthening the observance of these 
principles by the ECtHR ‘lends more legitimacy to the Convention because it allows for an 
expanding, living document but does so in a way that ensures that the primary moves are made 
by the domestic elements of Member States and not a transnational juridical body’.362 To this 
extent, judicial dialogue reflects a wider effort to legitimise the ECtHR through a significantly 
strengthened role for national courts within the Convention system. Masterman notes that it 
‘demonstrates the principle of subsidiarity operating in practice and illustrates that national 
authorities can – and do – play a decisive role in shaping the content of the Convention case 
law’.363 This is perhaps another reason why Bjorge argues that the national courts must play their 
part as the ‘faithful trustees of the Convention rights’,364 acting as ‘the prime movers, willing to 
take a lead both in the development and the further realization of the Convention rights’. 365In his 
view, ‘only if that domestic application is faithfully loyal to the hilt can the European Court play 
the subsidiary role which it was always intended to play, one in which the European Court no 
more than completes the system that is the larger construction of fundamental rights 
protection’.366 
 9.2 Domestic Judicial Autonomy in Rights Adjudication 
 For the UK courts, dialogue with the ECtHR can be considered one aspect of a broader, 
parallel legitimising strategy based on the assertion of domestic judicial autonomy in human 
rights adjudication. This would appear to be a direct response to the two particular legitimacy 
challenges confronting the UK courts: the perceived deference to the ECtHR and the alleged lack 
of rights ‘ownership’ of the rights under the HRA.  Like the efforts to enhance subsidiarity within 
the Convention system, it is a strategy predicated on strengthening the role of national courts. 
This strategy is reflected in two distinct developments: the ability of the UK courts to disagree 
with the ECtHR, and the ‘resurgent’ common law, as discussed in Chapter 4.  
 With regard to the ability of the UK courts to disagree with the ECtHR, Horncastle once 
again merits closer attention. It must be recalled that the refusal of the Supreme Court in that case 
to apply the ECtHR’s Al-Khawaja judgment was not the first time that the UK courts had 
expressed concerns with the ‘sole or decisive’ test. As discussed earlier, the House of Lords in 
AF (No 3), despite having a variety of concerns over the principle, accepted out of a sense of 
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obligation that the right to a fair trial would be violated where a person suspected of terrorist 
offences was subject to control orders on the ‘sole or decisive’ basis of evidence obtained 
through closed material procedures. To this extent, it is arguable that the ‘sole or decisive’ test 
had become totemic of the deference of the UK courts to the judgments of the ECtHR for which 
the UK courts endured much criticism. Viewed in this way, the refusal by the UKSC to apply the 
same test in a different area of Art.6 jurisprudence amounted to a highly symbolic reassertion of 
domestic judicial autonomy over human rights questions. Indeed, Murphy observes that ‘the 
resistance to Al-Khawaja was not solely the result of normative objections’367 but served ‘a 
strategic function ...to assert the autonomy of domestic law and the authority of the Supreme 
Court in interpreting it’.368 Likewise, Gearty notes that Horncastle, only the fourteenth case to be 
handed down by the newly-established Supreme Court, presented an ‘opportunity ...to redefine 
the relationship with Strasbourg along the lines originally intended’.369 The resulting judgment, 
unanimous among its seven-strong bench and delivered with ‘one voice’370 through the Court’s 
President, Lord Phillips, served to shatter the image of the UK judges as ‘servants of a higher 
judicial power’371 and effectively declared ‘a new, more equal partnership’372 with the ECtHR.  
  Two significant decisions subsequent to Horncastle have continued this trend. The Court 
of Appeal in McLoughlin
373
 and Supreme Court in Haney
374
 respectively reached conclusions 
which directly contradicted key aspects of Strasbourg case law. The former judgment rejected the 
view of the Grand Chamber in Vinter
375
 that English law failed to provide sufficiently clear 
possibilities for the review and release of prisoners serving whole life tariffs to ensure that the 
right not to suffer inhuman or degrading treatment under Art.3 ECHR would not be breached. 
The latter judgment rejected the conclusion of the ECtHR in James
376
 that the detention of 
prisoners for public protection will be arbitrary and contrary to Art.5(1) ECHR following the 
expiry of their tariff if they have not been provided with rehabilitative assistance and the 
opportunity to demonstrate their eligibility for release. Thus, as the Justices observed in 
interview, Horncastle marked a distinct shift in the way that the UK courts approach the 
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Strasbourg jurisprudence, characterised by ‘more confidence’377 and a ‘greater willingness’378 to 
accept that they may take different views to the ECtHR. Clearly, the ‘Horncastle turn’379 reflects 
‘a new mood of ...calm co-responsibility’380 among the UK courts in their relationship with the 
ECtHR. In this respect, to paraphrase Lord Irvine, they appear to be concertedly acting as 
autonomous institutions.
381
 They have taken steps to counter the perception that ‘the law 
is ...driven by decisions of the Strasbourg court’382 and thereby sought to allay the ‘fears and 
resentments’383 which Lord Justice Laws was concerned would arise from the view that the UK 
courts are merely giving effect to the views of the ECtHR. No longer are they ‘merely agents or 
delegates of the ECHR’,384 ‘Strasbourg surrogate[s]’385 or even the ‘Strasbourgeoisie’.386 
 If the ‘Horncastle turn’ has served to demonstrate the autonomy of the UK courts in the 
way that they approach Convention rights, the ‘resurgent’ common law has served to further 
distinguish their decision-making from the ECtHR. Masterman and Wheatle observe that the 
reassertion of the common law as the first source of law in domestic human rights adjudication is 
‘analogous to a domestically developed presumption in favour of subsidiarity, which allocates 
decision-making first to the local level and only moves to more centralised decision-making as a 
secondary step’.387 Here, however, ‘it is the substantive law, rather than the institution that takes 
centre stage’,388 as the turn to the common law ‘evinces preference for domestic mechanisms and 
domestic legal sources over law with a more European heritage’.389  
 As well as reflecting a domestic presumption of subsidiarity, this turn to the common law 
arguably reflects a renewed effort by the UK courts at traditional legitimation in response to the 
attacks on the legitimacy of the ECtHR whose decisions have been so central to their own 
decision-making under the HRA. Weber argued that legitimacy based on tradition derives from 
‘established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising 
authority under them’390 or ‘acceptance of authority merely because it is regarded as long 
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established’.391 The turn to the common law in this way has the potential to harness a number of 
legitimacy benefits, observed by O’Cinneide. Because it ‘prioritise[s] the value of articulating 
rights in “home-grown” constitutional language’,392 it has the advantage of being ‘rooted in the 
organic legal and constitutional culture’,393 allowing the rights articulated to ‘become more 
deeply rooted in legal culture and popular esteem’.394 This can increase the likelihood of ‘a more 
welcoming response by politicians, the national media, the judiciary and the public at large than 
the application of disconnected and apparently abstract cosmopolitan standards’.395 Indeed, it was 
seen in Chapter 4 how the resurgent common law was considered by a number of Justices as a 
useful tool of combating the view that human rights lack legitimacy as a ‘foreign-imposed legal 
system’396 by giving the principles a ‘domestic law root’.397 This is echoed by Lord Justice Laws, 
who has stressed the importance of both judicial autonomy and ownership of human rights in the 
UK to their legitimacy: ‘if we can make the law of human rights truly our own, perceived and 
rightly perceived as a construct of English law, we shall quell these fears of the incoming tide ... 
and at the same time keep control of the proper place of human rights’.398 
 In these ways, the UK courts have offered a response to the legitimacy challenges arising 
from the perceived deference to the ECtHR and the perceived lack of ‘ownership’ of human 
rights in the UK under the HRA.  Linked as these challenges are to the HRA itself, the courts 
have gone some way to appeasing the clamour for that Act to be replaced, offering a ‘partial 
rejoinder to calls for a UK Bill of Rights’399  and conveying the impression that ‘the Act has been 
dispensed with before it has been repealed’.400 Poole’s observation in 2005 may have therefore 
proven well-founded: ‘It may also be the case ... that judges are now beginning to feel more 
keenly on the back of their necks, as it were, the clammy breath of a critical public. If so, they 
may well begin to appeal in their judgments more openly and directly to an audience of sceptics 
(real or imagined)’.401 
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10. Conclusion 
Both the UK courts and the ECtHR face challenges to the legitimacy of their adjudication on 
human rights. This chapter has examined how the judicial dialogue which has arisen between 
them responds to those challenges. In response to the common legitimacy challenges presented 
by the jurisdictional pluralism which defines their relationship, the rule of law difficulties 
associated with that pluralism, along with the distinct challenges faced by the respective courts, it 
has argued that judicial dialogue embodies three features of discourse with the potential to 
enhance legitimacy: the mutual participation of the courts in the jurisprudential development of 
the Convention rights, mutual accountability in reason, and the ongoing revision of refinement of 
arguments, each playing distinct and yet overlapping legitimising functions.  
 The participatory aspect of dialogue, by which each court is able to give its views on an 
issue both formally through judgments and informally through meetings, and have those views 
considered by the other court in turn, has a number of implications. The courts demonstrate 
institutional awareness or judicial civility towards one another, showing appreciation for the 
authority and role of each and a degree of caution and consideration in their shared interpretive 
space, thereby ensuring legitimacy with one another.  Further, through their mutual consideration 
the courts prevent conflict through reaching an understanding of the limits of their respective 
roles, allowing them to avoid the legitimacy challenges arising from conflicting approaches. 
Their joint participation allows them to reach shared interpretive outcomes which are acceptable 
to both.  
 The accountability function of judicial dialogue between these courts, by which each 
court considers itself and the other as accountable in certain respects for the claims which they 
make, complements participation and also provides distinct sources of additional legitimacy. It 
can enhance trust both between the institutions – again through showing institutional awareness 
and judicial civility – and on the part of other key constituents with whom the courts have a 
relationship. More importantly, the accountability expected of the ECtHR to the UK courts in 
their dialogue appears to have a parallel legitimising role. On the one hand, the UK courts are 
seen to be holding the ECtHR to account for the quality of its reasoning, particularly where it is 
felt to have misunderstood domestic law. Considering that a legitimacy challenge facing the UK 
courts was the perception of an uncritical deference to the views of the ECtHR, this is likely to 
enhance greater trust and thus legitimacy in the UK courts on the part of domestic audiences as 
they fulfil their role as guardians of the domestic constitutional order. At the same time, where 
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the ECtHR responds explicitly to such concerns, it demonstrates its commitment to taking on 
board national judicial concerns, showing respect to the views of national decision-makers and 
acknowledging the limits of its role.  
 The ongoing revision and refinement of arguments, whereby each court revises its views 
in response to the new arguments and information presented by the other, appears to again both 
reinforce and add further, distinct sources of legitimacy. Through such revision, the courts have 
been able mutually accommodate one another. This accommodation works in conjunction with 
participation and accountability, as each court shows institutional awareness and also seeks to 
rectify conflict where it has manifested through judgments. What is more, through their 
accommodation the courts try to ensure a degree of coherence between their respective 
approaches, again avoiding the compliance difficulties created by conflicting views. Aside from 
mutual accommodation, the possibilities for mutual challenge have at times prompted the courts 
to strengthen the justifications for their decisions, further contributing to the legitimacy of the 
courts in respect of one another and other key constituents to their decisions. Their shared 
insights have mutually assisted the development of their respective positions in terms of 
reasoning and authority, their agreements reinforcing their conclusions and harnessing greater 
legitimacy for both. This range of legitimising functions perhaps further explains why judicial 
dialogue between the courts is considered part of the broader, long-term effort to ‘secure the 
viability of the European Court’s role in the system for protecting and promoting human rights 
across Europe’.402 
 Viewed in their wider context, the legitimising roles of judicial dialogue are emblematic 
of two broader and adjacent legitimation strategies adopted by the courts in recent years: the 
move to enhance subsidiarity within the Convention system and the effort to strengthen domestic 
judicial autonomy and identity in domestic rights adjudication. The former strategy can be 
considered an attempt to instil greater democratic legitimacy into the Convention system in 
response to the concerns that the ECtHR has intervened too readily into the decision-making of 
national authorities, both political and judicial. The latter arguably reflects the broader response 
of the UK courts to the concerns that they had shown undue deference to the views of the ECtHR 
at the expense of their own opinions and the development of the common law. Both strategies, 
however, appear to serve the same broad end: legitimising the Convention system through 
enhancing the role of national courts. Thus, it would appear that the courts harness the discursive 
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features of dialogue as a source of legitimacy not in isolation but in the soil of these wider 
attempts to legitimise their decision-making on Convention rights. 
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Chapter 7  
Legitimacy and its Limits  
The protection of human rights is our common cause in Europe, and, for judges 
particularly, our common task. In performing it, the dialogue between us is a 
necessity, a corrective and an incentive. With the existing means for that 
dialogue, along with those anticipated though yet to materialize, the conditions 
are surely right to improve further the observance of the Convention. For me, 
judicial dialogue is the key – indeed, the golden key – to that desirable future for 
the protection of human rights in Europe.
1
 
- Dean Spielmann, former President of the European Court of Human Rights 
1. Overview 
This thesis has explored the judicial ‘dialogue’ that has become a central feature of the 
relationship between the UK courts and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The 
conclusion offered is that this concept and its associated practices have not arisen in a vacuum 
but in response to direct challenges to the legitimacy of judicial decision-making on human rights 
at both the domestic and European levels.  
 This final chapter has four parts. First, it offers a summary of the conclusions drawn 
throughout the thesis. Second, the chapter offers a normative critique of judicial dialogue 
between these courts.  While the thesis has argued that dialogue between these courts has a 
legitimising role, this chapter qualifies that view with a cautionary note about the potential of a 
particular manifestation of formal judicial dialogue – open disagreement by national courts with 
judgments of the ECtHR – to delegitimise the Convention system by cultivating a disposition to 
disobey on the part of national courts across the Council of Europe. The third part of the chapter 
looks to the future of the relationship between the UK courts and the ECtHR in light of recent 
developments, and the fourth part offers the final thoughts on the conclusions. 
2. A Summary of the Conclusions 
The thesis began by noting the rise to prominence of the concept of ‘dialogue’ within the case 
law of the UK courts against the historical background of their relationship with the ECtHR. 
Prior to 1997, it was noted, the UK courts had little to say to the ECtHR, either through their 
judgments or directly.  The Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998, however, transformed their 
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relationship: its enactment marked the end of a domestic ‘judicial silence’2 on the interpretation 
of Convention rights and the beginning of a dynamic and interactive relationship based on 
‘dialogue’. Through their respective judgments, and, since 2006, through informal meetings, the 
judges of these courts have been exchanging views on the interpretation of Convention rights and 
their application to UK law. This ‘dialogue’ was not merely an academic label, however: the UK 
courts explicitly invoked the concept as part of their judgments. Following the establishment of 
the UK Supreme Court, it became the byword for the relationship between the courts, drawn 
upon and developed across a significant number of Supreme Court decisions and praised by 
senior UK and ECtHR judges of past and present alike.  
 The introductory chapter noted, however, the puzzle of judicial ‘dialogue’: how its 
popularity as a concept within the academic and judicial commentary was coupled by differences 
of view as to its form and functions. UK and ECtHR judges used the term to connote different 
types of interaction between their courts: citation, agreement, disagreement, and influence in 
either or both directions. It was noted that the invoking of the concept of dialogue in the case law 
of the UK Supreme Court, however, appeared to have a contextual significance. Both the UK 
courts and the ECtHR had been confronted with challenges to the legitimacy of their decision-
making on human rights. The ECtHR was criticised for an allegedly excessive and undemocratic 
influence in the UK, facilitated by the UK courts which accorded undue deference to its views. 
Against this background, it was striking that ‘dialogue’ had been frequently drawn upon as a 
means of legitimising particular inter-institutional relationships, particularly as a retort to the 
long-standing counter-majoritarian critique of judicial review of democratically enacted 
legislation. The UK courts, it was noted, are not the first to have been allured by this concept: it 
has featured prominently in the case law of the Canadian courts as a way of justifying their 
relationship with the legislature. The UK Supreme Court’s seduction, of course, was not in 
relation to Parliament but in its relationship to the ECtHR. The phenomenon, however, appeared 
similar: judges drawing explicitly upon the idea of ‘dialogue’ as a riposte to contentions of an 
over-concentration of judicial power.  
 Thus, the thesis sought to explore whether and, to what extent, the judges may have used 
this concept and the practices associated with it as a means of legitimising their judgments. It set 
about this task by asking four questions. First, what is judicial dialogue in the context of the 
decision-making of the UK courts and the ECtHR? Second, what are its functions? Third, what is 
the role of the informal dialogue between these courts? Fourth, what is the role of the dialogue in 
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legitimising the judgments of the UK courts and the ECtHR? In order to answer these questions, 
this thesis took a novel approach to the study of this topic. It focused on how the judges involved 
understand the nature of the ‘dialogue’ between their courts and the functions which they 
attribute to it. In Chapter 2, it was noted that the debates had focused primarily on how the UK 
courts should approach their duty under s.2 HRA to ‘take into account’ the judgments of the 
ECtHR. Less attention had been paid to the judicial meaning and intention behind the turn to 
dialogue. It thus made the case for a qualitative interview-based study with the judges. Several 
previous studies had applied the same logic; none, however, have focused exclusively on the 
dialogue between these courts.  
 Each of the research questions was explored in the four subsequent chapters. The first 
question was addressed in Chapter 3. There, it was seen how judicial dialogue between the UK 
courts and the ECtHR is considered by the judges to take place through two mediums: the 
judgments of the courts (‘formal’ judicial dialogue) and face-to-face meetings (‘informal’ 
judicial dialogue). It concluded that while formal dialogue eludes precise definition, it could be 
understood as a process by which the courts, subject to practical and normative constraints, 
exchange views and seek to influence one another through their respective judgments, relying on 
judicial diplomacy to this end. Further, there was a consensus among the interviewed judges that 
this form of ‘dialogue’ refers to the situation where a national court uses its judgments to express 
concern or disagreement with a judgment of the ECtHR. However, to varying degrees the judges 
also perceived dialogue as the reciprocal influences at work in their relationship: each side being 
influenced by and, in turn, influencing the other. It was seen how the term also embodies certain 
shared expectations which the courts have of one another. Each is expected to listen attentively to 
the conclusions of the other and to explain its reasoning in reply, particularly where it disagrees. 
Critiques by either side are expected to prompt review and possible revision by the other court at 
the next opportunity. Further, there is a shared view that a Grand Chamber judgment should 
ordinarily mark the end of a conflictual dialogue. To this extent, ‘dialogue’ does not appear to be 
one of Lord Sumption’s ‘meaningless slogans’,3 discussed in the introductory chapter, but a term 
which captures the shared normative expectations of the judges involved.  
 Chapter 4 explored the second question, concerning the functions which the judges 
attribute to the dialogue taking place between their courts through their judgments. At the 
broadest level, dialogue appears to encompass the shared role of the courts in applying and 
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upholding fundamental rights in coordination with one another. A more specific purpose that 
emerged from the interviews, however, is the mitigation of tensions between the courts arising 
from their overlapping jurisdictions, differences of institutional perspective and legal tradition. 
For the Justices, these tensions manifest in three ways: in the clarity and coherence of the ECtHR 
case law, its substantive understanding of UK law and the common law system, and issues of 
judicial identity. By exchanging views and seeking to influence the ECtHR through their 
judgments, however, it was felt that the courts can address these tensions in various ways. First, 
the ability of each side to disagree with the other was deemed to be an important check in their 
relationship. The ECtHR, on the one hand, was valued by some of the Justices as a guard against 
domestic judicial complacency in human rights standards. The ability of the UK courts to 
disagree with ECtHR, on the other hand, was felt to provide an additional source of flexibility to 
the Convention system. Second, it was felt that it can lead to improved clarity and coherence in 
the relevant principles and, third, enhance the substantive quality of those principles. The 
judgments of the UK courts were felt to allow the judges to signal concerns and disagreement to 
the ECtHR, or offer contributions in areas lacking Strasbourg case law, in order to encourage it 
to develop its jurisprudence in ways that mitigate either existing or potential sources of difficulty. 
Fourth, the types of judgments which the Justices associated with their dialogue with the ECtHR 
appeared to have a bolstering effect upon their sense of judicial identity as they assert their 
willingness to reach their own conclusions on the interpretation of Convention rights. Placing 
these insights into their wider context, formal dialogue connected with another development in 
the domestic judicial context: the resurgent common law. Greater reliance on the common law 
was felt to mitigate against the difficulties brought about by unclear or incoherent Strasbourg 
jurisprudence by providing an alternative source of law with which to resolve human rights 
claims. Likewise, it was felt to contain valuable substantive insights which might further 
contribute to the development of the Convention rights by the ECtHR, and clearly gave renewed 
vigour to some of the Justices’ sense of judicial identity. Even more interestingly, both dialogue 
and the turn to the common law as a source of fundamental rights protection appeared to be 
inspired by strategic thinking on the part of the judges. Both were considered means of 
combating the view that human rights are a foreign imposition in the UK.   
 Chapter 5 addressed the third question, concerning the role of informal dialogue between 
the courts. It concluded that the value of this interaction – often praised by the participating 
judges but rarely discussed in any depth – plays an important, albeit subtle role in the relationship 
between these courts. It performs procedural, substantive and diplomatic functions, each of 
which can contribute to enhancing a relationship of subsidiarity between the courts. Procedurally, 
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the meetings allow the national judges to participate in the ongoing process of developing the 
Convention rights at the supranational level. Further, they provide an accountability forum where 
the ECtHR jurisprudence gives rise to domestic judicial concern. Substantively, they are valued 
for improving the judges’ respective understandings of Convention law and its practical 
application, the UK legal system, judgment-writing and even shared legal resource needs. 
Perhaps the most significant, however, are the diplomatic functions of preserving mutual respect 
and receptivity between the courts. It was seen how the judges value these opportunities to clear 
any false perceptions between them. In particular, some of the UK judges in particular valued the 
chance to distance themselves from political currents which could otherwise prove damaging to 
the relationship between the courts. Judges of both courts are eager to ensure receptivity on the 
part of the other to their views. For the ECtHR judges, the meetings performed an important 
legitimising function: by allowing national judges to raise their questions and concerns, the 
interactions were deemed to promote compliance with ECtHR judgments.   
 In Chapter 6, the thesis explored the fourth research question, concerning the legitimising 
role of dialogue between these courts. Synthesising the findings from the previous chapters with 
insights from legal and political theory, it concluded that both forms of dialogue embody three 
features of discourse – mutual participation, mutual accountability and the ongoing revision and 
refinement of arguments – each performing legitimising functions in response to the particular 
challenges facing the courts. The participatory aspect of their interactions, by which each court is 
able to state its views and have those views considered by the other, serves to demonstrate 
institutional awareness, aid conflict avoidance and contribute to the production of co-created 
interpretive solutions. The accountability dimension can enhance trust both between the courts 
and towards them on the part of domestic audiences, as each shows its openness to judicial 
critique, the UK courts fulfil their role as guardians of the domestic legal order and the ECtHR 
demonstrates its receptivity to domestic concerns.  
 Finally, through their ongoing revision of arguments the two courts mutually 
accommodate, showing institutional awareness and accountability towards one another and 
reducing incoherence between their positions and the legitimacy challenges that come with it. 
The revision of their respective positions through dialogue also encourages mutual enhancement 
of judicial reasoning, as conflict or its prospect prompts each to strengthen the justification for its 
decisions, the shared insights provide an additional source of insight and authority with which 
each can enhance its decisions, and the UK courts assist the ECtHR in building a jurisprudence 
with the quality of rational acceptability, logically justifiable within the framework of Europe’s 
diverse national legal systems. Viewed in the wider context, the role of dialogue between these 
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courts is an elemental part of two wider legitimacy strategies pursued by the respective courts: 
for the UK courts, the strengthening of domestic judicial autonomy and identity in fundamental 
rights adjudication; for the ECtHR, the enhancement of subsidiarity.  
3. New Legitimacy Challenges: Risking a Disposition to Disobey 
 3.1 Delegitimising through Dialogue 
 The focus of this thesis has been the legitimising role of dialogue between the UK courts 
and the ECtHR. To that end, it has argued that judicial dialogue has a legitimising role to play, in 
all of the ways explored in Chapter 6. Legitimacy, however, is always ‘relative’4 or 
‘particularistic’5 – ascribed ‘only from some particular perspective’.6 Thus, a court might be 
‘regarded as legitimate in the eyes of some constituencies and illegitimate in the eyes of others’.7 
Moran observes:  
The multiple audiences that the performance of judicial authority may engage 
will bring a variety of expectations and assumptions to the performance and 
evaluate it accordingly. So the same performance of judicial authority may 
generate different reactions from different audiences. These may range from 
respect, recognition, awe and compliance to incomprehension, confusion, 
derision, alienation, to name but a few.
8
 
Thus, judicial dialogue between the UK courts and the ECtHR might well carry the potential to 
legitimise the respective judgments of these courts. Nonetheless, as implied by Moran’s 
observation, what builds legitimacy among one audience may deplete it with another.  
 It is particularly necessary to ask whether judicial dialogue carries a delegitimising 
potential for the Convention system through the cultivation of a ‘disposition to disobedience’ on 
the part of national authorities within Europe. This concern relates to those cases where the UK 
courts have not only criticised an ECtHR judgment but refused to apply key aspects of the 
reasoning. Recalling that legitimacy is partly reflected in compliance with authority – the 
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‘disposition to obey’9 on the part of the governed – and that such compliance, as a measure of a 
court’s effectiveness, is in turn likely to influence belief in a court’s legitimacy, there is a 
growing anxiousness that the willingness of the UK courts to refuse to follow decisions of the 
ECtHR in the interests of stimulating a dialogue will encourage others to do the same, generating 
a loss of legitimacy. Føllesdal et al note that ‘whether a subject is morally obligated and 
motivated to comply may depend on whether the agent has reason to believe that others will also 
endorse the norm, for instance because they regard it as legitimate, for whatever reason’.10  For 
this reason, it has been observed of the ECtHR that, ‘[u]ndoubtedly, non-compliance with its 
judgments is a blow for the Court’s legitimacy’.11 The concern that this type of dialogue could 
cultivate a disposition to disobey is summarised by Bjorge:  ‘...the Supreme Court represents one 
of nearly 50 Member States. If the other courts of Europe were to take a leaf out of the Supreme 
Court's book, the result could be a very chaotic situation indeed’.12 The same is articulated by 
Draghici:  
From a systemic perspective, if each domestic judicature asserted its competence 
to challenge the interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights on the 
basis of its alleged inconsistency with national practices, the authority of the 
Strasbourg Court would be undermined...
13
 
The concern is felt to be heightened due to the UK’s high standing within the ECHR system and 
the loyalty which has been displayed by its courts in applying the Strasbourg jurisprudence. It is 
thought that other courts across the Council of Europe may ask themselves, ‘If so august a body 
as the UK Supreme Court can dispense at will with Strasbourg decisions then why should we not 
do the same?’.14 Indeed, it has been observed that the Russian Constitutional Court has protested 
that cases involving ECtHR case law can be resolved only through ‘dialogue’ rather than 
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‘subordination’, and that such dialogue derives from ‘the ECtHR’s respect towards national 
constitutional identity’.15 However, Dzehtsiarou et al warn that ‘[o]ne should not be misled ... 
The truth behind this word play is plain: no dialogue, no trade-offs, and no respect to 
international obligations’.16 
 Compounding this is the concern that the disposition to obey the ECtHR might be 
weakened by the degree to which the Court appears to revise its jurisprudence in order to 
accommodate UK judicial concerns. It was observed in the previous chapter how a legitimacy 
challenge facing the ECtHR is the need to convey the impression that it is acting on the basis of 
law and not discretion while at the same time showing respect to national decision-makers in the 
execution of their primary responsibility for the Convention rights. The concern is that, to the 
extent that the ECtHR appears to change its approach on the basis of discretion, the less inclined 
those subject to its judgments might be to accept them as legitimate exercises of legal 
interpretation. This pull from different directions has at times placed the reasoning of ECtHR 
judgments under strain. Two features of judicial dialogue (in the form of disagreement by the 
national courts) in particular appear to undermine this effort to maintain the guise of law over 
discretion: the reasoning of the court where it has revised its approach and the salience seemingly 
given to the political animosity towards the ECtHR in the UK at the time of key decisions. Three 
ECtHR judgments are particularly instructive here: Al-Khawaja
17
 on hearsay evidence and fair 
trials (Art.6 ECHR), Animal Defenders International (ADI)
18
 on political advertising and 
freedom of expression (Art.10 ECHR), and Hutchinson
19
 on whole life tariffs and the right not to 
suffer inhuman or degrading treatment (Art.3 ECHR).  
 3.2 Reasoning under Strain 
 It was discussed in Chapter 6 how dialogue sees the courts revising their positions in 
order to mutually accommodate one another and enhance the quality of their reasoning. The 
revisions made by the ECtHR, however, have at times manifested in jarring shifts either within 
the reasoning of particular judgments or against the grain of its well-established case law. On 
hearsay evidence, for example, despite the thoroughness of the judgment itself, several 
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commentators have noted a peculiar shift within the reasoning of the Grand Chamber in its Al-
Khawaja decision in response to the Supreme Court’s Horncastle20 critique, varying from a 
thorough rebuttal of the criticisms of its jurisprudence to a concession that said jurisprudence 
should be modified. Hoyano argues that the Grand Chamber’s judgment initially suggests a 
refusal ‘to remove its tanks from the UK Supreme Court’s lawn’21 only to reach a conclusion 
which reveals said tanks ‘to be constructed from papier mâché’.22 Likewise, Redmayne observes 
‘an abrupt gear change in the judgment, as the Court switches from a seemingly unbending 
response to Horncastle to an acknowledgment that the sole or decisive rule is not absolute’.23  
 Further, in order to accommodate domestic judicial and political concerns, the court has 
at times had to produce jurisprudentially novel reasoning which appears to contradict established 
trends within the case law already accepted by other ECHR member states, placing a strain on 
the rule of law requirement of equality before the law.  In respect of the jurisprudence on Art.6 
and hearsay evidence, Judge Sajó and Judge Karakaş in their dissenting opinion to Al-Khawaja 
expressed concern over the novelty of the term ‘overall examination’24 which the majority had 
introduced in the context of Art.6. In their view, the sole or decisive principle consistently applied 
by the court as a ‘bright line’25 was ‘abandoned in the name of an overall examination of 
fairness’.26  While emphasising the importance of ‘bona fide dialogue’27 with national courts, the 
two judges felt that the Court, ‘in the absence of a specific new and compelling reason, has 
diminished the level of protection... a matter of gravest concern for the future of the judicial 
protection of human rights in Europe’.28  
 This concern is shared by Hoyano, who argues that the insistence by the ECtHR that it 
had ‘always’29 approached Art.6 as a question of overall fairness was inaccurate.30 The shift was 
even more puzzling to many given the prior acceptance of the jurisprudence in this area both 
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within the UK and across Europe. The ECtHR position was accepted without question in a 
unanimous decision of the House of Lords in respect of the admissibility of anonymous witness 
evidence in R v Davis,
31
 with Lord Bingham stating that the same sole or decisive test – which 
later came under such heavy judicial fire in Horncastle – reflected ‘the view traditionally taken 
by the common law of England’.32 What is more, it has been noted that prior to Horncastle no 
other government in the Council of Europe had ever complained of the jurisprudence in this 
area.
33
 All the same, ‘judicial dialogue ...in this instance helped ratchet down the right of 
confrontation under both domestic and European law’.34  
The dialogue over the compatibility of a ban on political advertising and the right to 
freedom of expression is observed to have generated similar contradictions. The ECtHR’s 
conclusion in ADI that the UK’s ban did not breach Art.10, reached on the basis of the ‘exacting 
and pertinent’35 analysis of the issues raised for the Convention rights conducted by both the UK 
Parliament and courts,
36
 was made possible by categorising the ban in the UK as a ‘general 
measure’37 – a term described by one commentator, echoing the views of the dissenting judges in 
ADI,
38
 as having a ‘distinctly dubious doctrinal provenance’,39 having never before been cited in 
the court’s Art.10 jurisprudence or in the recent ECtHR decisions on restrictions to political 
advertising and free expression. For all eight dissenting judges to the decision, the conclusion 
was particularly alarming because the UK’s ban was viewed to be even wider than that which 
was held to violate Art.10 in a case against Switzerland,
40
  again resulting in concerns over 
equality before the law.
41
 Five of the dissenters perceived ‘the almost inescapable 
conclusion ...that an essentially identical “general prohibition” on “political advertising” ...is not 
necessary in Swiss democratic society, but is proportionate and a fortiori necessary in the 
democratic society of the United Kingdom’.42 This conclusion amounted to a ‘double standard 
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within the context of a Convention whose minimum standards should be equally applicable 
throughout all the States parties to it’.43 Commentators have raised the same concerns. English 
takes the view that ‘there are no convincing reasons given in this whole ruling why the UK 
challenge received such different treatment’,44 while Lewis points out that ‘states like 
Switzerland, Norway and Denmark, all of which reformed their systems in order to comply with 
the earlier Strasbourg rulings, might feel aggrieved at the Grand Chamber’s apparent U-turn’.45  
 In relation to whole life tariffs, similar concerns have been voiced over the shift by 
ECtHR between its Vinter
46
 and Hutchinson judgments, to the effect that UK law was held – and 
then not held – to violate Art.3 following the protestations of the Court of Appeal. In Vinter, the 
Grand Chamber had ruled that ‘...for a life sentence to remain compatible with Article 3, there 
must be both a prospect of release and a possibility of review’.47 Thus, it reasoned that persons 
subject to whole life terms should be entitled to know the conditions for release and the time 
when a review can be sought.
48
 Applying this reasoning to the whole life tariffs regime in 
England and Wales, the Grand Chamber was critical of the ‘lack of clarity’49 in the relevant law. 
It accepted that a ministerial power to release whole life prisoners on compassionate grounds
50
 
was itself subject to Art.3 principles under s.6 HRA,
51
 requiring all public authorities to act 
compatibly with Convention rights. However, it noted that the policy document containing the 
criteria
52
 for such release made no statement to this effect. Consequently, those subject to whole 
life tariffs had ‘only a partial picture’53 of the conditions which would prompt the exercise of the 
power to release on compassionate grounds. On this basis, the Court found a violation of Art.3. 
However, in the subsequent Court of Appeal case of R v McLoughlin,
54
 a specially convened 
five-judge panel, led by the Lord Chief Justice, openly declared: ‘We disagree. In our view, the 
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domestic law … is clear’.55 English law, properly explained, did in fact provide for the 
possibility of release. The absence of the Art.3 avenue for review from the guidance for releasing 
prisoners on compassionate grounds, while of ‘real consequence’56 to the Grand Chamber’s 
decision, it was ‘as a matter of law, ...of no consequence’.57 Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal 
sought to make the law regarding the potential release of whole life prisoners clear.
58
 It reiterated 
that the power to release prisoners on compassionate grounds was itself subject to Art.3, and that 
the ‘exceptional circumstances’ in which it would be exercised could be clarified by the domestic 
courts, case-by-case. When the issue subsequently returned to the ECtHR in Hutchinson, a 
majority at the Chamber level observed that the Court of Appeal had ‘expressly responded to the 
concerns detailed in Vinter’59 and found no violation of Art.3. When the case was relinquished to 
the Grand Chamber, this was affirmed 14:3. Observing that ‘the primary responsibility for 
protecting the rights set out in the Convention lies with the domestic authorities’,60 it was held 
that ‘the Court of Appeal responded explicitly to the Vinter critique’,61 and ‘brought clarity as to 
the content of the relevant domestic law, resolving the discrepancy identified in the Vinter 
judgment’.62 Again, however, this drew sharp dissenting judgments. Judge Pinto de Albuquerque 
expressed severe doubts as to whether anything had been clarified by the Court of Appeal’s 
judgment.
63
 In his view, the majority was ‘pretend[ing] that a future clarification of the law is 
capable of remedying its present lack of clarity and certainty and thus the violation that exists 
today’.64 Consequently, there was a risk that ‘the dialogue between courts risks becoming two 
parallel monologues until one of them gives up’.65 
A further case of note, discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, was the Supreme Court case of 
Haney.
66
 In this post-Horncastle case, the court rejected the conclusion of the ECtHR in James
67
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that the continued detention of prisoners subject to indeterminate sentences for public protection 
beyond the original tariff would be unlawful and contrary to Art.5(1) where rehabilitative 
assistance and an opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation had not been provided. The Supreme 
Court felt that a more sensible angle in such instances would be to provide a remedy in damages, 
implicit within Art.5 as a whole, so as to avoid the danger of having to release persons whose 
safety to the public had not been established.
68
 When the case reached the ECtHR, in the 
admissibility decision of Kaiyam v United Kingdom,
69
 it considered in detail the critique by the 
Supreme Court.
70
 On the one hand, the Court explicitly refused to modify or discredit its own 
approach, instead passing the buck to the Committee of Ministers to ‘determine ...whether the 
UK has properly implemented the judgment in James within its domestic legal order’.71 The 
Court simply applied its own approach, as established in James, based on Art.5(1) and not the 
Supreme Court’s approach, confining itself to the remark that ‘...the test applied by this Court ... 
might be said to be more stringent that the approach applied by the Supreme Court’.72   
 3.3 The Influence of the Political Climate 
 The concern with the fluctuations across the cases discussed is that they convey the 
impression of the ECtHR playing judicial politics, acting upon discretion rather than legal 
principle and prioritising its relationship with certain states over others. This impression has 
arguably been exacerbated by the apparent salience given to the political climate towards the 
ECtHR within the UK when those dialogues have taken place, during a time of heightened 
discussion of the legitimacy of the ECtHR’s influence within the UK. 
 Redmayne therefore ponders whether the Grand Chamber’s conclusion in Al-Khawaja, 
decided in 2012, was the product of a political compromise, in particular whether ‘a hard line 
reiteration of the sole or decisive rule was watered down to avoid antagonising the UK at a time when 
there is much talk of the problems of the Human Rights Act’.73  In even graver terms, Hoyano asks 
whether, in this instance, ‘...the Grand Chamber sacrificed principle to juridical, and possibly 
political, expediency, under the guise of judicial comity’.74 Likewise, noting that the slim 9:8 
majority which carried the decision in ADI was decided in 2012, Lewis suggests that the majority 
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may have been ‘desperate’75 to reach its decision in light of the ‘famously hostile reaction 
amongst the British political classes and media to the ECtHR’s judgment in Hirst’.76 Again, 
numerous commentators have expressed similar unease at the ECtHR’s decision in Hutchinson 
on whole life tariffs. Holcroft-Emmess notes that the decision arrived at a time when the 
Strasbourg court was ‘particularly vulnerable’,77 with the dialogue between the courts having 
‘played out in the shadow of political contentions to renegotiate the UK’s relationship with the 
ECtHR’.78 In equally strong terms, Pettigrew argues that Hutchinson ‘appears to be more of a 
response to hard line domestic politics than a continuation of holistic legal principle which the 
ECtHR has outwardly supported in the past’.79 
 Such revisions by the ECtHR in the name of judicial dialogue and accommodation have 
raised concerns of Strasbourg ‘losing its nerve’80 and capitulating under sustained criticism. 
Madsen observes that an ‘...unsolved balance between national and European human rights 
law’81 is creating ‘a new uncertainty in the system where the Court seems to be seeking the 
approval of the constituencies’.82 There is, he notes, a ‘new fragility’83 in the ECHR system to 
which the ECtHR is responding: ‘...the rights-oriented jurisprudence that became the Court’s 
trademark in the late 1970s is being supplemented, or replaced, by new forms of strategic judging 
reminiscent of the legal diplomacy of the early ECtHR’.84 
 In slightly different terms, Fenwick has plausibly asked whether the court has adopted an 
‘appeasement approach’85 towards certain states, retracting previous decisions with the aim of 
allaying criticisms of interventionism, ‘...revisiting the ‘true’ scope of the ECHR in a more 
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deferential spirit’.86 The same concerns are voiced by Dzehtsiarou, who questions whether there 
is a growing propensity of the ECtHR to engage in a ‘game of courts’:87 
Is the European Court of Human Rights a strategic actor that can sacrifice certain 
achievements in certain areas of human rights protection in order to save the 
“Strasbourg project”? … [O]ne can wonder what price the Court should and is 
prepared to pay to have the UK on board.
88
 
On the basis of these concerns, it may be that in its efforts to legitimise its decisions in the UK 
through dialogue with the national courts, the ECtHR risks facing a disposition to disobey from 
other national authorities across the Council of Europe. As discussed in Chapter 6, concern over 
double standards and preferential treatment was explicitly identified in Çalı, Koch and Bruch’s 
interview-based study as affecting the legitimacy of the ECtHR among elite political, legal and 
judicial actors in countries such as Turkey which make up a significantly larger proportion of the 
ECtHR case load.
89
  
 Along with the criticism from politicians and the media, what presents is ‘a double 
assault on the integrity of the Strasbourg-based system of human rights’.90 Dzehtsiarou et al 
argue that ‘[t]he constant questioning of the Court’s judgments undermines its authority. Erosion 
of the legitimacy of the ECtHR may become unstoppable. This process takes time, but it is hard 
to reverse and its ultimate result can be damning: rendering the Council of Europe obsolete’.91 
These very themes have recently surfaced in the dissenting opinion of Judge Pinto de 
Albuquerque in the Grand Chamber decision in Hutchinson, with which Judge Sajó, acting as 
ECtHR President on this occasion, agreed. In no uncertain terms, he argued that the ECtHR is 
facing an ‘existential crisis’92 in view its ‘retreat’,93 ‘regression’94 and ‘reversal’95 of positions in 
numerous cases involving the UK, and the fact that it was ‘still suffering from the ongoing Hirst 
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saga on the voting rights of prisoners’,96 which had manifested in an ‘unfortunate spill over effect 
... on the Russian courts’.97 The ruling by the majority that whole life tariffs under UK law were 
compatible with Art.3, in his view, had ‘seismic consequences ... for Europe’.98 It was ‘a peak in 
a growing trend towards downgrading the role of the Court before certain domestic jurisdictions, 
with the serious risk that the Convention is applied with double standards’,99  raising the 
‘probability of deleterious consequences for the entire European system of human-rights 
protection ... heightened by the current political environment, which shows an increasing 
hostility to the Court’.100 Judge Pinto de Albuquerque was explicit in his concern about the 
potential for a growing disposition to disobey. In light of way that the ECtHR had responded to 
domestic judicial criticism from the UK, he considered that ‘Domestic authorities in all member 
States will be tempted to pick and choose their own “rare occasions”101 when they are not 
pleased with a certain judgment or decision of the Court in order to evade their international 
obligation to implement it’.102 In his view, this had significant ramifications for the legitimacy of 
the ECtHR as a legal body: 
If the Court goes down this road, it will end up as a non-judicial commission of 
highly qualified and politically legitimised 47 experts, which does not deliver 
binding judgments, at least with regard to certain Contracting Parties, but 
pronounces mere recommendations on “what it would be desirable” for domestic 
authorities to do, acting in an mere auxiliary capacity, in order to “aid” them in 
fulfilling their statutory and international obligations...
103
 
3. The Future 
In light of the above critique, it is useful to consider the possible directions that the dialogue 
between the UK courts and the ECtHR might take in future. During the interviews with the 
Justices, there was a general feeling that it has developed as far as it will – in short, peak dialogue 
has been reached. One Justice opined: ‘I think that the dialogue has progressed probably as far as 
it can do and I would be hard-pressed to think of any way in which we could enhance it’.104 
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Similarly, another Justice commented: ‘I don’t think that there’s anything we can do by way of 
changing our methods to produce greater harmony with Strasbourg’.105 It is reasonable to 
suggest, however, that the future of the relationship between these courts is deeply uncertain. 
Three possible developments are worth considering: the now resurgent common law, Protocol 16 
ECHR and the prospect of the HRA being repealed.    
 3.1 The Common Law Resurgence  
 On the subject of the resurgent common law, several Justices stressed that their aim was 
not for common law analysis to completely supplant analysis of the Strasbourg jurisprudence but, 
consistently with the reasoning in Osborn, a ‘fusion’106 of the common law and Convention 
rights in domestic human rights adjudication.
107
 One Justice, however, indicated a slight feeling 
of unease as to the future direction of travel: 
... we’ve got to be careful not to detach ourselves too much from Strasbourg. Life 
seems to be full of pendulums. We’ve probably been too slavishly following 
Strasbourg. What I’m worried about is that the reaction will end up with us being 
too independent, and I would like to stop at some midpoint if we could.
108 
These words proved prophetic, with said pendulum swinging significantly in the direction of the 
common law. Two examples merit attention here. The first is noted by Gearty.
109
 The case of O 
(A Child) v Rhodes
110
 concerned a challenge to prevent the publication of a book by a famous 
pianist. Despite the relevance of Art.10 ECHR, the issue was dealt with almost exclusively at 
common law, and neither the HRA nor a single Strasbourg decision is mentioned in the 
judgment.
111
 A second example is the case of R (Ingenious Media Holdings) v HMRC.
112
 This 
raised the question of whether HMRC officials had acted unlawfully by disclosing tax 
information concerning a media company to a journalistic investigation into tax avoidance. Both 
the High Court and the Court of Appeal deemed it necessary to consider whether the disclosures 
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breached the right to privacy under Art.8 and the right to peaceful enjoyment of property under 
A1P1 ECHR. In both instances, the actions were deemed to be proportionate interferences with 
both rights. When the case reached the Supreme Court, however, it was lamented that ‘the courts 
below were not referred (or were only scarcely referred) to the common law of 
confidentiality’.113 By unanimous judgment the court held that the disclosures by HMRC had 
breached the common law requirements of confidentiality, which applied equally to public 
officials as to private actors.
114
 Here, neither Strasbourg nor domestic case law concerning 
Convention rights, or indeed the rights themselves, was mentioned.  
 One possible consequence of this shift is a loss of influence by the UK courts on the 
judgments of the ECtHR. If it is the case that the explicit engagement and analysis by the UK 
courts of the Strasbourg case law has been instrumental in their influence upon the reasoning of 
the ECtHR, as the interviews with the Strasbourg judges seemed to suggest, it might be that this 
trend will diminish their influence somewhat. Rhodes in particular saw the Supreme Court 
preferring a nineteenth century case to the Strasbourg case law.
115
 Lord Justice Sales has argued 
that where the UK courts make it apparent to the ECtHR that they are adopting their own, 
distinct interpretation of Convention rights, rather than finding the same meaning as the ECtHR,  
‘...it would be only too easy for [the ECtHR] to avoid confronting the domestic case law when 
making its own rulings under the ECHR’.116 Given that the UK courts in the above instances are 
largely prioritising consideration of the common law, on Sales’ view it might be even easier for 
the ECtHR to avoid confronting their arguments. More fundamentally, the extent to which this 
development can successfully offer the means to confer legitimacy on the judicial protection of 
fundamental rights at the domestic level, in the absence of the kind of mandate provided by the 
HRA, remains to be seen.
117
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 3.2 Protocol 16 – The ‘Protocol of Dialogue’118 
A second consideration for the future of the relationship between these courts is Protocol 
16 ECHR. Drafted in the follow-up from the Brighton Conference and its accompanying 
Declaration, in which further dialogue between national courts and the ECtHR was explicitly 
welcomed and encouraged,
119
 this optional measure offers a formalised procedure, similar to the 
preliminary reference under Art.267 TFEU, by which a national court can request directly a non-
binding,
120
 ‘advisory opinion’ from the ECtHR ‘on questions of principle relating to the 
interpretation or application’121 of ECHR rights. The courts involved in this procedure are 
required to give reasons at every stage: the national courts, when requesting an opinion;
122
 the 
ECtHR, when issuing its advisory opinion
123
 or, conversely, when refusing a request.
124
 
Concerns, however, have been expressed over its workability and the extent to which it would 
exacerbate, rather than alleviate, difficulties arising from the ECtHR’s backlog of cases.125 The 
UK Coalition Government in 2013 made clear its desire to observe how the procedure operates in 
those states that have ratified it.
126
 However, given that the measure has not obtained the required 
ten signatures required to enter into force, the present government seems unlikely to ratify the 
protocol in the near future.  
 3.3 Repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998 
 The final consideration is the future of the HRA 1998. The commitment of the UK 
Conservative Party to repeal and substitute this legislation with a ‘British Bill of Rights’ is long-
standing.
127
 It has been observed that the result of the UK’s referendum on its membership of the 
European Union may well give fresh impetus for the UK government to push ahead with this 
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plan.
128
 Recent government statements indicate this to be the case.
129
 While the contents of such 
a Bill have not been made clear, what is apparent is that the s.2 HRA duty on UK courts to ‘take 
into account’ judgments of the ECtHR will be repealed either entirely or replaced by an 
alternative,
130
 given the criticism specifically directed at that provision. It is difficult to say how 
this change will be interpreted by the courts. It is clear from the domestic case law that it is not 
simply the s.2 duty that compels the UK courts to adhere closely to the standards set by the case 
law of the ECtHR. As seen in Chapter 3, they place considerable weight on the presumption that 
Parliament is intended to act compatibly with its international obligations. Thus, any 
modification or replacement will be construed on that basis for as long as the UK remains an 
ECHR member state. A further point to consider is how this would impact on informal dialogue 
between the courts. As seen in Chapter 5, the UK judges insist on an autonomous relationship 
with the judges of the ECtHR. It therefore seems unlikely that they would accept such a 
provision as an indication that Strasbourg judges are to be kept at arms-length and that their face-
to-face exchanges should become less frequent.   
4. Final Thoughts 
Quoted in the heading to this chapter are the words of the former ECtHR President, Dean 
Spielmann, who describes dialogue between the national courts and the ECtHR as ‘a necessity, a 
corrective and an incentive’131 in the performance of their ‘common task’132 of protecting human 
rights in Europe – the ‘golden key’133 to its future. Another ECtHR judge, Julia Laffranque, 
however, has added: ‘a key is not enough; one also needs to know how to use this key’.134  
                                                          
128
 Gearty, On Fantasy Island (n 14) xiii 
129
 Danny Shaw, ‘Justice Secretary Liz Truss casts doubt on prison reforms’ (BBC News, 7 September 2016) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-37298415> accessed 10 December 2016; Christopher Hope, ‘Theresa May to 
fight 2020 election on plans to take Britain out of European Convention on Human Rights after Brexit is 
completed’ (The Telegraph 28 December 2016) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/28/theresa-may-
fight-2020-election-plans-take-britain-european/> accessed 10 Jan 2017 
130
 One suggestion for such an alternative reads as follows:  
‘A court or tribunal which is concerned with the interpretation and application of the constitutional rights may, 
in so far as it considers it relevant, take into account as persuasive authority decisions on provisions in treaties 
affecting the United Kingdom of, 
(a) the European Court of Human Rights; 
(b) the European Court of Justice; 
(c) other international courts; 
but in each such case shall be at liberty to express disagreement with the decisions of such courts.’ Anthony 
Speaight, ‘Mechanisms of a UK Bill of Rights’ in Commission on a UK Bill of Rights, A UK Bill of Rights? The 
Choice Before Us (Volume 1, December 2012) 267 
131
 Spielmann (n 1)  
132
 ibid 
133
 ibid 
134
 Speech by Judge Julia Laffranque in European Court of Human Rights, International and National Courts 
Confronting Large-scale Violations of Human Rights (Dialogue between Judges, Council of Europe 2016) 7 
239 
 
 This thesis has offered a qualitative, interview-based study of how judges in the UK and 
at the ECtHR understand the dialogue between their courts. It has developed a judicially-
informed account of this dialogue using the perspectives of those at its centre. Combining these 
direct insights with analysis of case law and contributions from political and legal theory, the 
thesis has explored the ways in which the UK courts and the ECtHR use the ‘golden key’ of 
dialogue as a means of conferring legitimacy on their respective judgments at a time of 
considerable challenge. It has observed that its various manifestations – judgment-based 
interactions, of a conflictual and consensual nature, and informal meetings between the judges – 
embody mutual participation, mutual accountability and the ongoing revision and refinement of 
judicial reasoning, each of which can confer legitimacy on the judgments of the courts, both in 
respect of one another and on the part of their UK audiences. The participatory dimension allows 
for the application and development of co-constructed norms, driven in part from the national 
level, as opposed to external impositions. Through accountability, there are meaningful checks in 
place rather than a supreme judicial power. Through revision, there is a demonstrable willingness 
at the supranational level to adapt, accommodate and strengthen the applicable principles in a 
way which is more accommodating of different legal and constitutional traditions. Dialogue is 
part of a wider effort to legitimise the Convention system and the courts enforcing it through a 
strengthening domestic judicial role, increasing the subsidiary nature of the relationship between 
the national and the supranational, on the one hand, and stressing the distinctness of the 
autonomy and identity of the domestic courts, on the other. In these ways, there has been a 
considerable effort to challenge and dilute the notion that the application of rights domestically is 
an imposition from afar. On the basis of these arguments, the ‘golden key’ to the future 
protection of human rights in Europe has a clear, legitimising role to play. 
 This chapter, however, has shown its limits. It has examined the growing concerns with 
the cumulative effects of judicial dialogue in the form of disagreement by national courts with 
the judgments of the ECtHR for the legitimacy of the Convention system. There is clearly a 
greater willingness on the part of the UK courts to depart from aspects of the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence in the interests of dialogue. At the same time, there is a discernible effort to 
accommodate those positions at the ECtHR, even going against the tide of its recent 
jurisprudence to do so, and occasionally manifesting in what are considered to be transparent 
attempts to maintain the consent of the national authorities. There is a growing anxiousness that 
this diplomacy risks promoting a disposition to disobedience towards the ECtHR on the part of 
other national authorities across the Council of Europe. Both the domestic and supranational 
judicial tendencies described are thought to convey the application of Convention principles at 
240 
 
both levels to be a matter of discretion and not law, weakening their prescriptive power, 
encouraging others to follow suit and risking their resentment where the ECtHR declines to make 
similar concessions. It is clear that some ECHR Member States (and their courts) are in a 
powerful enough position (and the ECtHR in a vulnerable enough position) to effectively 
negotiate the terms of their compliance. If negotiated compliance becomes widespread, however, 
it seems that the risk of passing a tipping point into a full-blown legitimation crisis would be 
brought closer. This perhaps underlines the fragility which has been noted in the international 
human rights landscape, from which dialogue has arisen and to which it can only be a partial, and 
carefully circumscribed, response. It unfolds in a space in which the line between legitimisation 
and de-legitimisation is a fine one. While the processes appear to offer a useful legitimising tool 
for both courts, the potential legitimacy challenges which their use creates should not be ignored 
if the judges do not wish to imperil the common cause of which the former President of the 
ECtHR spoke. 
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Appendix 1 
Ethical Considerations 
Ethical Approval  
Ethical approval for this study, including a proposal to interview Supreme Court Justices, was 
granted by the Research Ethics Committee of Cardiff University’s School of Law and Politics in 
February 2014. Following the decision to expand the remit of the research to include interviews 
with ECtHR judges, additional approval was sought from the Committee and granted in May 
2015 on the basis of a fresh research ethics application. There are no ethical issues in this project 
arising from the use of published materials, such as academic publications, statutes and case law. 
The main ethical considerations arise from the interviews conducted with the judges of the two 
courts.  
Judicial Independence 
A principal issue for this study was the need to protect the participating judges’ independence, 
particularly given the highly topical nature of the UK’s relationship with the ECHR and the 
European Court of Human Rights. This was addressed in a number of ways. First, in order to 
secure the participation of the UK Supreme Court Justices, it was necessary to make a formal 
application to the Judicial Office (JO). As required by the JO, the application had to state why the 
project was in the public interest, why judicial participation was essential, how judicial 
independence would be preserved, the extent of the burden which would be placed on the judges 
by their engagement with the research, and the extent to which confidentiality would be 
maintained. This application process is subject to a two-tier approval: permission is required 
from both the JO and the head of the judicial branch from which judges are sought for research 
purposes. The stringency of this process helped to ensure that the participation of the Justices 
would not undermine their independence. In accordance with the JO’s guidelines, the judges 
were not asked about the merits of pending cases or to comment on more overtly political issues 
such as the UK’s membership of the ECHR. The application and participant information sheets 
made plain to the judges that they would be identified only by their professional affiliation in the 
write-up of the research, that they would be free to withdraw from the study at any time, without 
giving a reason, and that any direct quotes from the interviews would be used in any subsequent 
publications only with their express permission. This thesis is therefore subject to a temporary 
bar on access until the participating judges have signalled their consent to the quotations 
used.   
 In contrast to the UK Supreme Court, the ECtHR does not have a formal gatekeeper for 
researchers seeking to interview its judges. Prospective participants were thus informally 
approached by one of the project supervisors. After the prospective participants had expressed 
their willingness to discuss the research project, they were sent a formal invitation to participate, 
including detailed information about the research, interview questions and consent forms. While 
a formal gatekeeper was absent, the conditions detailed in the previous paragraph were replicated 
to ensure that judicial independence was maintained.  
 Inevitably, given the nature of the topic, there were points during some interviews where 
the judges felt that they might be straying too far into political territory and provided a clear 
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indication to that effect. Those sections of the interviews therefore do not appear in this thesis, 
nor have they been relied on in any way. 
Confidentiality 
Each of the judges interviewed and quoted in this thesis is anonymised with the exception of 
their professional affiliation as judges of either the UKSC or ECtHR.  
Data Protection Issues and Consent 
In accordance with Cardiff University’s Data Protection Advice for Researchers and the Data 
Protection Act 1998, electronic copies of the interview data were stored on the encrypted 
university servers and a password-locked memory stick.  Hard copies were stored in a locked 
draw on university premises. An information sheet and consent form was issued to the 
participants prior to the interviews taking place detailing information to this effect. Informed and 
written consent was then obtained from each of the participants before the interviews were 
conducted, as required by the DPA 1998, the SLSA’s (Socio-Legal Studies Association) 
Principles of Ethical Research Practice and Cardiff University’s Research Integrity and Code of 
Practice. 
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Appendix 2  
Consent Form (UKSC Interviews) 
 
Judicial Dialogue between the UK and Strasbourg: Perspectives from the UK Supreme 
Court 
Interview Consent Form 
 Initials 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the 
information sheet for the above study. I have 
had the opportunity to consider the information, 
ask questions and have had these answered 
satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is 
voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time, without giving a reason.  
 
3. I agree to take part in this study and for the 
interview to be recorded and transcribed.  
 
 
Name of participant: ............................................................................................................................................................ 
Signature of participant: .................................................................................................................................................... 
Date: ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 
 
Name of researcher: ......................................................................................................................................................... 
Signature of researcher: ................................................................................................................................................ 
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Appendix 3 
Consent Forms (ECtHR Interviews) 
 
Judicial ‘Dialogue’ between the UK and Strasbourg: An Examination of the 
Legitimising Potential 
Participant Consent Form 
  
Initials 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and 
understood the participant information 
sheet for the above study. I have had 
the opportunity to consider the 
information, ask questions and have 
these questions answered 
satisfactorily. 
 
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is 
voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving a 
reason.  
 
 
3. I agree to take part in this study and 
for the interview to be recorded and 
transcribed.  
 
 
 
4. I consent to the opinions and views 
which I express being used in the 
research, subject to the conditions 
outlined above.  
 
 
 
Name of participant (please print): 
Signature of participant:  
Date:  
Name of researcher:  
Signature of researcher:   
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Appendix 4  
Interview Guide (UKSC Interviews) 
1. Concept 
 
a. The term ‘judicial dialogue’ has been used in a variety of ways within the academic literature, 
judicial lectures and court decisions, so I’d like to begin by simply asking: what is your 
understanding of the term?  
 
b. Do you have any examples of judicial dialogue between the UK and Strasbourg courts?  
 
c. In a lecture last November, Lady Hale commented that the only two ‘really good’ examples of 
judicial dialogue between the UK courts and the ECtHR stemmed from the respective decisions 
of the House of Lords and Supreme Court in Animal Defenders and Horncastle. Do you share 
that assessment?  
 
d. Do you think the decision in the Cheshire West case is a good example of judicial dialogue 
between the courts? 
 
e. Do you think that dialogue between the courts existed before the Human Rights Act 1998? 
(Yes – can you think of any examples?) 
 
 
2. Appraisal  
 
a. Which courts from the UK do you think should engage in the dialogue?  
 
b. In what ways can the UK courts and ECtHR create a dialogue with one another? 
 
c. Do you think the courts could reach a modus vivendi over a particular issue?  
 
d. What factors would influence it?  
 
e. Which do you think is the most effective?  
 
f. Are there any potential disadvantages to judicial dialogue between the courts?  
 
g. Do you think that the margin of appreciation in a given area affects the scope for dialogue 
between the courts? If so, how?  
 
h. Thinking of the controversy surrounding the ECtHR’s decisions in such decisions as Hirst and 
Vinter, do you think that there is now an expectation that a thorough judicial dialogue takes place 
between the UK courts and the ECtHR before a wider constitutional dialogue takes place, either 
between the UK courts and Parliament or Strasbourg and Parliament?  
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3. Future  
 
a. Do you agree that there has been a resurgence of the common law in human rights adjudication 
in the UK? Do you think this will influence in any way the dialogue with the ECtHR? 
 
b. Do you think that the legislative repeal of the duty on UK courts to ‘take into account’ 
judgments of the Strasbourg court would have an impact on the scope for dialogue between the 
courts? (If so, how? / If not, why?) 
 
c. What are your views regarding Protocol 16 to the European Convention on Human Rights? 
(Would it enhance the interactions between the courts in any way?) 
 
d. In 2010, Lord Bingham remarked that his hope that a ‘constructive dialogue’ would develop 
between the courts had been ‘partly’ realised. Do you think that assessment still applies? If so, 
how could a dialogue between the courts be fully realised?  
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Appendix 5  
Interview Guide (ECtHR Interviews) 
1. Concept 
Could you summarise your understanding of judicial dialogue between this court and the courts 
of Member States? 
 
2. Face-to-face meetings between ECtHR judges and judges of Member State courts 
History 
The Annual Reports of this court show that bilateral meetings between judges of this court and 
judges of Member State courts have been taking place for many years. Do you know when such 
meetings first began taking place?  
What do you believe was the impetus behind the earlier meetings?  
The Annual Reports of this court and the UK Supreme Court suggest that bilateral meetings 
between their respective judges only started taking place relatively recently. Do you have any 
thoughts on why these meetings began much later than meetings with other Member State 
courts?  
Procedure 
Have you ever been part of a delegation to visit the judges of a particular Member State, or been 
involved in the reception of such judges visiting the Strasbourg court?  
How are the meetings arranged?  
Which members of this court will usually be present at the meetings? Would a delegation to the 
UK, for example, typically involve judges from the Fourth Section? 
Do the meetings have a chair?  
Do the meetings have a set agenda? If so, who is responsible for setting it?  
Are minutes taken at the meetings?  
Are the meetings ever concluded with agreed actions? Are there any follow-ups to the meetings?  
 
Substantive 
What issues are typically discussed during these meetings? 
263 
 
When I interviewed the UK Supreme Court Justices, several of them remarked that their 
meetings with judges of this court tend to be characterised by very open and frank discussions. 
Would you agree with that assessment? Have you experienced, or are you aware of, any 
examples of particularly frank exchanges with judges of national courts?  
Do you think such meetings have an impact on the decision-making of this court or the domestic 
courts?  
The President of this Court, Dean Spielmann, has spoken about how a recent bilateral meeting 
between this court and judges of the French Court of Cassation led to an agreement to establish a 
network of shared case-law. Any you aware of any other practical developments that have 
emerged from such meetings?  
 
3. Dialogue through judgments 
Do you think ‘dialogue’ is a suitable metaphor to describe the way in which this court and the 
courts of Member States interact through their judgments?  
What do you feel are the key advantages in this court and the courts of Member States 
exchanging opinions through their judgments?  
The Horncastle / Al-Khawaja exchange concerning the admissibility of hearsay evidence in 
criminal trials between the UK Supreme Court and this court is often cited as the cardinal 
example of judicial dialogue. What do you think is the best example of an exchange between this 
court and the courts of a Member State?  
In their partly dissenting opinion to the Grand Chamber decision of Al-Khawaja, Judge Sajó and 
Judge Karakaş expressed concern that the approach of the majority was ‘... a matter of gravest 
concern for the future of the judicial protection of human rights in Europe’. Are there any 
examples of dialogue with national courts which give you similar concerns?  
In what circumstances do you believe it is right for this court to modify its approach in the face 
of domestic judicial criticism?  
Would you agree that the judgments of courts in certain Member States are more influential on 
this court than others? If so, do you think this is in any way a problem? 
Do you think it is desirable that national courts explicitly analyse the case-law of this court when 
adjudicating on human rights? 
In a number of cases against the United Kingdom, this court has drawn support for its 
conclusions from minority / dissenting judgments at the domestic level. Do you think dissenting 
judicial views at the domestic level are generally helpful to this court in reaching its view as to 
the proper interpretation of a Convention right? 
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4. The future of judicial dialogue within the ECHR system 
Are you aware of the so-called common law ‘resurgence’ taking place within human rights 
adjudication in the UK? Do you have any thoughts on it? 
Critics of this court often call its legitimacy into question. Do you think dialogue with national 
courts, whether through meetings or judgments, enhances the legitimacy of this court’s 
decisions?  
Do you think Protocol 16 – the ‘Protocol of dialogue’ – could further improve the legitimacy of 
this court’s decisions?  
 
